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FOREWORD
We cannot accept the continued horrific violence 
against civilians across the conflicts of our genera-
tion. International Humanitarian Law, designed to 
protect civilians from the worst horrors of war, has 
been abandoned by parties to conflict. Civilians 
have been forced to protect themselves and their 
families. Discussions of “safe zones” and “humani-
tarian spaces” have become frequent among actors 
who are desperate to enable protection for be-
sieged populations.
In recent years in South Sudan, over 200,000 
civilians sought refuge in the bases of the UN 
peacekeeping mission. This was unprecedented in 
the history of peacekeeping and humanitarian 
action. Although imperfect, these “protection of 
civilians” sites most probably saved tens of thou-
sands of lives at the start of the war. The long and 
controversial history of “safe havens” and “protect-
ed sites” from Bosnia to Rwanda also shows that 
while the hosting of IDP camps inside UN bases 
may be new, the trend of IDPs seeking UN protec-
tion during times of violence is not – indeed, it has 
historical precedent and the debates have been 
many.
With violence against civilians continuing to 
haunt many current crises, the international 
community must anticipate that such sites may 
emerge in the future – including inside UN bases. 
Today there are UN peacekeeping missions in 16 
countries, and internal conflicts in many more. 
Now is the time for humanitarians and peacekeep-
ers to learn the lessons of the past and prepare for 
protected sites that could emerge in the future. 
Humanitarians and peacekeepers in places like the 
Central African Republic, Mali, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo cannot wait until 
civilians are flooding into peacekeeping bases to 
begin developing plans.
This publication is a first step in enabling the 
humanitarian and peacekeeping communities to 
be better prepared for future protection of civil-
ians (POC) sites. It reflects on the experiences of 
the POC sites in South Sudan, but is designed for 
humanitarians and peacekeepers working in other 
crises and at the policy level. It challenges actors to 
think critically about the complex issues that 
emerge inside and around protected sites. It 
provides suggestions and lessons that emerged 
from South Sudan.
Humanitarians and peacekeepers in South Sudan 
did a commendable job coping with a crisis of an 
unprecedented nature. The operational, legal, and 
moral challenges they faced were immense, and 
nevertheless, humanitarians and peacekeepers 
showed resolve in improving conditions for 
civilians. It is my hope that we will all learn from 
the experiences of these committed individuals 
and use this to guide our responses in the future.
Jan Egeland 
Secretary General of  
the Norwegian Refugee Council
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ACRONYMS
 CCCM  Camp Coordination and  
Camp Management
 CWG Community Watch Group
 DDR  Disarmament, Demobilization, 
and Reintegration
 DPA  UN Department of Political 
Affairs
 DPKO   UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations
 DSRSG  Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary General
 DSS  Department of Safety and Security
 FPU  Formed Police Unit
 FRAGO Fragmentary Order
 GBV Gender-Based Violence
 HC Humanitarian Coordinator
 HCT Humanitarian Country Team
 HRDDP  UN Human Rights Due  
Diligence Policy
 HRP  Humanitarian Response Plan
 ICRC  International Committee of  
the Red Cross
 ICWG Inter-Cluster Working Group
 IDP  Internally Displaced Person
 IMDRM  Informal Mitigation and Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism
 IOM  International Organization of 
Migration
 J9  UNMISS Force Civil Military 
Coordination section
 JOC  Joint Operations Center
 NGO  Non-governmental organization
 OCHA  Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs
 POC   Protection of Civilians
 QIPs Quick Impact Projects
 RRP  Recovery, Reintegration,  
and Peacebuilding section
 SOFA   Status of Forces Agreement
 SOP Standard Operating Procedure
 SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army
 SRSG  Special Representative of the 
Secretary General
 TCC Troop Contributing Country
 TOB Temporary Operating Base
 TOR Terms of Reference
 UNAMID  United Nations Assistance  
Mission in Darfur
 UNAMIR  United Nations Assistance  
Mission in Rwanda
 UNHCR  United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees
 UNMAS  United Nations Mine Action 
Service
 UNMISS   United Nations Mission  
in South Sudan
 UNPOL United Nations Police
 UNPROFOR  United Nations Protection  
Force (in Croatia and Bosnia  
and Herzegovina)
 USD United States Dollars
 WAM  Weapons and Ammunition 
Management
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Throughout the history of United Nations (UN) 
peacekeeping, civilians have sought protection 
with the UN during times of crisis. From the “safe 
areas” in Bosnia, to the “protected sites” in 
Rwanda, to the “protection of civilians sites” (POC 
sites) in South Sudan today, this trend has contin-
ued to develop and evolve over recent decades. In 
April 2015, the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) released a Policy on the 
Protection of Civilians in United Nations 
Peacekeeping, which for the first time stated that as 
a measure of last resort in in extremis situations, 
UN missions must be prepared to open their gates 
to protect civilians. The precedent set in South 
Sudan, combined with the inclusion of this lan-
guage in the global DPKO policy, means that there 
is a potential that such sites could emerge in future 
crises. In this context, it is imperative to learn 
from past experiences, particularly the ongoing 
response in the POC sites in South Sudan.
The objective of this publication is to examine the 
unique operational challenges and dilemmas 
associated with the POC site model, with the aim 
of drawing out lessons from South Sudan to help 
to inform future POC site responses. The publica-
tion begins by looking at the history of protected 
sites, from Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s, to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan 
in the 2000s, to South Sudan today. History shows 
that many of the peacekeeping missions charged 
with protecting such sites have encountered 
similar challenges – most notably, crippling 
resource and personnel constraints, and mandates 
that were not fit for purpose. Many missions were 
faced with the impossible task of having to protect 
sites without the means necessary to do so, which 
subsequent investigations found at times led to 
cases of peacekeepers potentially doing more harm 
than good.
The publication goes on to look at POC sites as we 
know them today, and argues that POC sites can 
be distinguished from traditional internally 
displaced person (IDP) camps in four main areas: 
the legal status of the sites and protection offered 
therein, how the sites are administered, the in-
tended purpose of the sites, and the freedom of 
movement associated with them. Recognizing that 
South Sudan is the first country to see long-term 
IDP camps emerge inside UN bases, the publica-
tion considers why POC sites may emerge in some 
countries but not others, and asks whether the 
presence of certain characteristics could make it 
possible to predict where a POC site might appear 
in the future.
Experiences from South Sudan show that the 
overlapping humanitarian and peacekeeping 
spaces inside POC sites can pose unique challeng-
es with regard to coordination. Having clearly 
delineated roles and responsibilities between 
humanitarian and peacekeeping actors is essential, 
as is the need to conduct joint, realistic planning 
based on most-likely and worst-case scenarios. 
Likewise, despite the challenges in doing so, 
maintaining distinction where possible is central 
to enabling both sets of actors to effectively carry 
out their mandates, as is having clearly agreed 
upon civil-military coordination mechanisms.
When POC sites first emerge, there is a risk that 
humanitarian and peacekeeping responses can 
become overly site-centric. As time progresses, 
however, both humanitarians and peacekeepers 
will need to carefully monitor the context inside 
and outside the POC sites, and triage responses 
based on greatest needs. Likewise, humanitarians 
and the UN mission will need to continuously 
rationalize the presence of personnel across the 
country to ensure that an appropriate balance is 
maintained between POC and non-POC site 
responses.
In considering the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance in contexts with POC sites, humanitari-
an actors are likely to face a number of challenges. 
First, humanitarians must recognize that POC 
sites pose unique constraints with regard to the 
availability of operating space. Humanitarians will 
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need to contextualize technical standards for 
services inside POC sites, and will benefit from 
gaining UN mission endorsement in order to 
streamline future decision-making. Second, 
humanitarians will need to consider whether 
services in POC sites will be provided on a blanket 
or targeted basis, and how this will compare to the 
approach outside POC sites. There may be a risk or 
perception that blanket services could create a pull 
or entrenchment factor – although evidence from 
South Sudan does not suggest that this is as 
significant an issue as many had feared.
Providing physical protection to civilians in 
contexts with POC sites is no easy task, and will 
require committed action from the UN Security 
Council, Troop and Police Contributing 
Countries, and mission leadership. Following the 
emergence of a POC site, the mission mandate will 
need to be quickly revised to reflect the new 
context, and both the mandate and operations 
may need to be adapted to reflect changes in the 
relationship with the government. The Security 
Council should ensure that the mission is provid-
ed with sufficient amounts of troops and resources 
(including key civilian staff), and must hold the 
mission accountable to fulfilling the mandate. 
Likewise, when state interference prevents the UN 
mission from implementing its mandate, this 
needs to be addressed at the highest levels. At 
country level, experiences from South Sudan have 
shown that developing localized protection of 
civilians response plans can be a useful tool, and 
regular trainings and rehearsals for peacekeepers 
and UN police are integral to the effectiveness of 
responses.
Like many IDP and refugee camps, POC sites are 
susceptible to militarization and loss of their 
civilian character. While the capacity to prevent 
militarization may be higher in POC sites than in 
traditional IDP camps due to the role of UN 
peacekeepers, the potential damage caused by 
militarization is also far greater and can have a 
considerable impact on the perception of the UN 
and humanitarians. In such settings, there is a 
need to first objectively establish the level of and 
reasons for militarization (if the sites already 
exist), and agree on a robust screening and disar-
mament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) 
procedure for new arrivals. Instituting a 
weapons-free zone and reinforced perimeter have 
proved useful in South Sudan to stem the flow of 
weapons into the sites, and could be considered in 
future operations. Policies will also need to be 
developed for how confiscated weapons will be 
managed, and it is strongly encouraged that the 
UN mission avoid handing weapons back to 
parties to the conflict.
The presence of thousands of people in congested 
camps creates an environment rife for crime and 
acts of aggression, and will require some form of 
rule of law to maintain stability. In the absence of 
an executive mandate, UN missions may find 
themselves in the uncomfortable position of 
having to try to uphold peace and security within 
a POC site without having the legal authority or 
resources necessary to do so. The publication looks 
at how this was managed in South Sudan (namely, 
through a combination of mediation mechanisms 
and the use of “holding facilities” for persons 
posing a serious threat), and considers lessons 
from these experiences as well as alternatives for 
how this could be managed in the future. Key 
concerns in South Sudan related to issues of due 
process, conditions for individuals in the “holding 
facilities,” and the need for greater consistency in 
how cases are managed.
POC site contexts also present a unique environ-
ment when considering approaches to protection. 
Humanitarians and peacekeepers have comple-
mentary, but distinct roles in supporting the safety 
and well-being of civilians, and differing mandates 
and priorities can at times place actors at odds 
with one another. Experiences from South Sudan 
highlight the importance of developing a humani-
tarian protection analysis and strategy that is 
independent of that of the UN mission. 
Humanitarians will need to be aware that the 
political elements of the UN mission’s mandate 
can influence their analysis and approach to 
protecting civilians, and should also recognize the 
potential for the “One-UN” framework to impact 
on how some UN humanitarian agencies engage.
Finally, POC sites are not a permanent solution for 
IDPs. Most IDPs would prefer to eventually leave 
the POC site and reestablish a life and livelihood 
in a more sustainable environment. Equally, UN 
missions may be eager to reclaim their bases and 
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relieve the strain created by providing static 
protection to large sites. Finding exit strategies 
and solutions for IDPs in POC sites is no easy task 
however: dynamics in IDPs’ pre-displacement 
locations may have changed and become prohibi-
tive to returns, and the experience of displacement 
may have altered some IDP’s preferences on where 
they would like to settle permanently. In consider-
ing solutions and exit strategies, it is important 
that humanitarians recognize that the principles 
that are fundamental to humanitarian approaches 
to solutions (namely that they must be voluntary, 
safe, dignified, and informed) may not be shared 
by the UN mission. This understanding will be 
critical in helping humanitarians determine how 
to engage with the mission and develop a strategy.
Experiences from South Sudan highlight a num-
ber of important considerations when designing 
an approach to solutions. First, it is essential to 
carefully consider the timing. Rushing into a 
conversation about solutions while mass human 
rights violations continue may be detrimental to 
the quality of the response and the safety and 
well-being of IDPs. Linked to this, efforts to 
promote solutions should never come at the 
expense of addressing more imminent protection 
threats. Protection actors will need to carefully 
analyze the protection environment to determine 
how to prioritize. Sequencing will be a crucial part 
of this – focusing on the current threats does not 
mean deferring solutions, but rather is a first step 
towards making returns achievable. 
Humanitarians will also need to be aware of 
conflict dynamics when considering how to 
support solutions to ensure that they do not 
inadvertently contribute to political or military 
strategies, and they should likewise prioritize 
robust communication – both between operation-
al actors, and with the affected communities.
Humanitarians and peacekeepers in South Sudan 
have made commendable progress in strengthen-
ing the response to POC sites over the three years 
since they first emerged. While no response is ever 
perfect, important lessons can be drawn from 
these experiences that can help to inform future 
responses.
UN House POC site in Juba. November 2016.  © NRC / Albert Gonzalez Farran
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On the evening of December 15, 2013 fighting 
erupted at the army barracks in Juba between 
forces aligned with President Salva Kiir and 
former First Vice President Riek Machar. Over the 
following days, ethnically-motivated violence 
surged in Juba, Bor, Bentiu, and Malakal, and 
within two weeks the death toll reached an esti-
mated 10,000 people killed.1 Human rights groups 
found evidence to suggest that all sides had perpe-
trated war crimes and crimes against humanity,2 
and some experts argued that massacres in Juba 
from December 16 to 18 constituted ethnic 
cleansing.3
While experts may have seen warning signs of the 
coming violence,4 no one predicted that within a 
week of the crisis unfolding, over 35,000 people 
would seek refuge inside the United Nations 
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) peacekeeping 
bases. Even as thousands of people began to pour 
through the gates, some UNMISS staff members 
still held out hope that this informal refuge would 
be short-lived. “We weren’t thinking five days, but 
maybe a week, maybe two, maybe three weeks was 
the assessment we had,” said then Special 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) 
Hilde Johnson.5 Three years later, over 200,000 
IDPs continue to shelter inside these so-called 
Protection of Civilians (POC) sites within 
UNMISS bases.
1 Nicholas Kulish, “New Estimate Sharply Raises Death Toll in South Sudan,” The New York Times, January 9, 2014, https://goo.gl/C56wgc.
2 United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report, May 8, 2014, http://goo.gl/c3AJzS.
3 Mahmood Mamdani, African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan (AUCISS), A Separate Opinion: A Contribution to the AUCISS Report, October 20, 2014, 
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auciss.separate.opinion.pdf
4 See for example the Sudd Institute’s briefing note, South Sudan and the Risks of Unrest, December 3, 2013, https://goo.gl/HPZ01S. 
5 Hilde Johnson, as quoted in Michael Arensen, If We Leave we are Killed: Lessons Learned from South Sudan Protection of Civilians Sites, 2013 – 2016, International 
Organization of Migration, 2016, https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/if_we_leave_0.pdf, 19.
6 United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Policy, Ref 2015/7, The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, April 1, 2015, 
http://goo.gl/0bGPXy.
7 UN DPKO, Practice note on civilians seeking protection at UN facilities, 2015.
In April 2015, it became binding policy of the 
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) that all UN missions with a 
protection of civilians mandate must be prepared 
to house and protect displaced persons within 
their bases in in extremis situations, including 
when civilians are at risk “due to a lack of prepar-
edness or where the mission has insufficient 
military or police capacity to secure a site outside 
the mission compound.”6 This clause emerged in 
part from the experiences in South Sudan, where 
six POC sites had been established by the time of 
the DPKO Policy on Protection of Civilians entry 
into force.
The combination of the formalization of this 
directive into UN Policy and the experiences in 
South Sudan have, for better or for worse, set a 
precedent. While South Sudan may have been the 
first country to see formalized POC sites, it may 
not be the last. Indeed, as a 2015 DPKO document 
points out, “the numerous and varied incidents in 
which civilians have sought refuge with the UN 
indicate that it is a situation that will doubtlessly 
occur again.”7 In this context, it is imperative that 
we learn from the experiences in South Sudan.
 1   INTRODUCTION
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While South Sudan may have been the first 
country to see formalized POC sites, it may not be 
the last... In this context, it is imperative that we 
learn from the experiences in South Sudan.
It is also likely that the POC sites in South Sudan 
will continue to exist for some time, and taking 
stock of current operational challenges could allow 
humanitarians and peacekeepers to further 
strengthen the response. In 2016, a Special Report 
of the UN Secretary General concluded “the 
United Nations presence in South Sudan must 
accept that civilians will continue to seek refuge in 
the protection of civilians sites until there is a 
significant improvement in the situation and 
should therefore turn its energies to improving its 
holistic approach to the management of the site.”8 
A careful examination of lessons from the past 
three years will be crucial to this process.
With this in mind, the primary objective of this 
publication is to examine the unique operational 
challenges and dilemmas associated with the 
POC site model, and to draw lessons from South 
Sudan with the hope of informing future POC 
site responses.
Recognizing that most POC sites are likely to 
emerge spontaneously, the publication does not 
aim to determine whether POC sites are a “good” 
or “bad” model (although this question will be 
briefly touched upon in the following chapter), nor 
does it intend to focus specifically on the successes 
and failures in South Sudan.9 Given that South 
Sudan is the only place POC sites have existed thus 
far, it will be used as a lens through which to 
examine the POC site model, but analyzing the 
response in South Sudan is not the aim in and of 
itself. Equally, the publication does not delve into 
questions of the effectiveness of or challenges to 
humanitarian aid or peacekeeping as a whole. 
Rather, it merely considers how protection and 
assistance are impacted by the POC site model 
8 UN Security Council, S/2016/951, Special report of the Secretary-General on the review of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, November 10, 
2016, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/951.
9 For more detail on successes and failures in South Sudan, see Michael Arensen, If We Leave we are Killed: Lessons Learned from South Sudan Protection of Civilians 
Sites, 2013 – 2016, International Organization of Migration, 2016, https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/if_we_leave_0.pdf.
10 For more on the effectiveness of protection of civilians in South Sudan, see recent publications from the Center for Civilians in Conflict at 
http://civiliansinconflict.org/our-work/countries/south-sudan/.
11 DPKO Policy, Ref 2015/7, The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, 12.
compared to what might be experienced in a 
traditional IDP settlement. Along these same 
lines, entire publications can and have been 
written about the ability of peacekeeping missions 
to fulfill protection of civilians mandates, and as 
such this will not be discussed here except when 
considering unique circumstances of a POC site 
context.10
Although this publication will undoubtedly be 
relevant to humanitarians and peacekeepers 
working in South Sudan, it is designed to be 
accessible to individuals who are not intimately 
familiar with the experiences of that particular 
crisis. The primary target audience are humanitar-
ian and peacekeeping professionals who are either 
faced with the emergence of a POC site in another 
country or who are designing guidelines or poli-
cies to inform future responses in POC site 
settings.
This publication makes a number of assumptions 
that are important to recognize. First, in keeping 
with the definition of POC sites outlined in the 
DPKO Policy on Protection of Civilians,11 this 
paper is based on the assumption that POC sites 
exist inside the bases of UN missions with a 
Chapter VII protection of civilians mandate. 
While similar lessons could undoubtedly be 
applied if sites emerged in African Union bases, 
for example, such scenarios have not been consid-
ered in this publication. A second assumption is if 
a POC site has emerged, it is likely that the govern-
ment is either unable or unwilling to fulfill its 
responsibilities to protect civilians in that location. 
If a POC site emerged in a location with functional 
authorities, many of the activities of the UN 
mission described in subsequent chapters might 
instead more naturally be implemented by the 
government.
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METHODOLOGY
Research for this publication was carried out from 
January to March 2017, and additionally draws on 
the author’s experience serving as the South Sudan 
Protection Cluster Co-Coordinator from July 2015 
to December 2016. Developments in South Sudan 
that occurred after March 2017 are not reflected in 
this paper.
Research relied predominantly on qualitative 
methodologies. Semi-structured interviews were 
held with key informants in UN missions, UN 
agencies, NGOs, and Civil Society Organizations, 
and members of the affected community. 
Interviews were conducted both in person and 
remotely.
This publication is not exhaustive, and while the 
author has made every effort to consult all relevant 
sources of information and reflect diverse perspec-
tives, there will invariably be issues that are 
insufficiently addressed or views that have not 
been adequately captured. It is also possible that 
despite best efforts at fact-checking, some inaccu-
racies may still exist – for this the author apologiz-
es and takes full responsibility.
This publication was reviewed in full by three 
individuals who have worked in South Sudan, and 
each chapter was further peer reviewed by at least 
one person with technical expertise relevant to the 
specific theme of the chapter. All reviewers either 
currently or previously worked in South Sudan, 
and included both UNMISS staff and humanitari-
an personnel.
All names of interviewers and reviewers have been 
withheld from this publication, as in many cases 
individuals requested to be kept anonymous so as 
to be able to speak more freely.
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BOSNIA AND RWANDA
One of the first experiences of protected sites was 
in Bosnia.12 In the early 1990s, conflict devoured 
much of the former Yugoslavia. Ethnic cleansing 
and war crimes were widespread, and pockets of 
civilians became besieged in enclaves across 
Bosnia. Between April and June 1993, the UN 
Security Council passed Resolutions 819, 824, and 
836 declaring six cities “safe areas” and placing 
them under the care of the UN Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR).13 Hundreds of thousands of people 
lived in the safe areas for two years under siege, 
unable to travel in and out or access basic com-
modities. While the safe areas ostensibly offered 
some physical protection, in 1995, the conflict 
intensified and attacks on the safe areas became 
more frequent. July 1995 culminated in one of the 
worst massacres in recent history: the fall of the 
Srebrenica and Zepa safe areas, where over 8,000 
Bosnian Muslim men and boys were killed in a 
period of days.
12 A note on terminology: Bosnia is technically a region within the country of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but is also commonly used to refer to the whole country. The 
shortened term Bosnia is used here for ease of readership.
13 Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zepa, Bihac, and Tuzla.
14 Four of the locations that came to be known as UN protected sites included Amahoro Stadium, the Hotel Mille Collines, the Ecole Technique Officielle in Kicukiro, and 
the Saint Famille Church.
At the same time as Bosnia was unraveling, 
Rwanda was simultaneously descending into 
genocide and witnessing the emergence of a new 
kind of safe area – this time termed “UN protected 
sites.” Unlike the safe areas in Bosnia, the protect-
ed sites in Rwanda were never formally mandated, 
but rather emerged spontaneously as the genocide 
progressed. In some cases, this resulted from 
people fleeing to locations where United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) per-
sonnel were known to be stationed. In other cases, 
UNAMIR troops (sometimes no more than a 
handful) were dispatched to protect sites where 
civilians had congregated in search of safety.14 
UNAMIR succeeded in saving thousands of lives 
at some of these sites, but due to the scale of the 
crisis and shortage of troops, civilians in some of 
the sites ended up falling into the hands of 
genocidaires.
 2   THE HISTORY OF PROTECTED SITES
Although December 2013 was the first time the world witnessed the emergence of formalized POC 
sites, it was not the first time civilians had sought refuge in peacekeeping bases. To the contrary, there 
is a long tradition both inside and outside of South Sudan of civilians seeking protection with the UN 
during times of violence. The following chapter provides a very brief introduction to cases of UN 
protected sites over the past three decades, and highlights some of the operational challenges and 
dilemmas that were common across these cases. Entire books can and have been written about many of 
these crises, and the content and lessons included below are therefore a small snapshot at best. 
Nevertheless, these summaries of historical lessons aim to draw out insights that may be relevant in 
future POC site operations.
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DRC, SUDAN, AND SOUTH 
SUDAN (PRE-2013)
Between 2000 and 2013, incidents of violence in 
Sub-Saharan Africa regularly drove civilians to 
seek protection in and around UN bases – albeit in 
fewer numbers than in Bosnia or Rwanda. In 
DRC, 6,000 people sheltered inside the UN peace-
keeping base in Kinshasa in 2006, and 5,000 
people sheltered near a base in Kiwanja in 2012. 
Informal protective sites also existed intermittent-
ly in Sudan between 2008 and 2014, including one 
incident in 2009 when over 10,000 people sought 
protection next to the UN Assistance Mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID) base in Muhajeriya.15
Similar patterns emerged in South Sudan in the 
years leading up to 2013. Intercommunal clashes 
in Jonglei state drove people to the UNMISS base 
in Pibor six times between October 2012 and 
March 2013.16 Given the perceived imminent 
threat and reasonably small numbers of civilians, 
the IDPs were generally allowed to enter the 
UNMISS base, where they would typically stay for 
a few days and then leave. In December 2012, 
clashes in Western Bahr el Ghazal led 5,000 people 
to seek protection at the UNMISS base in Wau. As 
the former UNMISS Senior Protection of Civilians 
Advisor pointed out in a 2014 article, “most UN 
peacekeeping missions have encountered this 
phenomenon at one stage or another.”17
POC SITES POST DECEMBER 2013
The protected sites that emerged after Rwanda 
were in most cases smaller, shorter in duration, 
and were often a result of generalized violence as 
opposed to deliberate targeting of civilians. All of 
this changed when conflict erupted in South 
Sudan on December 15, 2013. Within a week of the 
resurgence of fighting, over 35,000 IDPs had 
entered UNMISS bases seeking protection. The 
UNMISS base in Juba was particularly 
15 UN Security Council, S/2009/201, Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, April 14, 2009, 
http://goo.gl/c2d6qX.
16 UNMISS, Guidelines on Civilians Seeking Protection in UNMISS Bases, April 30, 2013, http://goo.gl/VU1FDg. 
17 Damian Lilly, “Protection of Civilians sites: a new type of displacement settlement?” Humanitarian Exchange Magazine No. 62, September 9, 2014, 
http://goo.gl/TQYGXU.
18 UN DPKO, Challenges, lessons learned and implications of the protection of civilians sites in South Sudan, June 2016, 2.
overwhelmed, sheltering over 30,000 IDPs. As the 
conflict continued to intensify and expand over 
the coming weeks and months, the number of 
IDPs in the sites steadily grew: by mid-February 
2014, 54,000 people had moved into the Bor, 
Bentiu, and Malakal bases, and when fighting 
surged in Unity State in April 2014, the population 
in the Bentiu POC site soared from 8,000 to 
43,000. As a 2016 DPKO document noted, 
“Although it soon became apparent that the IDPs 
would not be leaving UNMISS bases imminently, 
few within the UN foresaw that the population of 
the POC sites would continue to increase over the 
next two years, reaching a population of 102,000 at 
the end of 2014 and peaking at over 200,000 in 
August 2015.”18
Between December 2013 and December 2016 there 
would be four major attacks on the POC sites, and 
innumerable smaller incidents. Particularly 
egregious were the attacks on the Bor and Malakal 
POC sites: in April 2014, a group of youth stormed 
the POC site in Bor, killing at least 50 civilians, 
and in February 2016, the attack on the Malakal 
POC site killed an estimated 30 people and burned 
around a third of the site to the ground. 
Nevertheless, an estimated 200,000 people remain 
in the sites at the time of writing.
CHALLENGES AND DILEMMAS 
IN PAST PROTECTED SITES
Despite the contextual differences in each of these 
cases, there are nevertheless common experiences 
that are worth examining. Peacekeepers in each 
case have faced criticism for failing to effectively 
protect civilians, but there has not always been 
equal recognition of the challenges posed by 
protected sites and the constraints facing these 
missions. Below are some of the shared challenges 
and dilemmas.
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AN IMPOSSIBLE (AND SOMETIMES 
UNWANTED) TASK
A first issue that must be acknowledged is the 
magnitude of the challenge facing peacekeepers in 
each of these contexts – and most notably in 
Bosnia and Rwanda. Protected sites emerge, 
almost by definition, in environments character-
ized by extreme violence, and often targeting of 
civilians. In such situations, peacekeepers must 
not only provide security to the civilians in the 
protected sites, but must do so while simultane-
ously being expected (by the population even if 
not by their mandates) to bring an end to ethnic 
cleansing and genocide. While this expectation is 
understandable from a desperate population, a 
2016 Special Report of the Secretary General 
clearly states, “United Nations peacekeeping 
operations do not have the appropriate reach, 
manpower or capabilities to stop mass atrocities.”19 
Indeed, as subsequent sections will illustrate, 
many of the missions faced crippling resource, 
personnel, and mandate constraints, combined 
with overwhelming security threats, which made 
the protection of protected sites a difficult, if not 
impossible task.
THE SPONTANEOUS NATURE OF SITES
A factor that compounds these challenges is that 
over the past twenty years, protected sites have by 
and large emerged spontaneously. As such, peace-
keepers may find themselves in a situation where, 
despite lacking the resources necessary to be able 
to effectively protect civilians, they are expected to 
do so regardless. In this sense, peacekeepers have 
been set up for failure.
The spontaneous nature of the sites also creates 
additional challenges in regard to infrastructure 
and physical security. In Rwanda, the protected 
sites were scattered across the capital city. Many 
were in hard to reach locations, and with the 
exception of Amahoro Stadium, the sites were far 
from ideal from a defensive or tactical perspective. 
19 UN Security Council, S/2016/951, Special report of the Secretary-General on the review of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, November 10, 
2016, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/951, 16.
20 UN Security Council, S/1994/1389, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 959, December 1, 1994, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1994/1389.
21 UN Security Council, S/Res/912, “Resolution 912,” April 21, 1994, https://goo.gl/WlCuyA.
Most of the sites had no exterior berms or barriers, 
and some sat exposed on main roads and in areas 
that could be easily surrounded. Likewise, because 
UN bases are not designed to host displaced 
people, influxes of tens of thousands of people, 
such as those that occurred in South Sudan, can 
lead conditions to quickly deteriorate. During the 
first 12 months in South Sudan many of the sites 
flooded due to heavy rains, leading to overflowing 
latrines and disease outbreaks.
RESOURCE CHALLENGES
Peacekeeping missions responsible for protected 
sites have also consistently faced resource con-
straints that severely hindered their ability to 
fulfill their protection responsibilities. When the 
UN Security Council passed Resolution 836 
expanding the mandate of UNPROFOR in Bosnia 
to include to “deter attacks against the safe areas, 
to monitor the cease-fire, to promote the with-
drawal of military or paramilitary units,” no 
additional troops were allocated. There was an 
elusive promise of NATO air support, but this only 
materialized after Srebrenica had already fallen. In 
a report to the UN Security Council on December 
1, 1994, the UN Secretary General expressed his 
dismay that of the 34,000 troops needed to protect 
the safe areas, only 7,600 had been authorized, 
severely impairing the ability of the force to fulfill 
its mandate.20
In Rwanda, 14 days after the start of the genocide 
the UN Security Council voted to reduce 
UNAMIR’s troop numbers from 2,548 to 270.21 
The Council felt that conditions in the country 
were no longer permissive to supporting a peace 
process, and that the mandated purpose of the UN 
force was therefore no longer relevant. This man-
date issue is discussed in greater detail below, but 
the practical implications of this for the protection 
of civilians was substantial. With only 270 troops, 
UNAMIR was forced to withdraw from many of 
the sites it protected, as well as reduce its protec-
tive presence in the town center.
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While hopefully the Security Council has learned 
from these experiences, humanitarians and UN 
missions responsible for protected sites should 
nevertheless anticipate that they may not receive 
the full number of troops needed to effectively 
provide protection. Likewise, the troops that are 
provided may themselves face shortages of essen-
tial supplies, and may arrive without the weapons 
or subsistence materials needed to execute their 
mandates. Subsequent chapters will also discuss 
the challenges of troop caveats, or the conditions 
that dictate where and how troops engage. These 
caveats have had a paralyzing impact on mission 
capabilities in a number of the contexts mentioned 
above, as troops may be counted towards the total 
force strength but may not be allowed to work on 
the protection of civilians component of the 
mandate.
DELIBERATE ATTACKS ON PEACEKEEPERS 
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL
A related challenge that has not yet been consid-
ered enough is the use of deliberate attacks on 
peacekeepers as a means of disincentivizing the 
UN from proactively engaging during a crisis, or 
provoking troop withdrawal. During the first days 
of the Rwandan genocide in April 1994, the 
genocidaires deliberately targeted a contingent of 
Belgian peacekeepers, knowing that this would 
cause Belgium to withdraw the remainder of its 
troops and further weaken the already struggling 
UNAMIR force. Their plan succeeded: by April 20, 
1994, only 1,515 UNAMIR troops remained in 
Rwanda.22 This departure (and the subsequent 
further reduction of troops following the April 21 
UN Security Council Resolution mentioned 
above) crippled UNAMIR’s ability to effectively 
protect the thousands of people under its protec-
tion. In Bosnia, a group of Dutch peacekeepers 
were held hostage by Bosnian Serb forces, who 
threatened to kill them if NATO bombed Bosnian 
Serb positions.23 Although NATO did eventually 
bomb the positions anyway, the threats succeeded 
in delaying the response significantly. Attacks on 
22 UN Security Council, S/1994/470, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, April 20, 1994, https://goo.gl/JuF3U2.
23 Human Rights Watch, The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of UN Peacekeeping, October 15, 1995, https://goo.gl/2m53Tp.
24 Jason Patinkin, “South Sudan needs peace as much as food,” IRIN, March 20, 2017, https://goo.gl/oLpL6T.
25 UN Security Council, S/1993/872, “Resolution 872,” October 5, 1993, https://goo.gl/O1obgY.
26 UN Security Council, S/1993/872, “Resolution 872.”
peacekeepers have likewise unfortunately contin-
ued over subsequent decades, as have attacks on 
and expulsions of humanitarian workers. In 2015, 
the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator in South 
Sudan was attacked in her home, reportedly by 
members of the government forces.24 This attack 
came only months after the previous 
Humanitarian Coordinator was declared a persona 
non grata and was forced to leave the country. 
More rigorous discussion is needed on how these 
types of deliberate threats and tactics will be 
managed.
MANDATE
The appropriateness of peacekeeping mandates has 
also historically been a challenge in the provision 
of effective security at protected sites. Until 1999, 
no UN mission had ever been specifically mandat-
ed to protect civilians – including in Bosnia and 
Rwanda. In the case of the latter, at the time the 
genocide began, UNAMIR’s primary mandate was 
to monitor compliance with the Arusha Peace 
Agreement and support the implementation of a 
weapons free zone in the capital.25 When violence 
erupted in Kigali, troops were ill-prepared for the 
situation that followed. Rather than quickly 
adapting the mandate to reflect the changing 
context, the Security Council used the discord 
between the mandate and the situation on the 
ground as justification for troop withdrawal.26 It 
was not until the genocide had been ongoing for 
nearly six weeks that the UNAMIR mandate was 
adjusted to include references to the protection of 
civilians. This delay had a devastating effect on the 
effectiveness of UNAMIR during the worst days of 
the crisis.
Similar delays in adapting the mandate occurred 
at the start of the crisis in South Sudan, where it 
took nearly six months for the priority mandate to 
be changed from state-building to protection of 
civilians. Even once the state-building aspect had 
been removed, its legacy appeared to continue to 
have a detrimental impact on the willingness of 
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Mission leadership and troop contributing coun-
tries to uphold the new protection of civilians 
focus. This is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 6.
RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH 
DEMILITARIZATION
Another challenge that has historically occurred 
in protected sites is managing militarization. One 
of the trade offs of receiving international protec-
tion is that communities must forfeit their own 
means of military self-protection – namely, their 
weapons. The UN cannot protect armed actors, 
and thus to qualify for UN protection, the local 
population must demonstrate their civilian 
character. Surrendering weapons can be a difficult 
decision for a community, however, particularly if 
they have historically had to be self-sufficient in 
terms of their personal security, or if confidence in 
international protection is weak.
27 Statement of the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as quoted in UN General Assembly, A/54/549, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to 
General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall of Srebrenica, November 15, 1999, http://goo.gl/0Sga6f, 40.
One such situation occurred in Bosnia. When the 
six Bosnian cities were declared safe areas in 1993, 
most had already been besieged for some time. 
Prior to the arrival of UNPROFOR, residents of 
the six cities had relied on local defense forces for 
security, and residents were understandably 
reluctant to surrender the weapons that had served 
as their primary means of protection until that 
point. An initial demilitarization effort took place 
in 1993, but when the UN Secretary General 
proposed further demilitarization in December 
1994, the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina argued that “the demilitarization of 
the safe areas as a stand-alone measure could 
actually have the counter-productive impact of 
exposing the safe areas and their population to 
greater danger” given that “UNPROFOR’s and 
NATO’s previous responses to attacks on the safe 
areas do not engender confidence.”27 Ultimately, 
partial demilitarization of the Bosnian safe areas 
took place, and some of the survivors of the 
Women carry sacks of white maize back home after a food distribution 
in Unity State, South Sudan. March 2017 © NRC / Albert Gonzalez Farran
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Srebrenica massacre argued that the demobiliza-
tion of the safe area ultimately contributed to its 
demise. While there is no consensus among 
military experts about whether Srebrenica’s men 
could have defended themselves had their weapons 
been returned, the failure of UNPROFOR to give 
the weapons back left a dark shadow on the feel-
ings of some former safe area residents.28
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AS 
A REPLACEMENT FOR POLITICAL 
OR MILITARY ENGAGEMENT
Another concern that emerged during the Bosnia 
crisis was whether humanitarian assistance to the 
safe areas was being used as a replacement for 
meaningful engagement by the international 
community. David Rieff, one of the preeminent 
journalists covering the conflict, wrote, “Instead of 
political action backed by the credible threat of 
military force, the Western powers would substi-
tute a massive humanitarian effort to alleviate the 
worst consequences of a conflict they wanted to 
contain.”29 The airlift to Sarajevo alone cost over 
one million US dollars per day at one point in 
1993, and would become the longest airlift in 
humanitarian history.30 Though it is difficult to 
prove whether this humanitarian intervention did 
indeed contribute to political inaction, it is clear 
that regardless of the cause, the failure to address 
the more difficult threats would lead to some of 
the worst protection of civilians breakdowns of the 
20th century.
DO NO HARM AND THE RISK OF CREATING 
A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY
Finally, one of the greatest risks associated with 
the protected site model is the potential for them 
to create a false sense of security among the 
displaced and conflict-affected populations. 
Although peacekeepers and international humani-
tarian personnel may be aware of the limitations 
28 In 2007, the “Mothers of Srebrenica” filed a writ of summons accusing the UN and the Netherlands (whose troops had been deployed as part of UNPROFOR to 
protect Srebrenica) of breaching their duty of care and allowing the massacre of 8,000 men and boys, in part by failing to return their weapons. While this broader 
case was ultimately not upheld, this initiative speaks to the collective disappointment felt by Srebrenica’s survivors.
29 David Rieff, A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis, (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2003), 131.
30 Rieff, A Bed for the Night, 136.
31 UN Security Council, S/1999/1257, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, December 15, 
1999, http://goo.gl/Q5wHUO, 46. 
facing a UN mission, this understanding may not 
necessarily be shared by the affected persons. As a 
result, families may base their decision on where 
to seek protection on a false assumption that UN 
peacekeepers will be able (and willing) to protect 
them in case of violence. As examples have shown, 
the consequences of these assumptions and 
subsequent protection breakdowns can be 
devastating.
One such case occurred during the withdrawal of 
the Belgian troops and other contingents from 
Rwanda in 1994. As part of the UNAMIR force, 
Belgian troops had been stationed at various 
protected sites around Kigali, often serving as the 
only barrier between civilians and preying geno-
cidaires. When the Belgian troops found out that 
they were withdrawing and no one would be 
replacing them, they in some cases snuck away 
from the sites, leaving thousands of people aban-
doned. In the 1999 Report of the Independent 
Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations 
during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the investi-
gation team made the following observation:
When the UNAMIR contingent at [the Ecole 
Technique Officielle] left, there could not have 
been any doubt as to the risk of massacre which 
awaited the civilians who had taken refuge with 
them. Indeed, the Interhamwe and the [Rwandan 
Government Forces] had for days been stationed 
outside the school. The manner in which the 
troops left, including attempts to pretend to the 
refugees that they were not in fact leaving, was 
disgraceful.31
While the departure was undoubtedly a difficult 
situation to manage, particularly when troops 
were unable to offer any reassurance to civilians 
that help was coming, these types of examples 
highlight the importance of doing careful analysis 
and contingency planning in advance for worst 
case scenarios, and clearly communicating to the 
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affected populations. Had the civilians hiding at 
Ecole Technique Officielle known that the Belgians 
would be departing, they may have tried to sneak 
away before the genocidaires had the opportunity 
to attack. Instead, many of the civilians hiding at 
the site were massacred. The 1999 report further 
concluded that “tragically, there is evidence that in 
certain instances, the trust placed in UNAMIR by 
civilians left them in a situation of greater risk 
when the UN troops withdrew than they would 
have been otherwise.”32 This devastating critique 
foreshadowed concerns that emerged repeatedly in 
South Sudan and protected sites elsewhere: pro-
viding partial or incomplete protection to a 
civilian population can at times be worse than 
providing no protection at all.
In the years since Bosnia and Rwanda, the risk of 
peacekeepers creating a false sense of security has 
become better acknowledged by the international 
community – although this has not necessarily 
translated into improved information sharing with 
affected communities. When UNMISS developed 
Guidelines on Civilians Seeking Protection in 
UNMISS Bases in 2013, it specifically explained 
that “The term ‘protected area’ has been used 
instead of ‘safe haven’ or ‘safe area’ as these terms 
convey the unrealistic expectation that UNMISS 
will be able to guarantee the safety of civilians 
which is not the case.”33 Although the attempt at 
expectation management has been reflected in the 
language change, it is not clear if or how this was 
communicated to the affected persons themselves.
Displaced populations need to have access to 
accurate information about the capabilities and 
willingness of the UN to offer them physical 
protection so that they can make informed choic-
es. Coming to a UN base due to a belief that they 
will be provided with safe refuge, only to find out 
that they may have been better off relying on their 
usual self-protection strategies, can have damag-
ing impacts on their ability to keep themselves safe 
from violence.
32 UN Security Council, S/1999/1257, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the UN in Rwanda, 45.
33 UNMISS, Guidelines on Civilians Seeking Protection in UNMISS Bases, 6. 
34 See Caelin Briggs, “Protection of Civilians (POC) sites and their impact on the broader protection environment in South Sudan,” Humanitarian Exchange No. 68, 
January 2017, http://odihpn.org/magazine/protection-civilians-poc-sites-impact-broader/.
THE IMPOSSIBLE QUESTION: ARE 
PROTECTED SITES A “GOOD” MODEL?
Any conversation about POC sites inevitably 
comes back to the question of whether protected 
sites are a “good” model. While most peacekeepers 
and humanitarians who have worked in a protect-
ed site will have a view on this, it is difficult to 
arrive at a definitive answer. In South Sudan, 
supporters argue that the fact that the POC sites 
undoubtedly saved tens of thousands of lives in 
December 2013 outweighs the other risks and 
negative consequences associated with the POC 
site model. Critics argue that the risk of a 
Srebrenica-type incident is too high to warrant 
having POC sites, regardless of the potential 
temporary protective benefits the sites can offer.
Despite whatever beliefs we may hold about the 
merits or pitfalls of the POC site model, the 
ultimate decision about the viability of a site will 
be made by the IDPs themselves. The role of 
humanitarians and peacekeepers is to mitigate 
the risks as far as possible.
The pros and cons of POC sites are discussed in 
greater detail elsewhere,34 and will not be elaborat-
ed here. What is worth recognizing, however, is 
that despite whatever beliefs we may hold about 
the merits or pitfalls of the POC site model, the 
ultimate decision about the viability of a site will 
be made by the IDPs themselves. Most POC sites 
will emerge spontaneously, meaning the question 
of whether they are good or bad becomes some-
what irrelevant, as humanitarians and peacekeep-
ers may have little ability to influence their crea-
tion in the first place. The role of these actors is to 
mitigate the risks of the sites as far as possible. In 
the case of South Sudan, even after the POC sites 
had repeatedly been attacked, IDPs still preferred 
to remain in the sites rather than attempt to find 
protection elsewhere.
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UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN POC SITES AND 
TRADITIONAL IDP CAMPS
The most fundamental characteristic of a POC site 
is that they are situated within UN mission bases. 
Unlike the safe areas of Bosnia or the majority of 
the protected sites in Rwanda, the POC sites that 
emerged in South Sudan (and the description of 
POC sites in the global DPKO Policy on Protection 
of Civilians) are defined by the fact that IDPs have 
sought refuge “within existing [UN] mission 
premises.”35 While there are obvious physical 
protection benefits of this co-location given the 
presence of UN troops, barricades, and other 
infrastructure, the most significant impacts of this 
model are arguably in the legal and administrative 
subtleties.
35 DPKO Policy, Ref 2015/7, The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, 12.
36 If the UN mission does not include a military component, the agreement would instead be termed a “Status of Mission Agreement.”
37 UNMISS, The Status of Forces Agreement between the United Nations and the Republic of South Sudan Concerning the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, 2011, 
http://goo.gl/gUG0LQ, para. 16.
38 Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations states that “The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not 
enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.”
LEGAL STATUS
When a UN peacekeeping mission enters a coun-
try, they sign a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 
with the host government.36 The SOFA dictates the 
rights and powers of the United Nations in the 
country, including its right to be allocated land to 
be used for UN premises. Although this land 
customarily remains the territory of the host state, 
it is typically designated as “inviolable” and “under 
the exclusive control and authority of the UN” for 
the duration of the time that it is used as a UN 
premise.37 This language is almost identical to 
what is found in the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, which grants a similarly 
inviolable status to embassies and other sovereign 
state premises.38
 3   DEFINING POC SITES
Protected sites have evolved since their inception in the early 1990s. But what differentiates POC sites 
as we know them today from a traditional IDP camp? Many IDP camps receive some form of protec-
tion from peacekeepers, what makes POC sites so different? These questions are not only fundamental 
to understanding the nature of POC sites, but also have a direct operational impact on the protection 
afforded to IDPs, and the approach to security and service provision inside the sites. The following 
chapter looks at these questions in greater detail, and considers the evolution of policy and guidance 
on protected sites in recent years. The chapter will also look at whether it is possible to predict when 
and where POC sites could emerge in the future.
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The SOFA also typically makes clear that officials 
of the government or any other non-UN entity 
may not enter a UN premise without the explicit 
permission of UN authorities.39 In this sense, even 
though the land under a UN mission base is still 
technically under the jurisdiction of the govern-
ment, the inviolable status means that the state’s 
ability to exercise its powers within a POC site 
remains firmly at the discretion of the UN – thus 
offering an extra layer of protection to the IDPs.
While on the surface this may appear a legal 
technicality, in practice it has broad implications 
when comparing POC sites to normal IDP camps. 
“This is arguably the single defining feature of the 
‘POC sites’ as distinct from IDP camps,” said an 
UNMISS memo in 2014, “the inviolable status of 
UN premises, combined with the protection of 
civilians mandate, means that those who seek 
refuge from threat of physical violence in UNMISS 
premises are both (a) provided physical protection 
and (b) cannot be removed by the Government, or 
any other party, without the consent of the United 
Nations.”40
Even if a normal IDP camp is protected by peace-
keepers, the camp itself is still typically on land 
owned by the authorities or a private citizen. 
Peacekeepers can provide physical protection, but 
they have a limited legal basis to control who 
enters a site or what they do while they are there. If 
authorities want to come to a normal IDP camp 
and detain a large group of men for “questioning,” 
the peacekeepers may be unable to interfere unless 
their mandate specifically authorizes them to take 
pre-emptive action to prevent human rights 
violations (which is very rare) and they have 
determined that there is a credible threat. IDP 
camps do not inherently have any distinct status 
outside that of the host state, regardless of whether 
39 UNMISS, The Status of Forces Agreement, para. 19.
40 UNMISS, Note to File: Legal ramifications related to designation of UNMISS POC sites as IDP camps on non-UNMISS premises, August 4, 2014, para. 4.
they are humanitarian sites and managed by an 
international organization.
In South Sudan, UNMISS officials have often 
asked why IDPs inside POC sites could not instead 
seek refuge with humanitarian agencies who could 
provide relief and assistance. There are two main 
differences in the protection offered in this scenar-
io: first, NGOs and churches do not have an 
inviolable status, and are thus unable to prevent 
actors who pose a threat from entering their bases. 
While “UN blue” agencies (namely, humanitarian 
UN agencies, funds, and programs) have inviola-
ble status granted through the SOFA, their hu-
manitarian character means that they would have 
limited means to prevent an intrusion if an actor 
were attempting to gain entry. Second, the purpose 
of POC sites is to provide physical protection – an 
intervention which humanitarian organizations 
have neither the mandate nor capacity to provide. 
While humanitarian agencies could indeed 
provide relief and assistance, they cannot provide 
for the security needs of a population who are 
under direct threat.
ADMINISTRATION OF POC SITES
The inviolable nature of UN bases also places the 
peacekeeping mission in the unique position with 
regard to the administration of services and the 
rule of law inside POC sites. Both of these issues 
will be discussed in much greater detail in subse-
quent chapters, but in short, the fact that the 
mission has “exclusive control and authority” 
within their bases (and therefore over the POC 
sites) places the mission in a de facto position of 
filling many of the functions that would usually be 
carried out by the state – despite not having the 
resources, capacity, or full legal authority to do so. 
While this is an uncomfortable position for the 
UN and the government alike, it is largely 
The inviolable status of UN premises, combined with the protection of civilians mandate,  
means that those who seek refuge from threat of physical violence in UNMISS premises are both  
(a) provided physical protection and (b) cannot be removed by the Government, or any other party,  
without the consent of the United Nations.
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unavoidable when, as is the case in South Sudan, 
government abuses are a primary driver of 
displacement.
As a result of this unique context, many of the 
administration and justice functions that would 
normally be exercised by local authorities in an 
IDP camp are instead held by the UN in POC 
sites. Compared to normal IDP camps where 
security and rule of law is the responsibility of the 
host government, in POC sites, the UN mission is 
responsible for maintaining internal peace and 
security. This includes preventing and responding 
to threats such as criminality, sexual violence, and 
other types of incidents that occur commonly in 
displacement settings. SOFAs usually include 
provisions allowing UN police to “take into 
custody any other person on the premises,”41 
which is uniquely tied to the inviolable status of 
the UN mission base. This provision normally 
applies only to issues pertaining to UN security, 
and typically also requires individuals to be 
handed over to the government within 48 hours, 
but these elements may be extended in POC site 
contexts. In a non-POC site setting, the UN’s 
ability to detain perpetrators of violence is far 
more limited as it falls squarely under the jurisdic-
tion of the government.
Camp management specialists in South Sudan 
described UNMISS as filling the role that would 
normally be carried out by a camp administration, 
which is defined as “the functions carried out by 
governments and national (civilian) authorities 
that relate to the oversight and the supervision of 
activities in camps and camp-like situations. It 
comprises such sovereign State functions as… 
providing security, maintaining law and order and 
guaranteeing the civilian character of a displaced 
persons’ camp.”42
When asked about the differences in working with 
UNMISS as camp administrators compared to 
working with camp administrations in a normal 
IDP context, humanitarian officials in South 
Sudan acknowledged that both scenarios present 
41 UNMISS, The Status of Forces Agreement, para. 44.
42 Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (NRC/IDMC), Camp Management Toolkit, May 2008, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/526f6cde4.html, 29.
challenges. As one humanitarian explained, “the 
challenge [with local authorities as camp adminis-
trators] is that they advocate for a higher level of 
service provision. On the contrary, UNMISS was 
always advocating for no service provision at all.” 
Whereas local authorities often push for humani-
tarians to deliver far beyond their capacity, hu-
manitarians working in the POC sites reported 
that they often found themselves having to fight 
for approval to deliver even the most basic 
services.
UNMISS’ determination to not have IDPs living in 
their bases long term was perceived by many 
humanitarians as negatively impacting UNMISS’ 
role as camp administrators. Instead of supporting 
humanitarians to meet international standards for 
humanitarian assistance, some humanitarians 
believed UNMISS often wanted to maintain a low 
standard of living in order to prevent IDPs from 
staying or incentivizing other people to seek 
refuge in the sites. Many humanitarians likewise 
felt that this same drive led to UNMISS overstep-
ping its camp administration functions and 
attempting to dictate technical aspects of the 
humanitarian response. One example of this came 
in August 2016, when UNMISS initially prevented 
humanitarians from improving drainage and 
sanitation at Tomping POC site, even after cholera 
had emerged. Although humanitarians were 
equally committed to relocating people from the 
Tomping site, they had advocated for these basic 
measures in the interim as a matter of public 
health. Ultimately UNMISS reversed this policy 
(by which time humanitarians had relocated most 
of the IDPs), however IDPs in Tomping were left 
living in dangerous conditions far longer than was 
necessary as a result.
UNMISS officials, on the other hand, emphasized 
the extremely difficult circumstances POC sites 
create for the Mission. Not only do peacekeeping 
missions have their own infrastructure and 
security standards they must uphold for their staff, 
but individual troop contributing countries 
(TCCs) also sometimes have separate demands 
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that can impact missions as a whole. In August 
2016, one TCC reportedly threatened to withdraw 
all their troops and police from the Mission if 
IDPs were not cleared from their contingent’s 
space in Tomping. Senior UNMISS staff have 
expressed concern that if humanitarians delivered 
assistance in accordance with international 
standards in the six remaining POC sites, not only 
would UNMISS not be able to adequately meet the 
standards required for its own staff, but the POC 
sites could become permanent settlements. In 
discussing this dilemma, one UNMISS official 
asked “do you think if you give each person 30m2 
they will ever go home? I don’t think so – and we 
can’t take that chance.”43
With this in mind, the role of a UN mission as a 
camp administrator is one that may be fraught 
with challenges. While in other contexts the 
priorities of a camp management and camp 
administration are typically relatively aligned, in 
the case of POC sites, the competing priorities and 
constraints affecting the UN mission often lead to 
greater divergences than would otherwise be 
expected between humanitarians and a camp 
administration. These issues will be discussed at 
greater length in the chapter on coordination.
43 In their official response to this publication, UNMISS argued that this approach was appropriate given that “a) these are protection sites and not normal IDP camps; b) 
UNMISS has limited resources to offer static security to overly expanded POC sites; c) over 90% of the population lives outside of POC sites and UNMISS is required to 
offer protection through other tiers.” 
PROTECTION VS. DISPLACEMENT SITES
Another factor that distinguishes POC sites from 
normal IDP camps is their intended purpose. 
Whereas in a traditional IDP camp there is less 
focus on differentiating between IDPs who face a 
threat of physical violence and those who are 
merely displaced, POC sites are designed to be 
exclusively an in extremis measure to support 
those persons who would be unsafe outside of a 
UN compound. Although in the most acute phases 
of an emergency there may be little difference 
between these two types of sites, it becomes 
increasingly significant as the crisis becomes more 
protracted. Given the relatively narrow mandate of 
POC sites compared to traditional IDP camps, 
POC sites are envisioned to be more temporary in 
nature, and there is often greater pressure to move 
people out of POC sites than may be the case in a 
normal IDP camp.
Given the relatively narrow mandate of POC sites 
compared to traditional IDP camps, POC sites 
were envisioned to be more temporary in nature, 
and there is often greater pressure to move 
people out of POC sites than may be the case in a 
normal IDP camp
UN House POC site in Juba. November 2016. © NRC / Albert Gonzalez Farran
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In South Sudan, this urgency to move IDPs fre-
quently created tensions between humanitarians 
and peacekeepers. While there is generally consen-
sus that POC sites (and camps in general) are 
never a preferable option long-term, peacekeepers 
and humanitarians in South Sudan often had 
differing perspectives on the security situation 
outside the POC sites, and contrasting approaches 
to conducting assessments of safety and viability 
for returns. When the situation temporarily 
stabilized or new government assurances were 
received, UNMISS officials often expressed the 
view that humanitarians and peacekeepers should 
try to maximize the window of opportunity to 
encourage returns or relocate as many IDPs from 
the POC sites as possible. Humanitarians often 
took a more pessimistic view of the security 
environment, seeing periods of calm and renewed 
assurances as merely the pause before the next 
outbreak of fighting. While some IDPs left volun-
tarily during such periods, many humanitarians 
were reluctant to proactively encourage or facili-
tate this for fear that doing so would expose the 
IDPs to greater harm once the fighting resumed.44 
UNMISS likewise also largely based their security 
assessments on a situational analysis of the politi-
cal process as opposed to the individual case by 
case approach favored by humanitarians.
The perception of POC sites as being more tempo-
rary than normal IDP camps also has significant 
impacts on the approach to service provision. 
While in a traditional IDP camp humanitarians 
would work to provide assistance that is consistent 
with international standards and is moderately 
sustainable, in South Sudan, UN Mission officials 
argued that the protective (and therefore tempo-
rary) nature of the sites meant that minimum 
humanitarian standards were inapplicable and 
that humanitarians should avoid using durable 
materials that could incentivize people to stay. 
Indeed, in explaining why the Mission did not 
support meeting the 30m2 emergency standard for 
living space, the first response from the Mission 
was that “These are protection sites and not 
normal IDP camps.” One shelter expert explained 
44 This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 10.
45 DPKO Policy, Ref 2015/7, The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, 12.
46 UNMISS, Supplemental Guidance No. 2 to the UNMISS Guidelines on Civilians Seeking Protection at UNMISS Bases (2013), October 8, 2014, http://goo.gl/XgxezC, 
para. 2.
that if humanitarians had been permitted to 
manage the response as they would in a normal 
camp, “from the beginning, we would have been 
able to provide more semi-permanent infrastruc-
ture that would have been much more efficient. 
Instead, [due to UNMISS’ restrictions], we keep 
renovating the plastic sheeting and wooden poles, 
and it has had huge cost implications.” Three years 
into the crisis, humanitarians have still struggled 
to gain permission to put in place more durable 
and sustainable infrastructure.
The protection mandate of POC sites also has 
implications on who is granted entry to the site. In 
a traditional IDP camp, it is uncommon for 
limitations to be placed on who may enter or stay 
in the camp. The camp management organization 
and the police (or other actor providing security) 
may prevent individuals from entering who are 
armed or otherwise deemed a threat to the camp, 
but individuals are not granted entry on the basis 
of their reason for requesting refuge. In POC sites, 
on the other hand, access to the site is determined 
by the UN mission. During periods of calm, the 
UN mission may be more selective in who it 
admits. The global DPKO Policy on Protection of 
Civilians highlights that peacekeeping missions 
should first exhaust the possibilities to provide 
security a) “outside UN premises, including in IDP 
camps or in host communities,” and b) “in areas 
adjacent or close to existing mission premises 
identified for that purpose.”45 An UNMISS guid-
ance note from 2014 went further and stated that 
“In locations where there is neither current fight-
ing nor threat of physical violence, UNMISS will 
not admit additional individuals into its premis-
es.”46 Being displaced alone does not officially 
constitute sufficient grounds to be granted entry, 
nor does the guidance officially allow individuals 
to be admitted who continue to be persecuted in 
locations where active violence has ceased.
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The perception of POC sites as being more 
temporary than normal IDP camps also has 
significant impacts on the approach to service 
provision... UN mission officials argued that the 
protective (and therefore temporary) nature of 
the sites meant that minimum humanitarian 
standards were inapplicable and that 
humanitarians should avoid using durable 
materials
Some humanitarians have nevertheless expressed 
concern that the assessment of a person’s protec-
tion needs are sometimes conducted by UNMISS 
staff who do not have a protection or human rights 
background and who do not necessarily have the 
right profile to make such a determination. 
Nevertheless, humanitarians expressed apprecia-
tion that to date it has been rare for the mission to 
turn away women and children.
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
Finally, another aspect that frequently distinguish-
es POC sites from normal IDP camps is the level of 
freedom of movement available to those seeking 
refuge in the POC site. While there is no standard 
profile for traditional IDP camps, self-settled IDP 
camps are often located in areas where IDPs feel 
safer and are able to move more freely. This could 
be an area that is in control of an armed group that 
is favorable to the displaced population, or some-
where sufficiently far from the front line that it is 
not yet affected by violence.47
POC sites typically have the exact opposite profile, 
and are islands of relative safety for IDPs in an 
otherwise hostile area. In South Sudan, the POC 
sites are surrounded by members of the govern-
ment armed forces that are perceived to be hostile 
to the IDPs seeking refuge inside the UNMISS 
bases. While there is a limited degree of freedom 
of movement, IDPs did not choose the sites be-
cause they are in a safe part of the country. On the 
contrary, the IDPs who entered the POC sites did 
so in many cases because they were perceived to be 
47 IDP camps are likewise not always a product of conflict – IDP camps can also occur after natural disasters, or as a preemptive mitigation strategy in proximity to areas 
that are newly liberated or where future conflict could be expected.
48 UNMISS contests this point and explained in their formal response to this publication that “Although UNMISS acknowledge that the initial arrival of IDPs were for 
seeking protection. [sic] Subsequent arrivals are to access humanitarian assistance.” This issue is discussed in greater detail in Box 6 in Chapter 5.
the only safe location in an area that was otherwise 
inhospitable.48
This position creates a myriad of challenges for the 
IDPs. Not only does it severely hamper their ability 
to sustain an independent source of livelihood, but 
it also diminishes IDPs’ chances of being able to 
access areas of greater safety or conduct their own 
assessments of the viability of returning home. 
Being encircled by hostile armed actors also poses 
serious threats to the IDPs in the POC sites and to 
the peacekeepers that protect them.
GUIDELINES ON MANAGING 
PROTECTED SITES
Although civilians have repeatedly sought protec-
tion at UN bases over the past two decades, by 
December 2013 (and indeed by the time of writ-
ing) there was still no formalized guidance on how 
such situations should be managed – either in 
DPKO or in the humanitarian community. 
Various investigations and inquiries looked into 
the events in Srebrenica and Rwanda, but although 
each of these reports captured invaluable lessons 
relating to protected sites, they were never distilled 
into common, practical guidelines for peacekeep-
ers or humanitarians. To date, there are still no 
global standard operating procedures (SOPs) 
defining roles and responsibilities for POC sites, or 
minimum standards for their protection or 
maintenance.
In the absence of centralized guidance to direct 
them, a number of UN missions took the initiative 
to develop their own guidelines. Some of these 
went into a commendable level of detail, but 
because the various documents were developed by 
individual missions and were not adopted or 
consolidated at headquarters level, other missions 
rarely had the opportunity to benefit from lessons 
learned from other contexts.
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In April 2013, UNMISS developed Guidelines on 
Civilians Seeking Protection at UNMISS Bases. The 
guidelines largely reflected the types of scenarios 
UNMISS had dealt with previously: short term 
population influxes into their bases that required 
only limited engagement from UNMISS. While 
these guidelines were suitable for situations such 
as those that had taken place in Pibor or Wau, they 
were not prepared for the type of crisis that would 
emerge in December 2013.
The biggest shortcoming of the April 2013 
Guidelines was that they were based on the as-
sumption that IDPs would stay in the bases for 72 
hours maximum – not three years or more. In 
working within a 72-hour framework, the guide-
lines predictably centered on how to manage the 
initial influx and triage, and did not delve into the 
more complicated issues of administration of a 
long-term settlement.
Some of the assumptions underpinning the 
guidelines were also deeply problematic. Of note is 
the following statement: “it is not considered likely 
that UNMISS bases in which civilians have sought 
protection will be overrun by armed actors in the 
same way as in Srebrenica.”49 No further explana-
tion or justification for this statement is provided, 
and given that peacekeepers had regularly come 
under attack in the months leading up to the 
publication of the guidelines, it is unclear what led 
to this conclusion. Unfortunately just days after 
the crisis emerged in December 2013, the UNMISS 
base in Akobo would be attacked and overrun, 
and two peacekeepers and at least 20 civilians 
would be killed.
Although these guidelines came closer to offering 
suggestions on managing a protected site than any 
other document at that point, they became quickly 
outdated when the POC sites formed in South 
Sudan in December 2013. The equally well-inten-
tioned Guidelines for Coordination between 
Humanitarian Actors and the United Nations 
Mission in South Sudan, which had been formally 
endorsed by the Humanitarian Country Team 
(HCT) just nine days before the outbreak of the 
49 UNMISS, Guidelines on Civilians Seeking Protection in UNMISS Bases, para. 
7.
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MONUC Protection of Civilians Handbook 
for Peacekeepers
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 UNMIS Operation Safe Refuge -FRAGO
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MONUSCO Contingency Plan for Securing 
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2015
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conflict, likewise became somewhat irrelevant as it 
focused extensively on the distinction between 
peacekeepers and humanitarians – a line that 
became heavily blurred when IDPs and humani-
tarians found themselves living inside UNMISS 
bases. Peacekeepers and humanitarians alike 
found themselves in a situation in which their 
normal ways of working were challenged (the 
distinction between peacekeepers and humanitar-
ians in particular), and where they had to develop 
an approach as the went along. This organic 
approach was not necessarily negative, but as 
renowned think tank The Stimson Center pointed 
out in 2014, “Policies or laws that could clarify the 
rights and responsibilities of peacekeepers, civil-
ians and parties to a conflict with respect to 
protected areas might help to improve the lives of 
the 100,000 people seeking shelter in POC sites in 
South Sudan and prevent a future Srebrenica.”50
50 Stimson Center, Making UN-Safe Areas Safer: From Srebrenica to South Sudan, October 7, 2014, https://goo.gl/urQXIX.
Since the emergence of the POC sites in South 
Sudan, DPKO has worked to capture some of the 
lessons and best practices from contexts where 
civilians have sought protection in UN bases. In 
2014 and 2015, a Practice Note was drafted on 
Civilians Seeking Protection at UN Facilities. 
Although it does not appear that this note was ever 
finalized, it made worthy efforts to consolidate 
best practices to date, as well as articulate some of 
the common challenges in these types of contexts. 
The finalization of this document (as well as 
detailed SOPs to be discussed later) could be 
instrumental in helping to prepare future peace-
keeping missions for these types of realities.
Wau POC Adjacent Area (POCAA) - a protected site just outside 
the UNMISS base in Wau. © IOM / Muse Mohammed
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PREDICTING THE EMERGENCE 
OF POC SITES
Why did the POC sites emerge in South Sudan, 
but not in other crises? Despite the frequency with 
which IDPs sought refuge at UN bases over the 
past decade, South Sudan was the first place to see 
IDPs stay inside UN bases in large numbers over 
an extended period. Although it is difficult to 
conclusively determine which factors led to this 
situation, it can nevertheless be useful to analyze 
whether there were specific characteristics of the 
political landscape, conflict dynamics, or humani-
tarian context in South Sudan that created an 
enabling environment for the creation of POC 
sites. If it is possible to isolate certain elements that 
existed in South Sudan but not in other similar 
crises, the question then becomes whether this 
correlation could provide indicators that could 
help to predict when and where POC sites may 
emerge in the future.
Below are some of the possible elements that may 
have contributed to the creation or acceptance of 
POC sites in South Sudan. At a general level, 
contributing factors tend to relate broadly to three 
issues: the determination and desperation of the 
civilian population to enter the base, the willing-
ness of the UN mission to grant entry, and the 
history of peacekeeping within the country.
CONFLICT DYNAMICS AND SEVERITY 
OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
The first significant factor appears to be the level of 
threat to civilians, and the identity and tactics of 
the perpetrator. In December 2013, as in Rwanda 
and Bosnia, the targeting of civilians went beyond 
what is typical of a modern internal conflict. The 
violence against civilians was not isolated, but 
rather fell squarely into the realm of crimes 
against humanity, and involved tens of thousands 
of people fleeing ethnically-motivated attacks. As 
people began to arrive at UNMISS’ gates, the 
perceived immediacy and severity of the threat 
made civilians far more determined to gain entry 
51 UN DPKO, Challenges, lessons learned and implications of the protection of civilians sites in South Sudan, 1.
52 Human Rights Watch, They Burned It All: Destruction of Villages, Killings, and Sexual Violence in Unity State, South Sudan, July 2015, https://goo.gl/evbggY, 16.
53 South Sudan Protection Cluster, Protection Situation Update: Southern and Central Unity (April – September 2015), September 24, 2015, https://goo.gl/4zrTYb.
to the UNMISS compounds than may have been 
the case in a “normal” episode of violence. “The 
scale of the atrocity perpetrated against civilians, 
an in extremis event even by the standards of 
peacekeeping, required the Mission to take last-re-
sort measures to protect civilians,” said a 2016 UN 
report.51 For UNMISS staff, it became clear that 
failing to open the gates was leading to people 
climbing over the perimeter fences regardless.
Another significant element of the December 2013 
violence was that many of the human rights 
violations were perpetrated by armed actors 
associated with the state. Whereas under interna-
tional law the state can be called upon to uphold 
their primary responsibility for protection and 
security, when the state itself is the perpetrator, the 
UN has little recourse. The state-as-perpetrator 
can also significantly increase the fear factor for 
civilians, who may not know where else to turn 
except the UN after seeing their former protector 
morph into their primary threat.
Another element that can have an impact on 
whether civilians seek protection at UN bases are 
the military aims and tactics of the parties to the 
conflict. Humanitarian experts pointed out during 
interviews that compared to the types of ethnic 
clashes that occurred in neighboring countries, the 
parties to the conflict in South Sudan were unique-
ly concerned with holding territory and targeting 
civilians. As a result, while civilians in DRC may 
have been able to return to their homes relatively 
quickly following clashes, no such option was 
available for civilians in South Sudan. In other 
cases, displacement was an aim in and of itself for 
the parties to the conflict in South Sudan. In June 
2015, government officials disseminated radio 
messages saying everyone should move to Bentiu 
(one town with a POC site) if they wanted to live.52 
Subsequent in-person communications were 
reportedly more explicit in saying that anyone who 
did not go to the POC site would be presumed to 
be a rebel and killed.53
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With this in mind, it is likely that specific elements 
of the conflict dynamics (namely, the presence of 
mass atrocity crimes, the involvement of state 
actors, and the territorial tactics of parties to the 
conflict) could influence the likelihood of the 
creation of a POC site. The combination of the 
increased sense of urgency and determination 
among the civilian population to enter a UN base, 
plus the reputational risk to peacekeepers should 
they fail to grant entry, is likely to be significant. 
This may be true even if these dynamics have been 
observed only in another part of the country – the 
fear factor alone could have a similar effect as if 
the violence were occurring in a more proximate 
location.
ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO 
THE CIVILIAN POPULATION
A second major factor appears to be whether there 
are viable protection alternatives available to the 
civilian population. “Alternatives” in this context 
can take many forms, whether it is proximity to an 
international border that can be used to escape, 
the presence of a “friendly” armed actor who can 
provide effective protection, or the availability of 
nearby hiding spaces. In locations where these 
types of alternatives exist, some people may still 
opt to seek refuge with the UN, but others may 
choose to protect themselves through different 
means.
In the case of South Sudan, one of the defining 
aspects of the initial violence was that it took place 
largely in city centers. Compared to residents of 
rural areas, residents of the cities had far fewer 
self-protection options available to them. Usual 
strategies such as hiding in the swamps could not 
be accessed, and many people found themselves 
trapped within the city limits. City residents were 
also less accustomed to violence and displacement 
than their rural counterparts, who were far more 
likely to have been exposed to cattle raids and 
intercommunal clashes. Consequently, city-dwell-
ers also had fewer coping skills than their rural 
relatives. Given that the state armed forces in 
many of these urban areas were now primary 
54 CIVIC, Under Fire: The July 2016 Violence in Juba and UN Response, 2016, http://goo.gl/EyGRrH, 77, 32.
aggressors, the sole source of physical security for 
many city residents became the UN.
Another potential alternative is the presence of 
proactive UN engagement outside the peacekeep-
ing bases. As one former UNMISS official pointed 
out, in South Sudan, the fact that there was not 
robust patrolling or a visible presence of peace-
keepers in the town meant coming to the bases for 
protection was, in many cases, the only option for 
civilians. UNMISS troops’ practice of refusing to 
move without the explicit permission of the 
government (even to collect water and resources 
for its own personnel) meant that it was highly 
unlikely UNMISS would be able to access areas 
most affected by violence given that requests (or 
notifications of intent) to move into such areas 
were regularly denied by the parties to conflict.54 
As such, little protection could be offered to 
civilians outside of UNMISS’ bases.
HISTORY OF DEPENDENCY 
ON INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 
INSTEAD OF THE STATE
A third factor that can influence the emergence of 
POC sites is the pre-violence level of dependency 
on assistance or protection from international 
organizations instead of state mechanisms. In 
locations where aid or protection has been provid-
ed by external actors for an extended period, the 
population may be more likely to expect that they 
will be given refuge by the UN during times of 
violence.
Having received extensive humanitarian assis-
tance from international organizations since the 
late 1980s, South Sudan is a country characterized 
by uniquely high levels of dependency on external 
actors. Many of the basic social services (schools, 
clinics, water and sanitation infrastructure) are 
provided by humanitarian organizations rather 
than the state. As a result, it appears that the 
civilian population in some locations has come to 
expect that they can rely upon the UN for many of 
the support mechanisms they would normally 
look for in a state. When the violence broke out in 
December 2013, turning to the UN was a natural 
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step for many South Sudanese who had previously 
benefitted from humanitarian or protection 
services. It is worth noting however, that the 
absence of dependency does not necessarily mean 
that civilians will not seek refuge with the UN 
– many of the initial IDP arrivals in 2013 and 2014 
were wealthy individuals who had limited depend-
ency on international actors.
REPUTATION OF THE UN MISSION 
AND LOCAL CONTINGENT
Another factor related to establishment of POC 
sites is the presence and reputation of the UN prior 
to the outbreak of fighting. As discussed above, 
POC sites by definition require there to be existing 
UN premises into which civilians can flee. If a UN 
mission is not present in the country at the out-
break of conflict, or is not present in the locations 
affected by violence, then a POC site cannot form.
Equally important, however, is the reputation of 
the UN and the level of trust from the civilian 
population. This relates both to the mission as a 
whole, as well as the individual peacekeeping 
contingent in place in the area affected by violence. 
This correlation can work in many directions 
however: if a contingent is well-known and trust-
ed, people may believe either that a) the troops will 
offer them refuge, or b) that the peacekeepers are 
strong enough that civilians do not necessarily 
need to be inside the base to be protected. Taking 
an opposite example, if a contingent has come 
under pressure for failing to provide effective 
protection in the past, civilians may feel either that 
a) they must force entry into the base in order to 
receive adequate protection, or b) that they cannot 
rely on the UN and must seek out traditional 
hiding places instead. The reaction of the peace-
keepers can also differ in such a scenario, and past 
failures could lead to the contingent either a) 
becoming more willing to open their gates in order 
to avoid further reputational damage, or b) keep-
ing the gates shut if they know their protective 
capacity is weak.
55 South Sudan Protection Cluster, Protection Situation Update: Leer County, Southern Unity State, May 11, 2016, https://goo.gl/TFeU3E.
56 World Health Organization, International Organization of Migration, Concern Worldwide, Leer Temporary Protection Area Rapid Assessment, November 2016.
Unfortunately, there is no foolproof equation to 
determine which outcome will occur on the basis 
of the mission’s reputation – each case will have to 
be assessed carefully and independently. In South 
Sudan (and indeed most peacekeeping contexts), 
the capacity and commitment of peacekeepers 
varies significantly between contingents. In one 
example in Leer county, a particularly robust 
contingent was deployed from the end of 2015 to 
early 2016. During this period, civilians reported 
feeling safe even when violence continued in 
nearby areas, and did not seek out sustained 
protection at the UNMISS base.55 Some months 
later when the contingents rotated, confidence in 
the peacekeepers diminished significantly. 
Humanitarians on the ground reported that the 
new contingent was not perceived by civilians to 
be as motivated as the previous company, doing 
fewer patrols and maintaining a less visible pres-
ence in the community. During an episode of 
intense fighting in late July 2016, hundreds of 
civilians sought refuge at the UNMISS base in 
Leer. Initially they were turned away, but after 
increased pressure the contingent eventually 
accepted people into their base. As of the end of 
2016, over 1,600 of people continued to live in the 
Leer “temporary protection area.”56
POLITICAL APPETITE WITHIN THE UN
Another element that may contribute to the 
likelihood of a POC site being created is the level 
of political appetite within the UN. If the UN has 
recently come under pressure for failing to ade-
quately to protect civilians or prioritize human 
rights, there may be greater willingness to open 
the gates and accept the responsibilities that come 
with a POC site. Conversely, if the UN mission 
feels it is able to adequately protect people outside 
its gates or there are acceptable alternatives availa-
ble to the civilian population, they may be more 
likely to turn people away.
The outbreak of war in South Sudan came shortly 
after the release of the Internal Review Panel (IRP) 
Report on UN Actions in Sri Lanka, which found 
that there had been a “systemic failure” of the UN 
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to protect civilians at the end of the war.57 In the 
aftermath of this report, the UN came under 
heavy pressure to improve their responses to mass 
human rights violations, and subsequently 
launched “Human Rights Up Front,” which it 
described as “a plan of action to strengthen the 
UN’s role in protecting people in crises.”58 The 
outbreak of violence in Juba came just five months 
after the launch of Human Rights Up Front, and in 
light of this timing, failing to open the gates to 
people fleeing ethnic cleansing may have been seen 
as an intolerable reputational risk.
Interestingly, it is possible that the experiences in 
South Sudan could have the opposite impact on 
the political appetite within the UN for new POC 
sites. UNMISS and the UN has been heavily 
critiqued for its protection failures at the POC sites 
in South Sudan, and in the UN special investiga-
tion into the July 2016 violence, the panel conclud-
ed that, “as highlighted in the UN Board of 
Inquiry for Malakal, protecting the POC sites 
– effectively small cities of thousands of people – is 
beyond the capability of UNMISS or any peace-
keeping mission, and a task that raises unreasona-
ble expectations.”59 It is possible that this language 
may point to a reluctance of DPKO Headquarters 
to see POC sites emerge in the future. As will be 
discussed later in this publication, there have also 
already been instances within South Sudan of 
peacekeepers refusing to open the gates to civil-
ians fleeing violence, seemingly for fear of another 
POC site being created.
EXISTENCE OF OTHER POC 
SITES IN THE COUNTRY
Finally, the presence of other POC sites in the 
country is also likely to have an impact on the 
emergence of new sites. This may take two differ-
ent directions: on the one hand, the presence of 
other POC sites could mean that members of the 
community are likely to be familiar with the 
model and know that in the past civilians have 
57 United Nations, Report of the Secretary General’s Internal Review Panel on United Nations Action in Sri Lanka, November 2012, http://goo.gl/J1xDA, 28.
58 United Nations, Rights Up Front: A Plan of Action to strengthen the UN’s role in protecting people in crises, July 9, 2013, 
http://www.innercitypress.com/sriban1rightsupfronticp.pdf. 
59 United Nations, Executive Summary of the Independent Special Investigation into the violence which occurred in Juba in 2016 and UNMISS response, November 1, 
2016, http://goo.gl/LVE8ma, 5.
60 Toby Lanzer, as quoted in Arensen, If We Leave We Are Killed, 19.
been permitted to stay at bases. Conversely, if 
other POC sites exist and the peacekeeping mis-
sion is already overstretched, they may a) be more 
reluctant to allow a new POC site to form, or b) 
recognize that allowing people into their bases is 
the only hope of providing protection.
Ultimately, most POC sites will occur spontane-
ously. In times of extreme violence and limited 
options, civilians and peacekeepers alike work to 
find whatever solution will provide immediate 
protection for the population under threat. It is 
unlikely that the creation of a POC site will be 
pre-planned or organized, and even if the peace-
keepers would rather not have a site, the determi-
nation of the civilian population and their willing-
ness to jump the perimeter fences may make the 
creation of a POC site unavoidable. “We never 
‘opened the gates,’” said former South Sudan 
Humanitarian Coordinator Toby Lanzer, “it was 
an attitude that if there are people under threat, 
under stress, jumping over the fence, which is 
what the vast majority were doing, we will wel-
come them and we will protect them.”60 The above 
factors are identified with the hope that where 
these indicators are in place, humanitarians and 
peacekeepers may be able to monitor the environ-
ment for early warning signs and better prepare 
themselves in case a POC site should form 
spontaneously.
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If civilians have fled to a POC site instead of to an 
area protected by the government, one of the 
possible reasons is that the government itself is a 
perpetrator of violence. In such a situation, what 
role (if any) should the government or local 
authorities have in a POC site? While the govern-
ment always retains the primary responsibility to 
protect and support their citizens, how should 
humanitarians and peacekeepers engage the 
government if they are a party to the conflict?
There is no easy answer to this. The longer civil-
ians stay in a POC site, the longer the government 
is absolved of its responsibilities to uphold the 
rights of its people. But equally, involving the 
government too early in a crisis can create untena-
ble risks for the civilian population. This dilemma 
has led to debates of whether humanitarians and 
peacekeepers should allow supportive, civilian 
sections of the government to respond in the POC 
sites even if the military sections perpetuate 
violence.
Viewpoints on this issue differ substantially 
between individuals and organizations. Some 
NGO officials perceived UN agencies to be par-
ticularly concerned with maintaining a positive 
relationship with the government, regardless of 
their role in perpetrating human rights violations. 
“UN agencies are trapped in the mindset of the 
government as primary duty bearer,” said one 
NGO official, who went on to describe the “cogni-
tive dissonance” this caused for individuals who 
simultaneously wanted to support the 
government, while at the same time recognizing 
them to be a threat to their own people. Numerous 
UN officials, on the other hand, described their 
disappointment that humanitarians had not done 
more to continue to engage with “cooperative” 
sections of the government and encourage them to 
take responsibility where possible.
This issue came to a head in South Sudan in 2014, 
when the Directorate of Nationality, Passports, 
and Immigration offered to assist with the provi-
sion of identification documents to IDPs in the 
POC sites. While this particular branch of govern-
ment appeared genuine in their desire to be of 
help, many humanitarians feared that giving 
authorities access to sensitive personal informa-
tion about IDPs in the POC sites could expose the 
IDPs to greater harm. Ultimately UNMISS facili-
tated visits of the officials, but during one visit 
IDPs attacked the government representatives, and 
the program was subsequently suspended.
Undoubtedly, the extent to which a government 
can be engaged in a POC site will depend on the 
conflict dynamics and context. Humanitarians 
will have to consider the short and long term risks, 
both of engaging the government and of failing to 
do so. If there is sufficient separation between 
branches of government, it may be possible to 
engage with some civilian sections, but all actors 
should be aware that trust will need to be slowly 
reestablished over time between the displaced 
community and the relevant authorities.
BOX 1: HOW SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT  
BE ENGAGED IN POC SITES?
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 4   COORDINATION BETWEEN 
HUMANITARIANS AND PEACEKEEPERS
POC sites present unique challenges with regard to the roles and responsibilities of humanitarians and 
peacekeepers. Not only are actors required to work together in much closer proximity than would be 
the case in a traditional IDP site, but equally, many actors may be expected to fill functions that are 
outside their usual responsibilities or areas of expertise. Infrastructure constraints, differing man-
dates, and contrasting perceptions of the humanitarian and security environment can further compli-
cate relationships between actors.
Given that South Sudan was the first country to 
experience POC sites, and also arguably the first 
crisis since Bosnia where a UN mission has filled a 
role similar to that of a camp administration, the 
achievements of the UN Mission and humanitari-
ans in South Sudan have been commendable. 
Nevertheless, coordination has continued to be 
challenging in the three years since the sites first 
emerged, and efforts to strengthen communication 
and collaboration between actors has been an 
ongoing and imperfect process.
The following chapter considers lessons from 
South Sudan on coordination between actors 
working in POC sites. It aims to identify both 
good practices and challenges, with the hope of 
offering considerations to strengthen future POC 
site responses should they emerge in other 
countries.
61 UNMISS formally endorsed the guidelines in January 2014. They can be found at https://goo.gl/lo69tw.
ESTABLISH CLEAR ROLES AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN 
HUMANITARIANS AND PEACEKEEPERS
A first lesson to emerge from South Sudan in 
regard to coordination is the importance of 
establishing clearly defined roles and responsibili-
ties. The emergence of a POC site may present 
many “firsts” in a country: the first time humani-
tarians and peacekeepers have worked in overlap-
ping operational spheres, and the first time peace-
keepers have become involved in a humanitarian 
operation or camp-based response, and the first 
time coordination emphasizes cooperation rather 
than deconfliction. In such a context, having 
guidelines that articulate the expectations and 
limitations of each actor will be crucial.
In South Sudan, numerous documents were 
developed before and during the crisis to assist in 
clarifying roles and responsibilities. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, just days before the 
outbreak of fighting, the HCT endorsed the 
Guidelines for the Coordination between 
Humanitarian Actors and the United Nations 
Mission in South Sudan.61 Earlier that year, 
UNMISS had even taken the further step of 
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articulating Guidelines on Civilians Seeking 
Protection in UNMISS Bases.62 Although neither 
of these documents had anticipated a scenario like 
the one that would emerge in the POC sites, the 
fact that these issues had already been recognized 
meant that the mission and humanitarians did not 
have to start from scratch in attempting to dis-
entangle coordination issues. It would be benefi-
cial for humanitarians and peacekeepers to con-
sider developing these types of documents even if 
a POC site does not yet exist.
When the violence broke out in December 2013, 
humanitarians were faced with having to con-
struct a new, emergency-oriented coordination 
structure while simultaneously navigating a 
drastically changed relationship with UNMISS. 
The coordination guidance that had been devel-
oped pre-2013 was predominantly geared toward 
deconfliction, but the new environment called for 
much closer cooperation than had ever been 
anticipated. Following the emergence of the sites, 
it became clear that supplemental guidance was 
needed to outline the coordination arrangements 
in this new context.
In early 2014, UNMISS and the newly formed 
South Sudan Camp Coordination and Camp 
Management (CCCM) Cluster developed a Roles 
and Responsibilities document that outlined the 
respective areas of work of the humanitarian camp 
management actors and of the UN Mission. In 
broad terms, the document agreed that camp 
management would be responsible for coordinat-
ing the overall humanitarian response within the 
site, and UNMISS would be responsible for “pro-
viding security, maintaining law and order and 
guaranteeing the civilian character of the IDP 
settlements/POC areas.”63 The articulation of this 
document was an important step for both the 
humanitarian community and the UN Mission. In 
order to be successful, however, a roles and re-
sponsibilities document needs to not only articu-
late these elements in broad strokes, but also make 
clear who is responsible for actual implementation. 
With this aim in mind, the initial Roles and 
Responsibilities document was further 
62 UNMISS, Guidelines on Civilians Seeking Protection in UNMISS Bases, April 30, 2013, http://goo.gl/VU1FDg.
63 UNMISS and the South Sudan Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster, Roles and Responsibilities, 2014, https://goo.gl/vItMyi.
complemented by a document titled 
Responsibilities in UNMISS POC Sites for Planning 
and Budgetary Purposes, which linked activities to 
specific sections in the mission and humanitarian 
clusters. Interviewees strongly recommended that 
this type of matrix be developed in future POC 
site settings to help navigate the complex sets of 
activities that will undoubtedly be required.
When developing a roles and responsibilities 
document for future POC site operations, protec-
tion actors emphasized that humanitarians and 
the UN mission should agree on who specifically 
will be responsible for managing sensitive issues 
such as conducting interviews, case management, 
or supervising community justice and reconcilia-
tion initiatives. The International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) Professional Standards for 
Protection Work can be a valuable tool in this 
process. In certain sites in South Sudan, actors 
were able to navigate these complex issues by 
relying more heavily on UNMISS civilian sections 
with particular expertise in dealing with sensitive 
cases. While multiple humanitarian actors and 
UN mission sections may have legitimate reasons 
to be involved in these issues, developing a stream-
lined and survivor-centered approach will yield 
the best outcome for all actors involved. Issues 
associated with humanitarians and peacekeepers 
working with survivors of sexual violence in 
particular are discussed in Box 2.
DEVELOP GLOBAL GUIDELINES 
FOR KEY POSITIONS
For UN sections that are likely to play a central 
role in POC site contexts, DPKO (in consultation 
with humanitarians) may want to consider devel-
oping suggested SOPs or Terms of Reference 
(TORs) at the global level. While each mission will 
need to contextualize these documents based on 
the specific dynamics and needs on the ground, 
having a document to start with may facilitate this 
process and help field missions avoid delays and 
pitfalls experienced in other locations. Three 
positions stand out in this regard: the Recovery, 
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Survivors of sexual violence can face unique 
difficulties in POC site settings. Although the 
housing of an IDP camp inside a UN base can 
have advantages when it comes to proximity of 
services and physical security, the multiplicity of 
actors and ease of access for UN mission personnel 
can create its own challenges. As one gender-based 
violence (GBV) specialist in South Sudan ex-
plained, in POC sites “survivors are even more 
under the microscope than they would be in a 
normal IDP camp.”
Whereas in a traditional IDP camp there may be a 
small number of peacekeepers protecting the 
perimeter of the camp, in POC sites it is not 
uncommon to have United Nations Police 
(UNPOL) Individual Police Officers, Formed 
Police Units (FPU), Human Rights Division 
(HRD), and multiple other sections inside the 
POC site on any given day. Each of these sections 
have mandated tasks in the POC sites relating to 
the peace, security, and well-being of the IDPs, 
and as a result, survivors are sometimes inter-
viewed by multiple different sections, each using 
the information for slightly different purposes. 
“Survivors are treated as passive subjects” in POC 
sites, said the GBV specialist.
In one case, after the resumption of fighting in July 
2016, the Protection Cluster voiced concern about 
plans for a visiting high level delegation to meet 
with a GBV survivor. An UNMISS official re-
sponded that indeed, one survivor had already 
been interviewed over 10 times. Repeated inter-
viewing of this nature can have extremely damag-
ing impacts for both the individual and the com-
munity, from re-traumatizing the survivor, to 
breaching their anonymity, to making other 
survivors less likely to seek help in the future.
Should POC sites emerge in future crises, it will be 
important for the UN mission and humanitarian 
protection partners to develop a clear agreement 
on how cases of sexual violence will be managed. 
This agreement needs to include all the sections 
that might be involved in receiving a case or 
interviewing the survivor, as well as the political 
and senior leadership offices who organize visiting 
delegations. A plan should be developed that is 
survivor-centered and prioritizes Do No Harm. 
There were positive examples of this in South 
Sudan (most notably in the Malakal POC site), 
which resulted predominantly from humanitarian 
protection actors and UNMISS human rights 
actors developing a close working relationship and 
agreement on how cases would be managed.
BOX 2: THE IMPACT OF THE POC SITE MODEL 
ON SURVIVORS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE
Reintegration, and Peacebuilding section (RRP) in 
UN missions, State Coordinators (now retitled 
Head of Field Office in the case of South Sudan), 
and the Deputy Special Representative of the 
Secretary General (DSRSG).
In interviews for this publication, humanitarians 
almost unanimously cited frustration with the role 
of RRP in the South Sudan response, in one case 
saying that RRP “wants to have a say in everything 
but be responsible for nothing.” Many humanitari-
ans felt that rather than facilitating engagement 
between humanitarians and different sections of 
the UN mission, RRP was often instead a block-
age. “If you want to get things done, you go 
straight to the troop contingents,” said one hu-
manitarian official. A number of humanitarians 
expressed concern that the political role of RRP in 
supporting senior leadership often interfered with 
their role in facilitating humanitarian operations. 
They expressed concern that decisions relating to 
the welfare of the IDPs were often not made on the 
basis of security or protection (the primary con-
cerns of Force), but rather for political reasons (as 
prioritized by RRP and mission leadership).
The role of the State Coordinator was also seen as 
controversial among many humanitarians. 
Although UNMISS officials were quick to high-
light that State Coordinators (or Head of Field 
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Offices) are ultimately accountable for what goes 
on in UNMISS bases, some humanitarians felt 
that this was at times used as an excuse to exces-
sively control humanitarian operations. One 
humanitarian explained that it was the State 
Coordinator, not camp management or a technical 
expert, who decided how many people would live 
in Malakal Sector 1. “We said that it could hold no 
more than 10,000 people safely, but eventually we 
had 12,500 people there because of UNMISS 
pressure.” Over subsequent years the Malakal 
POC experienced repeated fires, in part due to the 
level of overcrowding and the absence of adequate 
fire breaks.64 Humanitarians repeatedly requested 
the Mission to ask for more land from the govern-
ment, but the Mission appeared reluctant to do so 
lest this lead to the camp becoming more 
permanent.65
As in many operations, the role of the DSRSG 
(triple hatted as Humanitarian Coordinator [HC] 
and Resident Coordinator [RC]) was also noted by 
64 Radio Tamazuj, Fire and grenade blast kill 7 at Malakal UN base, January 12, 2016, http://goo.gl/ns1heT.
65 In their official response to this publication, UNMISS leadership argued that the refusal to work towards site expansion related to the additional troops that would be 
required to protect a larger area, as well as the financial requirements this would entail. However, humanitarians had already developed a plan with UNMISS Force to 
construct a robust perimeter that would reduce the number of troops needed, and likewise humanitarians had already independently sourced the funding necessary 
to put in place such infrastructure.
interviewees as being problematic, and the success 
of the position being particularly personality 
dependent. Numerous publications have noted the 
challenges with having a triple hatted DSRSG/HC/
RC, but these issues are uniquely acute in POC site 
settings where there is much greater overlap 
between the UN mission and work of humanitari-
an actors. Although having a triple hatted DSRSG/
HC/RC can present opportunities for strengthened 
coordination, many humanitarian actors felt that 
there was a need for better structure and guidelines 
to articulate how the person filling this position 
should balance and prioritize their three roles.
Having global SOPs or suggested TORs that 
articulate the roles of these types of central (and 
sometimes controversial) positions in POC site 
settings could help to avoid confusion on the 
ground and reduce tensions between actors. Given 
the respective areas of expertise, it will be impor-
tant that any such SOPs emphasize the criticality 
of humanitarians retaining control over the 
Fire damage in the Malakal POC site following an attack in February 2016. © IOM / Rainer Gonzalez
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technical aspects of the humanitarian response, 
while recognizing that the approach will need to 
be developed in close cooperation with the UN 
mission to ensure the feasibility within the given 
security context. A 2016 Special Report of the 
Secretary General recommended that UN mis-
sions “be responsible for ensuring the external 
security of the sites and their immediate sur-
roundings…humanitarian actors should be 
responsible for the management of the sites and 
the provision of services therein.“66
Finally, any Roles and Responsibilities documents 
(particularly those developed at field level) will 
need to be reviewed at regular intervals. Having a 
senior level meeting at least once a year to discuss 
the division of responsibilities can help to ensure all 
actors have a common understanding of approach 
and could enable leadership to address coordina-
tion issues where tensions have been identified. It 
could likewise be useful to establish a formal 
complaints mechanism that humanitarians and 
UN mission staff could use to address issues that 
they have been unable to resolve at site or national 
level. This was attempted in South Sudan through a 
national POC site coordination meeting, but led to 
frustration within the mission that some issues had 
not first been adequately address at site level.
CONDUCT JOINT, 
REALISTIC PLANNING
Another lesson to emerge from South Sudan and 
previous crises is the need for joint and realistic 
operational planning between the UN mission and 
humanitarians. This imperative applies both to 
planning for contingency purposes, as well as for 
operational aspects of the ongoing response. As a 
2009 DPKO document points out, “It has become 
evident that mission sites will likely become a 
magnet for displaced persons seeking protection 
or assistance in the midst of conflict. This is an 
eventuality for which missions should develop 
contingency plans.”67 Key to successful planning is 
66 UN Security Council, S/2016/951, Special report of the Secretary-General on the review of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, November 10, 
2016, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/951, 11.
67 UN DPKO/DFS, Learned Note on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Dilemmas, Emerging Practices and Lessons, 2010, 18.
68 South Sudan CCCM Cluster, Juba Contingency Plan – UNMISS Tomping, November 2016.
69 UN DPKO, Challenges, lessons learned and implications of the protection of civilians sites in South Sudan, 8.
ensuring that scenarios reflect the realities on the 
ground – regardless of how uncomfortable they 
may be.
There is a sense among many humanitarians in 
South Sudan that too often, UNMISS planning is 
done on the basis of preferred scenario rather than 
the most likely scenario, or worst case scenario. 
One example of this relates to contingency plan-
ning in Juba. Three months after the renewed 
outbreak of fighting in July 2016, humanitarians 
and UNMISS once again reinitiated conversations 
about contingency areas in UNMISS bases. 
Humanitarians used a planning figure that 
matched the number of IDPs who had arrived into 
the base in July, but the space allocated by 
UNMISS was so small that even if total space per 
person was reduced to only 10m2 (one third of the 
internationally recognized emergency standard), 
the site could still only hold half the number of 
people humanitarians were using as a contingency 
figure.68 Humanitarians expressed concern that a 
larger influx would likely mean that IDPs would 
once again self-settle haphazardly within the base 
(as they had done in July) and that humanitarians 
would not be equipped to support them. 
Nevertheless, no additional space was allocated.
While planning for the preferred scenario may be 
easier and more politically acceptable, in the end, 
it is counterproductive for all parties involved. If 
contingency planning takes into account realistic 
eventualities, regardless of how unwelcome, the 
plans will be far more fit for purpose. Planning 
should always be done on the basis of the 
most-likely scenario, not the preferred scenario. A 
2016 DPKO came to similar conclusions: “Worst-
case scenarios, however unpalatable, should be 
considered.”69
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If contingency planning takes into account 
realistic eventualities, regardless of how 
unwelcome, the plans will be far more fit for 
purpose. Planning should always be done on the 
basis of the most-likely scenario, not the preferred 
scenario.
Similar lessons apply to planning for implementa-
tion of the ongoing humanitarian response. As 
described in previous sections, humanitarian 
partners were regularly told that the POC sites 
were “temporary” and that as such, more sustaina-
ble approaches would not be permitted. In reality, 
shortly after the arrival of IDPs into UNMISS 
bases in December 2013, it became clear to most 
humanitarians that the sites were there to stay. 
Honest reflection within UNMISS undoubtedly 
yielded the same conclusion, and yet despite this, 
humanitarians have still been required to use 
short term, emergency approaches to service 
provision. In Wau, for example, humanitarian 
partners are still required to truck water to the 
POC site every day rather than drill a borehole, an 
approach that cost tens of thousands of dollars 
more and is far more vulnerable to changes in the 
security environment. A senior humanitarian 
official explained that in refugee settings, “when 
you see that a camp is there for one or two years, 
you start looking at transitional shelters, etc., 
because after a certain point no one will invest.” 
The interviewee lamented that although it was 
clear early on that the POC sites were here to stay, 
humanitarians have nevertheless not been permit-
ted to adapt the response accordingly, and predict-
ably, funding is now starting to wane. By the time 
UNMISS concedes to using more sustainable 
materials, there may no longer be the funds 
available to do so.
Subsequent chapters look in greater detail at issues 
relating to pull factors, entrenchment, and long 
term options, but underlying all of these is the 
need for humanitarians and UN mission actors to 
have a more open and honest dialogue about 
capacities, constraints, and realistic options for the 
future.
PRIORITIZE DECONFLICTION 
WHERE POSSIBLE
Another element that came out strongly in discus-
sions in South Sudan is the need for humanitari-
ans in POC site contexts to maintain independ-
ence and distinction from the UN mission, despite 
the complexities of doing so within a POC site 
setting. Even more than in a traditional IDP camp, 
distinction in a POC site environment is para-
mount to the ability of humanitarians to effective-
ly provide assistance and protection.
An initial risk of dependency noted by humanitar-
ians in South Sudan was that becoming overly 
reliant on a UN mission opens space for leverage 
that can be counterproductive to independent 
humanitarian operations. In many of South 
Sudan’s POC sites, humanitarians lived inside the 
bases of the UN mission at the start of the crisis 
– to date, this is still the case in Bentiu and 
Malakal. While organizations have now become 
more self-sufficient, during the early days of the 
crisis, many humanitarian partners were still 
largely dependent on UNMISS resources. As one 
humanitarian official explained, “we would have a 
meeting with UNMISS about standards in the 
POC [site], and then when that was finished, we 
would go straight into another meeting about the 
amount of electricity being used by humanitarian 
partners.” He went on to say that although there 
was never an explicit connection drawn between 
the two conversations, there was an implied sense 
of “we’re doing you a favor by letting you stay here, 
so don’t make things difficult in the POC site.”
Similar sentiments were reported by humanitari-
ans in relation to the use of UNMISS’ assets for 
programming purposes. One humanitarian 
pointed out that UNMISS was happy to let hu-
manitarian organizations use their heavy equip-
ment, but only for projects that were favored by the 
Mission. Regardless of whether this sense of 
leverage is deliberate or self-imposed by humani-
tarians who are uncomfortable with the blurred 
lines brought on by the POC site model, the 
perception that dependency creates leverage is in 
its own right problematic for upholding independ-
ent humanitarian operations.
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A second element that makes distinction uniquely 
important in a POC site context is the heightened 
risks of being aligned with a UN mission if some-
thing occurs to make the mission seem less neutral 
in the eyes of a party to the conflict. While this is a 
risk in any peacekeeping context, the potential 
impacts are far greater in a POC setting where a 
significant portion of the humanitarian response 
is delivered to people seeking refuge inside UN 
bases. If the UN mission reaches a point where it is 
no longer perceived to be a neutral actor, humani-
tarians may have to walk a very delicate balance in 
order to continue providing services inside the 
sites, as well as to IDPs and conflict affected 
communities in other parts of the country who 
depend on humanitarian actors. These risks are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7.
While humanitarians may have no choice but to 
use UN mission assets and stay on-site during the 
first phases of a crisis, humanitarians suggested 
during interviews that organizations should 
transition out of this as soon as possible. This is 
typically easier to do with a number of organiza-
tions working together, so partners may want to 
pool resources to maximize on economies of scale 
if there is a common need for equipment, assets, or 
security. Forming joint humanitarian hubs outside 
of UN bases or POC sites can be a good option for 
this.
EXERCISE CAUTION WITH 
QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS (QIPS) 
AND PUBLIC MESSAGING
Other elements that can have an impact on percep-
tions of independence and distinction are issues 
such as the approach to communications from the 
UN mission and the use of “quick impact projects” 
(QIPs) by troop contingents. In the case of the 
former, the fact that the POC sites are inside UN 
bases may give the UN mission the sense that they 
can speak to the humanitarian context, or speak on 
behalf of humanitarian actors. While this may 
seem innocuous, in contexts where social media is 
used widely (as is the case in South Sudan), these 
70 UNMISS Tweet, 6.32 AM, October 7, 2014, https://twitter.com/unmissmedia/status/519480355397844992.
types of communications from the UN mission 
can be detrimental to the public’s understanding of 
the distinct roles of different actors. Further, the 
UN mission and humanitarians may have differing 
perspectives on the humanitarian and security 
situation, and the existence of two diverging sets of 
messages can create confusion among the IDP 
population and general public.
In 2014, the South Sudan Humanitarian Country 
Team developed a “Dos and Don’ts” paper to guide 
the public information approaches of humanitari-
ans and the UN mission. This initiative is com-
mendable and is worth replicating in other POC 
site contexts. As with any such guidelines though, 
they require review at regular intervals to ensure 
all actors remain aware and committed to the 
guidelines. Humanitarians found that over time, 
compliance with the guidelines reduced. The 
Tweet above70 is one example of the type of public 
communication from UNMISS that generated ire 
among humanitarians due to the perception that 
UNMISS and the SRSG were speaking on behalf of 
humanitarians (including NGOs who do not fall 
under the SRSG’s purview) on an issue that was 
highly sensitive and controversial, and about 
which there was not yet consensus among the 
humanitarian community.
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Humanitarians were also particularly concerned 
about the provision of direct assistance by troop 
contingents and QIPs.71 While the interest of the 
troop contingents to provide practical assistance is 
understood, there was a risk that such activities 
could lead to confusion about the different roles of 
humanitarians and peacekeepers. Humanitarians 
saw this to be particularly problematic in areas of 
active conflict where the role of UNMISS (and 
thereby perception of humanitarians) could 
become more contentious among the parties to the 
conflict.
To address these issues, the South Sudan Civil 
Military Advisory Group72 developed a document 
outlining “limitation zones.” It was agreed that 
direct assistance and QIPs would only be used in 
locations that are not heavily affected by conflict 
or displacement, and that UNMISS and troop 
contingents would never duplicate services that 
could be provided by humanitarians. There have 
been fewer miscommunications between UNMISS 
and humanitarians thanks to this document, 
despite it not having been as effective in prevent-
ing direct assistance implemented by individual 
troop contingents independently from the UN 
Mission. This type of document could be a useful 
tool in future POC site contexts.
AGREE ON CIVIL MILITARY 
COORDINATION STRUCTURES 
AND FOCAL POINTS
Due to the overlapping operational spheres in 
POC site contexts, it is particularly important to 
have clear procedures and focal points for civil 
military coordination. Some of these mechanisms 
have already been mandated at the global level, but 
in contexts with POC sites, these will need to be 
articulated in much greater detail and include 
specific procedures relating to how coordination 
will be managed at site level.
71 Humanitarians in UN mission contexts should be aware that there are two distinct forms of direct assistance and QIPs: 1) projects that are funded and monitored by 
the UN mission, and 2) direct assistance projects that are funded and implemented by individual troop contingents independently. In the case of the latter, there is 
often limited central oversight by the UN mission.
72 Composed of humanitarians and representatives from UNMISS.
In the case of South Sudan, RRP typically served 
as the UNMISS civilian focal point for operational 
issues relating to camp management within the 
POC sites, and the Protection of Civilians Unit 
served as intermediary on protection issues. Joint 
Operations Command (JOC) and J9 (Force Civil 
Military) served as the military focal points. JOC 
meetings were initially held on a daily basis, and 
then the frequency was reduced as the crisis 
became more protracted. RRP originally also 
hosted a “National POC Coordination” meeting, 
but these were eventually phased out in favor of 
prioritizing problem-solving at site level. On the 
humanitarian side, the Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) acted as the 
primary focal point on all issues relating to civil 
military coordination, and often worked closely 
with the protection cluster on issues relating to 
UNMISS’ protection of civilians mandate. Camp 
management agencies were typically the focal 
point for engagement with RRP.
While this system works well in principle, in 
practice there were numerous challenges. As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, RRP was at times 
not seen as an effective civilian interlocutor, as a 
result of their competing mandate to facilitate the 
departure of IDPs from the POC sites and to 
support UNMISS leadership. As a result, RRP was 
consequently at times bypassed by humanitarian 
actors. Coordination with military sections was 
seen to be stronger, though the JOC meetings 
reportedly became more useful for information 
sharing than coordination, which increasingly 
took place bilaterally. Many humanitarians voiced 
strong feelings in interviews that the absence of an 
apolitical advocate in the Mission was a hindrance 
to more effective coordination and responses. 
Some interviewees (both humanitarian and from 
the Mission) pointed out that the office of the 
DSRSG/HC/RC is intended to assist with this 
function, but that due to personalities, this man-
date was not always fulfilled.
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Humanitarian actors in South Sudan have at times 
also created confusion by delivering different 
messages in civil military coordination forums, 
and need to ensure better consistency in their 
engagement with the mission. In a JOC meeting in 
early 2017, the Protection Cluster representative 
reportedly indicated that the Inter-Cluster 
Working Group (ICWG) had requested informa-
tion from UNMISS on their plans to move IDPs 
out of the Leer Temporary Protection Area. This 
issue had been very controversial in the ICWG, 
and no such request had been made. However, 
because this message was delivered in the JOC 
meeting (where only OCHA, the Protection 
Cluster, and the NGO Forum have seats on behalf 
of humanitarian actors), UNMISS took this to 
mean that humanitarian actors were on board 
with the relocation, and began initiating the 
planning process. These types of mistakes can 
have long-term impacts on the trust between 
actors and the effectiveness of civil military 
coordination structures.
ESTABLISH A HIGH-LEVEL 
COORDINATION FORUM
In POC site settings, it is particularly important 
that humanitarian and UN mission leadership can 
communicate openly and directly. While various 
forums of this nature may already exist prior to 
the establishment of the POC sites, it is critical 
that separate space either be dedicated to address-
ing POC site issues within the existing mecha-
nisms, or a new forum be established that is solely 
devoted to discussing the humanitarian and POC 
site issues. Having such a forum at senior levels 
can ensure that priorities and constraints facing 
humanitarians and the mission are mutually 
understood, and that resolutions can be found to 
any ongoing issues in a timely and transparent 
manner.
In the case of South Sudan, a “mini-HCT” was 
established that included senior officials from the 
humanitarian community, select representatives 
from the donor and diplomatic community, the 
DSRSG/HC/RC, and the SRSG. These meetings 
generally took place on an ad hoc basis, and while 
they were seen by some a useful forum to address 
significant issues, others felt that these meetings 
often lacked a two-way dialogue and were more 
commonly used as an opportunity for the SRSG to 
“lecture” humanitarians. Although personalities 
may have caused this particular forum to be less 
effective than could have otherwise been the case, 
it is nevertheless a worthwhile initiative to consid-
er for future operations.
MAINTAIN TRANSPARENCY
Finally, one last aspect that is important in ena-
bling coordination in POC site settings is for all 
actors to maintain openness and transparency. 
This relates not only to openness between humani-
tarian actors and the UN mission, but also towards 
external researchers and evaluators. While recog-
nizing that there will be sensitive issues that 
cannot always be discussed, both humanitarians 
and the UN mission should make an effort to 
share information when possible and should not 
shy away from self-reflection or lessons learned.
During research for this publication, three senior 
level UNMISS officials independently expressed 
concern about the growing restrictions preventing 
UNMISS staff from speaking to visiting academ-
ics, researchers, and evaluators. Researchers are 
now required to gain written permission from the 
UNMISS Chief of Staff before speaking to any 
UNMISS personnel, and are at times required to 
submit their questions in advance. Visiting re-
searchers from renowned human rights institu-
tions have likewise been told that they cannot 
interview IDPs in the POC site without an 
UNMISS escort. These types of restrictions foster 
an environment of mistrust and suspicion rather 
than cultivating a positive relationship between 
actors. In the words of one senior UNMISS official, 
“we are trying to control [the narrative] in the 
same way the government tries to control it. It’s 
not good.” In UNMISS’ formal response to this 
publication they explained that this practice was 
to ensure that “the right experts speak on a par-
ticular issue so as to give the correct information,” 
however interviewees suggested that the policy 
appeared to be aimed at ensuring that staff only 
deliver the official talking points and do not share 
personal experiences which may contradict or call 
into question UNMISS’ official messages.
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 5   HUMANITARIAN RESPONSES INSIDE 
AND OUTSIDE POC SITES
When POC sites first emerge in a crisis, the protection and assistance needs can be overwhelming. UN 
mission bases are not designed to host displacement camps, and humanitarians may be faced with 
trying to build a site from scratch, while simultaneously addressing the immediate food, medical, and 
protection needs of the affected population both inside and outside the sites. All of this may occur 
while humanitarians are contending with their own security restrictions, evacuations, and other 
resource constraints.
In this chaotic environment, the balance between 
supporting the POC sites and supporting vulnera-
ble persons elsewhere can sometimes be momen-
tarily lost – this is understandable. As time pro-
gresses, however, it is critical that humanitarians 
work to realign the assistance and protection 
provided to ensure that it is responsive to the areas 
of greatest need. Undoubtedly, POC sites will 
constitute a large part of this, but providing 
support to the POC sites should not prevent 
continued efforts to strengthen responses in other 
parts of the country.
Humanitarians working in POC sites may also be 
faced with new operational and infrastructure 
constraints that impact their ways of working. The 
approach to service provision in POC sites may be 
heavily influenced by the UN mission, and hu-
manitarians may have to adapt their usual stand-
ards and guidelines to accommodate this unique 
context. This can be a difficult process for humani-
tarian actors who typically prioritize independ-
ence and adhere to global guidelines and 
standards.
The following chapter provides considerations for 
humanitarians when designing a strategy for 
humanitarian responses in a POC site setting. 
Based on the experiences from South Sudan, the 
chapter focuses on effectively balancing and 
triaging responses inside and outside sites, but it 
also looks at the particularities associated with 
service delivery inside sites themselves.
MAINTAIN EQUAL MONITORING 
OF NEEDS AND RISKS INSIDE 
AND OUTSIDE OF SITES
A first lesson to emerge from South Sudan that 
applies equally to humanitarians and peacekeep-
ers is the importance of maintaining equal moni-
toring of the needs and threats inside and outside 
POC sites. While it may be impossible to launch a 
response in every part of a crisis-affected country 
simultaneously, it is imperative that humanitari-
ans and peacekeepers are at the very least aware of 
changes to the context so that responses can be 
triaged on the basis of objective analysis of the 
severity of need (humanitarian) and threat (peace-
keepers) rather than on responding to what is 
easiest or most proximate. Particularly during the 
initial phase of a crisis when POC sites are just 
emerging, attention is likely to focus heavily on 
the situation inside the sites, at times at the 
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expense of understanding needs elsewhere. “In the 
first year of the crisis everyone wanted to be in the 
POC [site]s,” said one humanitarian official of the 
crisis in South Sudan. “That’s where donors 
wanted to visit, that’s where the TV cameras 
went.”
Although this is a predictable response given the 
highly visible nature of POC sites, it is important 
that humanitarians, the UN mission, and other 
international actors recognize that people who 
arrive at POC sites may not necessarily be the 
most vulnerable members of the population. 
Whole communities may be trapped in remote 
areas without access to effective protection reme-
dies, and elderly people and persons with disabili-
ties (even those living in proximity to a UN base) 
may struggle to flee with their family members. 
Understanding the situation of these types of 
individuals is far more difficult, and as a result is at 
times not factored into response planning.
While the needs of the people reaching the POC 
sites are likely to be substantial, it is crucial that 
humanitarians and peacekeepers continue to 
closely monitor the needs and threats elsewhere 
and adjust their responses accordingly. One 
humanitarian interviewed for this publication 
described how POC sites can quickly become a 
“comfort zone” for humanitarians and peacekeep-
ers, an easy location where, for example, the 
Human Rights Division can conduct interviews 
without interference, and where humanitarians 
can set up services without worrying about at-
tacks. These activities should of course be pursued, 
but it should not come at the expense of support-
ing people elsewhere if the greatest needs exist 
outside the sites.
Once this needs analysis has been completed, it is 
important for humanitarian actors and peacekeep-
ers to develop clear strategies on how they will 
address acute needs and threats that arise in hard 
to reach locations. This will require an analysis on 
the types of blockages humanitarians and peace-
keepers may face in responding in these areas. 
Access or political barriers may be key 
73 Survival kits were used in South Sudan to deliver a one-off package of essential lifesaving materials to communities who, due to the presence of an immediate threat, 
could not benefit from a more sustained humanitarian intervention or repeated distributions. The kits typically included materials like fishing nets, water purification 
tablets, mosquito nets, and high energy biscuits.
impediments, for example, which could require a 
country-wide access strategy, or engagement from 
the HC or diplomatic community in negotiating 
unhindered passage. Humanitarians may need to 
consider creative approaches to providing assis-
tance, such as mobile interventions or the use of 
multi-sector “survival kits.”73
RATIONALIZE THE NUMBER 
OF HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS 
INSIDE POC SITES
A second key lesson to emerge from South Sudan 
in regard to maintaining an effective humanitari-
an response is the importance of rationalizing the 
number of partners working inside and outside of 
POC sites. When the POC sites first emerge, there 
is often an influx of partners who are eager to 
respond in the sites. Visibility and media attention 
is high, new donor funding may be available, and 
organizations may face pressure from their head-
quarters to respond inside in order to maintain 
“organizational relevance.” Other organizations 
may feel that they have to be present due to their 
role as a Cluster Lead Agency or in order to be able 
to do advocacy on issues facing POC sites. As one 
former cluster focal point recalled during an 
interview, “at one point I had eight or nine organi-
zations working inside, and zero working outside.”
While an initial surge of partners can help to 
quickly scale up a response, having too many 
actors operating in one site can be counterproduc-
tive. Not only are organizations unable to maxi-
mize economies of scale on a logistical level, but 
equally, actors may begin to implement services to 
different standards or specifications. This can 
cause discord among the displaced population 
who may question why they have not received the 
same assistance as their relative or friend. The 
proliferation of organizations and variance in 
delivery then increases the need for coordination, 
which creates the risk of burdensome coordination 
mechanisms that could be avoided if there were a 
more streamlined response.
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BOX 3: MYTH-BUSTING: PROPORTIONALITY OF THE 
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE AND DIVERSION OF FUNDS
During the first phase of a crisis, humanitarian 
actors must dedicate a considerable amount of 
resources to the initial construction of a POC site. 
While some of these expenses will have to be 
repeated over time (particularly if, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, humanitarians are not 
allowed to use sustainable materials), they are by 
and large one-off costs. This investment can lead 
to the impression that humanitarian resources are 
being diverted from other locations, but while this 
may be true in some cases, in reality the construc-
tion of a new camp also typically comes with an 
increase in new funding. Consider the 2013 and 
2014 budgets of the International Organization of 
Migration (IOM) for example: in 2013, IOM 
received 45.6 million USD for their operations in 
South Sudan. The following year, after taking on 
the responsibility for site works in two of the POC 
sites, IOM received 78.6 million USD.74
In South Sudan, it is nearly impossible to track the 
amount of funds that were dedicated to the POC 
sites compared to more rural locations given that 
organizational budgets are typically only disaggre-
gated at the state or county level. If this data were 
available, however, there are few trends that could 
likely be observed:
 B First, during the initial stages of a crisis, the 
ratio of funds spent inside versus outside of 
POC sites would likely be disproportionately 
high in favor of the POC sites. A frequent 
critique during the early days of the South 
Sudan crisis was that over 30 percent of the 
humanitarian budget was spent on activities in 
the POC sites, but the sites housed only 14 
percent of the IDP population.75 While this 
statistic may be accurate, this spike in resource 
allocation can be expected during any initial 
camp startup (both POC site and traditional 
IDP camp) given the expensive nature of site 
works and of the installation of basic 
infrastructure.
74 OCHA Financial Tracking System, https://fts.unocha.org/countries/211/summary/2016.
75 Arenson, If We Leave we are Killed, 40.
 B Second, as the IOM example above shows, 
these initial expenses are also likely to be met 
by new influxes of funding, meaning that 
while more money overall may go into the 
POC sites, it is not necessarily being diverted 
from operations elsewhere. Undoubtedly, 
diversion will occur in some places, but in 
South Sudan this was typically described by 
interviewees as an outlier as opposed to the 
norm. Nevertheless, there is a risk that despite 
funding not being pulled from other locations, 
the attention and interest can be diverted and 
can have an impact on donor funding patterns 
during the next funding cycle.
 B Third, over time, total funding needs and 
commitments are likely to decrease, and the 
funds spent inside and outside are likely to 
become more proportional. One NGO 
Country Director described how, in the early 
stages of the crisis, approximately 60 percent 
of their operational budget was spent inside 
the POC sites, compared to closer to 20 per-
cent today. “The needs in the beginning were 
huge,” he explained. “We had a caseload of 
three thousand unaccompanied and separated 
children. There were massive levels of sexual 
violence. Three years later, people are more 
sensitized, there’s less need for us to do the 
same types of awareness raising and activities 
that we did in the POC [site]s before.”
 B Fourth, at a certain point, the level of spending 
inside POC sites will likely stabilize and will 
be primarily spent on sustaining basic services 
as opposed to site development. Depending on 
the approach to service provision, the cost to 
beneficiary ratio is likely to continue to be 
higher inside a POC site than outside, but this 
has largely to do with the fact that as a result of 
limitations in freedom of movement, more 
blanket services are provided inside POC sites 
than is the case elsewhere. This will be dis-
cussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
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Equally, having a disproportionate number of 
actors working in POC sites may mean that there 
is a dearth of actors available to respond to needs 
elsewhere. Given that the POC site population is 
likely to only be one small portion of the total 
caseload in need of support, having too many 
actors working in the sites may prevent urgently 
needed protection and assistance from reaching 
people in other parts of the country.
In a POC site context there are also unique con-
straints that may not exist in normal IDP camps. 
During the initial phases of the crisis humanitari-
ans are likely to stay within UN bases, and there 
will typically be a cap on the number of humani-
tarians that the UN mission is able to host. These 
limits may relate to space, resources such as the 
availability of water and electricity, and the securi-
ty environment. Changes to any one of those 
variables may impact the number of staff permit-
ted to stay at the base, meaning organizations and 
clusters need to think carefully about how to 
maximize the impact of individual staff members. 
Having an individual who can oversee multiple 
projects can ensure greater continuity of services 
during times where few staff are permitted to 
remain at the base or site.
When deciding which partners should work inside 
and outside of sites, it is important for the organi-
zation and cluster to think critically about the 
different capacities and comparative advantages. 
Where possible, and without excluding the need 
for some specialized actors, clusters and donors 
should prioritize partners who can deliver a 
multi-sector response. This can facilitate greater 
coordination, integration of services, and cost 
effectiveness. It is likewise crucial that organiza-
tions carefully consider their own risk tolerance 
thresholds, and that at cluster level, this is exam-
ined across the range of potential partners. One 
senior humanitarian official explained that in the 
case of his organization, a decision was made early 
in the crisis to focus on the POC sites. The organi-
zation fell under UN Department of Safety and 
Security (DSS) regulations, which at that time was 
heavily restricting movement outside of UNMISS 
bases. The organization knew that NGOs would be 
more nimble in responding to ongoing needs 
outside since they were not bound by the same 
DSS restrictions, and thus decided to focus their 
Today, OCHA estimates that 79 percent of 
beneficiaries reached by humanitarian 
organizations in South Sudan are outside 
POC sites. While there is certainly a greater 
concentration of services for IDPs inside the 
sites than outside, the large number of people 
reached in remote locations demonstrates 
humanitarians’ ongoing commitments to 
supporting people in hard to reach areas, and 
indicates that there are ongoing efforts to 
rationalize humanitarian presence.
In interviews for this publication, humanitar-
ian actors emphasized the importance of 
“getting it right from the beginning,” given 
that funding availability is likely to decrease 
as the crisis becomes more protracted, 
leaving fewer funds available to make im-
provements at a later stage. Many humanitar-
ian actors felt strongly that if there are 
indicators that a POC site is likely to exist for 
a number of years, they should be permitted 
to use sustainable materials which will be 
much more cost-effective long term.
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own efforts inside the sites where they could 
provide a more predictable and efficient response. 
While some people may see this as a risk transfer 
to NGOs, it was also a practical decision in light of 
the need to maintain services both inside and 
outside the POC sites. Short of changing DSS’ 
security management system, these types of 
uncomfortable, but practical considerations will 
need to continue to be accounted for in the future. 
DSS-bound agencies can also support remote 
responses through other means, for example by 
providing supplies from their pipelines to NGOs 
working in hard to reach areas.
Ultimately, maintaining an effective rationaliza-
tion of partners inside POC sites will require close 
communication and cooperation between clusters, 
camp management, donors, and partners. Clusters 
are responsible for assessing the full spectrum of 
needs across the country, and providing a rough 
recommendation of how the response should be 
divided between organizations. Respecting cluster 
recommendations can be crucial in ensuring that 
response efforts are appropriately balanced. This is 
discussed in greater detail in Box 4.
CONTEXTUALIZE AND AGREE ON 
TECHNICAL GUIDELINES AND 
STANDARDS FOR POC SITES
Another lesson that should be learned from the 
South Sudan POC sites is the need to agree on 
contextualized standards for service provision. 
Although this type of agreement was never 
reached in South Sudan, it could have been instru-
mental in reducing tensions and delays long-term: 
rather than having to re-debate standards every 
time there was a new population influx or change 
in personnel, humanitarian partners and the UN 
Mission could have moved straight into problem 
solving. If there is a common understanding in 
future POC sites that each IDP should have 15m2, 
for example, humanitarians would not need to 
spend time negotiating to use the contingency 
space for decongestion, nor would there need to be 
76 Sphere outlines minimum requirements for standards such as space per person (30m2), number of latrines (one per 20 people), and daily water supply per person 
(15 liters).
extensive discussions about whether the UN 
mission should request additional land from the 
authorities. Decisions would become more auto-
mated, which would enable a more timely and 
effective response.
In contextualizing the technical standards for a 
POC site context, there are three elements that 
need to be respected: first, humanitarians need to 
be willing to compromise. While diverging from 
Sphere Standards76 is not anyone’s preference, 
humanitarians must also be realistic about the 
unique challenges posed by a POC site environ-
ment, and be cognizant of the constraints facing 
the UN mission. Second, the UN mission needs to 
disclose in writing any issues or conditions that 
could have an impact on the humanitarian opera-
tion. This could include regulations such as a 
minimum space required for each UN troop, a 
political directive mandating that no permanent 
infrastructure will be erected, or security consid-
erations that could impact the site layout or space 
available. Third, within the parameters provided 
by the mission, technical aspects of the humani-
tarian response should be left to humanitarians 
with the relevant expertise.
A primary source of frustration for many humani-
tarians in South Sudan was a sense of not under-
standing the parameters in which they were 
working. Partners would be informed by UNMISS 
that they could not drill a borehole, but the expla-
nation given was often perceived to be incomplete 
or convoluted. Rather than having a frank conver-
sation about the constraints in a particular site, 
many humanitarians felt they were often left to 
guess the rationale for the directives they had been 
given, which led to an environment of mistrust 
and speculation. This in turn sometimes drove 
humanitarians to bypass UNMISS altogether, 
further corroding the relationship between actors.
In one case in Malakal, the defection of a senior 
general led to an influx of IDPs into the UNMISS 
logistics base. As humanitarian partners prepared 
to install emergency water and sanitation facilities 
for the new arrivals, they were told that they were 
48 PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS SITES
not allowed to construct any latrines – ostensibly 
because the population was supposed to leave 
imminently, and should not be encouraged to stay. 
The issue was escalated to Juba, but this appeared 
to only further aggravate the situation at Malakal 
level. Concerned about the potential for disease 
outbreak, the individual responsible for water and 
sanitation eventually commenced building latrines 
on a back road in the site. Shortly thereafter, the 
UN Department of Safety and Security was sent to 
find the individual responsible and investigate why 
the latrines had been built. Although everyone 
(including UNMISS) stood to benefit from an 
environment that was free from open defecation 
and disease, a lack of common agreement on 
standards meant that this was turned into a 
divisive and protracted debate.
Other cases in South Sudan have seen much more 
positive outcomes. One humanitarian official 
explained that in Wau, “we asked [UNMISS] Force 
what they could protect, and then we built to that 
specification.” Although the total square meter per 
person was below the 30m2 required by Sphere, the 
camp management agency felt that this was a 
worthwhile compromise if it meant UNMISS 
could provide better security for the camp 
population.
Maintaining an appropriate balance of partners 
inside and outside POC sites requires close coop-
eration from clusters, camp management, donors, 
and individual organizations. While in a crisis 
environment there can at times be a temptation to 
bypass coordination mechanisms and move 
straight into a response, this can be detrimental to 
the quality of the response long-term.
When POC sites first emerge, clusters should work 
to outline the needs inside and outside sites, and 
provide a general endorsement for which partners 
will work where. This is done primarily through 
the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), but also 
on an ad hoc basis as the crisis evolves. The aim of 
this mechanism is not to “block” organizations 
from responding, but rather to avoid duplication 
and minimize gaps. In an ideal scenario, donors 
will then fund partners for the activities endorsed 
by the cluster.
In practice, organizations and donors sometimes 
bypass the cluster and negotiate funding bilateral-
ly. At times, clusters only become aware of a 
planned intervention once the funding has already 
been received, and may be unable to prevent the 
project from moving forward. Camp management 
has the authority (working together with the UN 
mission) to prevent organizations from entering a 
POC site, but in the case of South Sudan, the 
erosion of the traditional camp management 
model in favor of a hybrid cluster system at camp 
level, meant that there was sometimes confusion 
between cluster focal points and camp manage-
ment about which partners had endorsement to 
work where.
To avoid this duplication inside POC sites, clusters 
need to be more assertive on the importance of 
gaining cluster endorsement prior to seeking 
funding for an activity in a POC site. But equally, 
donors need to commit to consulting clusters (or 
at minimum, the HRP) before funding a new 
partner to begin working inside a site.
Donors can also play an important role in promot-
ing greater responsiveness by providing funding 
that is flexible or which supports mobile interven-
tions. As one coordination official explained, 
“Donor flexibility in funding is key. Organizations 
that are most responsive are those with mobile 
funding. If you’re funded for static, you stay static. 
If you’re funded for mobile, you can be more 
reactive.” Providing funding that is tied exclusively 
to one geographic location can make it difficult for 
organizations and clusters to adapt responses to 
contextual changes and ensure that proportionali-
ty is maintained over time.
BOX 4: THE ROLE OF DONORS IN PROMOTING 
NEEDS-BASED RESPONSES
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Having an open and transparent conversation 
between humanitarians and the UN mission is 
essential in developing appropriate standards, and 
is likewise crucial in the ability of actors to esca-
late issues and hold one another accountable. In 
order for the UN mission to be comfortable 
sharing these constraints, however, humanitarians 
must acknowledge that while they may not agree 
with or like all of the constraints outlined by the 
mission, they nevertheless need to be realistic 
about likely outcomes. This does not mean hu-
manitarians cannot negotiate to try to find a 
compromise, but this needs to be done with 
respect for the fact that each TCC often has their 
own demands and caveats which, if not met, can 
have severe impacts of the resourcing of the 
mission and its ability to fulfill its mandate. 
Creating an environment of mutual trust and 
respect will be essential in finding an agreeable 
way forward.
Finally, in developing contextualized standards, 
humanitarians must be given the authority to 
determine the technical aspects of the response 
within POC sites, provided the standards comply 
with the parameters provided by and agreed with 
the UN mission. This includes all aspects of 
programming, from the types of materials used, to 
the design of the infrastructure, to how the servic-
es will be set up and implemented. Humanitarians 
must also have the space to work within their own 
timeline, unless there is a clearly explained reason 
why the timeline must be altered. Humanitarians 
should be as specific as possible when articulating 
the adapted standards so that there is no room for 
confusion or disagreement later. Likewise, al-
though there are elements of humanitarian re-
sponse which may seem inconsequential to the 
UN mission, peacekeepers must trust that after 
decades of delivering humanitarian services, 
NGOs and UN agencies have identified the types 
of issues and activities that need to be prioritized. 
For more discussion on this, see Box 5.
BOX 5: THE IMPORTANCE OF FUN
In any IDP camp setting, two of the greatest 
risks are idleness and trauma. In the ab-
sence of livelihoods, freedom of movement, 
or other activities, individuals become far 
more likely to turn to negative coping 
mechanisms like alcohol or drugs. As the 
consumption of intoxicants increases, so too 
does violence, criminality, and gang activi-
ty. Men, particularly young men and 
ex-combatants, are often disproportionately 
affected by these risks, which can have long 
term effects on their families, communities, 
and the perception of the sites by those 
outside it.
Reducing idleness is one of the many 
reasons that humanitarians emphasize the 
importance of programs that focus on 
education and skills training. Any activity 
that keeps people occupied during the day 
can lessen their vulnerability to negative 
coping strategies. These types of programs 
also help to provide people with alternative 
skillsets so that when they leave the POC 
sites, returning to fighting is not their only 
option.
Equally important though, are activities 
whose sole purpose is recreational. 
Providing space for IDPs to play sports, 
listen to music, or dance can be essential in 
allowing IDPs to blow off steam. It is for this 
same reason that humanitarians may do 
everything possible to retain football pitches 
in the POC sites, even if this means leaving 
blocks minimally overcrowded. One camp 
management specialist explained, 
“Maintaining space for sports and recrea-
tion is an important tool in helping to 
minimize boredom, frustration and tension 
arising in the population – and ultimately 
therefore in maintaining safety and security 
in the sites.”
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DECIDING BETWEEN 
TARGETED AND BLANKET 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
One of the most contentious debates to emerge in 
South Sudan was related to the balance of services 
inside and outside POC sites. Populations in the 
POC sites depended almost exclusively on human-
itarian assistance, which was provided on a 
“blanket” basis to all residents in the sites. This 
differs significantly from usual approaches to 
humanitarian service delivery, which dictate that 
assistance be targeted only to those persons most 
in need. The result is that services are much more 
concentrated in POC sites than in other parts of 
the country. Some humanitarians and peacekeep-
ers argued that this blanket approach was inappro-
priate, while others suggested that even the exist-
ing level of support was inadequate.
77 Even UNMISS has made such observations in some instances. In a Tweet on September 4, 2016, UNMISS commented that “we have seen conditions 
people are living in [in Wau], nobody would live like this if they felt secure going home.” @UNMISSMedia tweet, 7.10 AM, September 4, 2016, 
https://twitter.com/unmissmedia/status/772436766397693954.
In the case of South Sudan, arguments against 
blanket assistance related primarily to three areas: 
the risk of creating a pull factor, the potential for 
entrenchment, and the problem of undermining 
the responsibilities of the state. The pull factor and 
entrenchment debates are discussed in greater 
detail in Box 6, but in short, many officials (par-
ticularly staff of the UN Mission) felt that by 
providing such a high level of services, more 
people would be drawn to the POC sites, and those 
who are already there would be unlikely to leave. 
Although it is indisputable that access to services 
is higher in POC sites than in most places in South 
Sudan, data nevertheless shows that the vast 
majority of IDPs inside the sites came, and stayed, 
because of insecurity.77
UN House POC site in Juba. November 2016. © NRC / Albert Gonzalez Farran
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BOX 6: THE PULL FACTOR AND ENTRENCHMENT DEBATES
One of the primary arguments against the provi-
sion of robust humanitarian services inside POC 
sites is that delivering a high level of assistance 
could draw more people to the sites, and could 
further entrench the population already living 
there. But while the statement that “POC sites 
create a pull factor” is a familiar refrain, is there 
evidence to support this assertion?
With over 200,000 people seeking refuge in South 
Sudan’s POC sites by the end of 2015, most of the 
sites far exceeded their original intended capacity, 
and there was limited ability to absorb new arriv-
als. Humanitarians called on UNMISS to seek 
permission for additional land from the govern-
ment or allocate more existing space for deconges-
tion, but UNMISS instead focused on reducing the 
number of new arrivals. UNMISS referred back to 
the policies outlining that POC sites were intended 
to be used exclusively to provide protection in in 
extremis situations, and were not designed to 
replace traditional IDP camps. The level of service 
provision, they argued, was central in pulling new 
people to the sites and preventing others from 
leaving.
Humanitarians launched a number of initiatives 
aimed at better understanding the intentions and 
motivations of the IDPs living in the POC sites. At 
the end of 2015, REACH conducted a series of 
intentions surveys across the POC sites in South 
Sudan, using standardized quantitative data 
collection methodologies and a representative 
sample size. The surveys found that 94 percent of 
respondents cited security as their primary reason 
for coming to the POC site, and 83 percent report-
ed continued security concerns as the primary 
reason they had been unable to leave.78
In January 2016, the Office of the Deputy 
Humanitarian Coordinator released a report titled 
Crisis Impacts on Households in Unity State that 
reflected on movements to the POC sites. Research 
for the report used random sampling 
78 REACH, South Sudan Intentions Study: Country Report, March 2016, http://goo.gl/Eh6DyG.
79 Office of the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator for South Sudan, Crisis Impacts on Households in Unity State, South Sudan, 2014-2015, January 2016, 
http://goo.gl/YowMcm, 17.
methodologies of people in the Bentiu POC site 
and in areas of origin in Unity State, and achieved 
a representative sample size for 24 localities. The 
results found that “On average, the [households] 
that sent at least one person to the POC experi-
enced more than three times the number of shocks 
than those [households] that did not send anyone 
to the POC.”79 “Shocks” were defined to include 16 
types of incidents, such as death of a family 
member, abduction, recruitment, or new 
displacement.
What can these two studies tell us? In regard to 
POC sites as a pull factor: with 94 percent of 
respondents in the REACH survey citing security 
as the primary reason they came to the sites, it is 
difficult to argue that services are the main pull 
factor. The Crisis Impacts report further suggests 
that humanitarians and peacekeepers may need to 
develop a more nuanced understanding of what 
drives individuals to seek refuge at POC sites. If 
families that sent at least one person to the POC 
site experienced three times more shocks than 
other members of their community, it is possible 
that the final tipping point could be related to food 
or medical care, but that this should not necessari-
ly be misinterpreted to mean that accessing food 
and medical care are the root causes of their 
displacement. To the contrary, the data suggests 
that multiple incidents of insecurity (food being 
stolen, clinics being burned down) may be what 
drives families to a point in which going to a POC 
site becomes their only option.
Rather than viewing the POC sites as a pull factor, 
humanitarians and peacekeepers may want to 
instead consider viewing the absence of physical 
security (and thereby services) in areas of origin as 
a push factor. If families exhaust all their coping 
mechanisms prior to coming to a POC site, which 
the data suggests is the case, it is less a situation of 
them being drawn to the sites than it is of them 
being pushed out of their current locations. 
Reframing our perspective along these lines may 
enable a more holistic approach to understanding 
why people come to the POC sites. As one 
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Other arguments against long term blanket 
assistance relate to the role of the government and 
the relationship that it sets between the displaced, 
the UN mission as their host and the state. Some 
humanitarian and peacekeeping officials argue 
that by providing long term protection and com-
prehensive assistance over an extended period in 
UN inviolable compounds, peacekeepers and 
humanitarians are essentially filling the role of the 
state, and are therein further allowing the govern-
ment to abscond from its responsibilities to uphold 
the rights and needs of its citizens. “It creates huge 
barriers between the government and the people,” 
said one humanitarian official. Long term, they 
argued, this approach could make it more difficult 
to reestablish a link between the displaced and 
their government and could discourage the 
government from resuming its responsibilities for 
upholding the rights of their people. While this 
distancing of responsibilities is indeed a challenge, 
the current conflict dynamics also make it appear 
unlikely that the government would fulfill this 
mandate even if all assistance ceased.
Arguments in favor of a blanket approach to 
service provision relate to the lack of freedom of 
movement available to the population, and the 
inability or unwillingness of the government to 
provide support to IDPs inside the sites. Whereas 
in more remote areas, conflict affected populations 
still generally have some access to basic livelihoods 
and natural resources, those living in the POC 
sites have few such options. Some humanitarians 
highlighted that this was further compounded in 
South Sudan by UNMISS’ refusal to provide space 
for markets in the sites. Most IDPs arrived at the 
POC sites with very limited assets, and are unable 
to regularly leave to tend crops, fish, or undertake 
other income generating activities. Women 
sometimes leave to collect firewood or conduct 
basic trading in the market, but this is generally 
insufficient to sustain an entire family and danger-
ous for their safety and well-being. With this in 
mind, those in favor of blanket assistance argue 
that the situation for IDPs inside the sites is 
fundamentally different from those outside, and 
necessitates a higher level of service provision than 
would normally be the case.
Ultimately, the decision on the approach to service 
provision will need to be taken on a case-by-case 
humanitarian explained, “It’s not just that 
year on year the same needs arise, it’s com-
pounding. People are going to get tired of 
running.”
With regard to the entrenchment debate, the 
data from REACH is again telling. 83 percent 
of survey respondents reported that contin-
ued security concerns were the primary 
factor preventing them from leaving, which 
matches closely with what humanitarians 
had expected: while there is undoubtedly a 
small population living in the sites who are 
there to access services, the vast majority of 
IDPs remain in the sites because of security. 
As one humanitarian pointed out, “The POC 
sites are by and large an awful living environ-
ment. Apart from knowing that you will get a 
monthly food ration, there are not many 
incentives to live in a POC site.”
On the basis of these two studies, there is 
little evidence to suggest that service provi-
sion in the POC sites creates a substantial 
pull factor or risk of entrenchment. There are 
also additional issues that call this conclusion 
into question, such as why, if all other factors 
are equal, the POC sites are ethnically ho-
mogenous. If people come to the POC sites 
predominantly for services, one could expect 
to see greater ethnic diversity than is present-
ly the case. While there is plenty of scope for 
research to prove alternate intentions or 
motives, to date there has been no concrete 
substantiation or evidence to support the 
arguments that people come to, and stay in, 
POC sites because of services.
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basis. In South Sudan, humanitarian organiza-
tions are now working to scale up the level of 
assistance in areas outside sites, both to ensure a 
more holistic approach to assistance as well as to 
offer IDPs greater choice in where they access 
services. This type of dual approach would ideally 
be preferable from the start of a crisis, though this 
would require humanitarian actors to develop a 
much more robust mechanism for screening 
potential beneficiaries, conducting registrations, 
and targeting assistance. While blanket assistance 
is possible inside a POC site, it cannot (and should 
not) be provided to all residents of a major city 
center.
STREAMLINE HUMANITARIAN 
COORDINATION
Despite the complexity of POC sites, it is impera-
tive that humanitarian coordination mechanisms 
maintain a structure that is streamlined and fit for 
purpose. Coordination should exist to minimize 
gaps and duplication, but should not take away 
from programming or implementation. During 
interviews, many humanitarians stressed that 
while information sharing is key, the number of 
meetings and coordination forums should be as 
limited as possible to allow for a greater focus on 
the operational aspects of the response. Retaining 
a traditional camp management structure is one 
approach that can assist to this end.
UN House POC site in Juba. August 2016. © NRC / Adriane Ohanesian
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Given the many uncertainties when the POC sites 
were first created in South Sudan, there was a 
larger influx of coordination staff than may have 
been the case in a traditional IDP camp setting. In 
part because of its mandate for civil military 
coordination and the location of the IDP camps 
inside UNMISS bases, OCHA played a particular-
ly strong role. Although the Cluster System existed 
in South Sudan prior to the December 2013 crisis, 
the CCCM Cluster did not – there previously had 
not been any large IDP camps in the country. 
Many humanitarian actors were less familiar with 
the relationship between the Cluster System and 
traditional camp management approaches, and 
when OCHA reinforced their static presence in 
the state capitals (now POC sites), very quickly, 
two parallel systems began to emerge: one led by 
the newly appointed camp management agencies, 
and one led by OCHA that replicated the national 
level clusters.
In theory, the OCHA-led coordination structure 
was intended to cover the whole state, while the 
camp management meetings were designed to 
address issues at site level. In practice, however, 
the initial insecurity and fact that the POC sites 
emerged in state capitals meant that state level and 
site level coordination mechanisms significantly 
overlapped. The co-location of humanitarians 
(including OCHA and Cluster state focal points) 
inside the UNMISS bases meant that much of the 
state level discussion focused on what was occur-
ring inside the POC sites. These meetings did not 
replace the site level meetings led by camp man-
agement, but rather led to increased duplication. 
One humanitarian recalled that, “camp manage-
ment held a weekly partner coordination meeting, 
and OCHA held a weekly inter-cluster meeting, 
and most weeks, 90 percent of the people in the 
two meetings would be the same.” Even more 
frustrating to many humanitarians was the fact 
that the same issues would often be discussed in 
both meetings, leading to a sense that issues 
simply went around in circles rather than being 
decided and resolved.
This duplicate system also at times led to confu-
sion of who was in charge – camp management, or 
OCHA. Both the camp manager and OCHA 
representative typically attended the morning 
synchronization meetings with UNMISS, however 
UNMISS officials reported that at times it was 
unclear which actor had authority. Given that 
OCHA is a UN agency, some NGO officials 
reported that UNMISS sometimes appeared to 
defer to them rather than to the NGO camp 
manager, even though it is camp management who 
has ultimate responsibility for site level 
coordination.
As a result of this duplication and co-location, 
many of the clusters’ state focal points simply took 
on site-level coordination as well, instead of 
designating a separate site focal point. While in 
theory this could have led to a streamlined re-
sponse, in practice, the magnitude of issues 
occurring at site level made it nearly impossible for 
state focal points to maintain visibility over what 
was happening in more remote parts of the state. 
The proliferation of meetings on issues occurring 
at site level often resulted in a dearth in focus on 
the needs in other areas.
To avoid this confusion in the future, it is suggest-
ed to develop very clear SOPs for humanitarian 
coordination at state and site level, and to separate 
out state and site level functions. Some individual 
clusters worked on this in South Sudan, but 
without a holistic approach or strict guidance 
from the global level or OCHA, progress between 
clusters was inconsistent. At site level, it is suggest-
ed to retain a traditional camp management 
structure as far as possible, with partners having 
primary accountability to the camp manager 
rather than the cluster focal point. This is not to 
say that site level cluster focal points should not be 
retained in some form (particularly if there are a 
multiplicity of actors working in the same sector), 
but rather that the camp management needs to be 
empowered and have the authority to manage 
partners and service provision. Separate state level 
coordination should continue to occur, but to 
ensure they are able to focus on responses in other 
parts of the state, these meetings should not be 
managed by the same individuals who oversee 
site-level coordination.
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BE AWARE OF CONFLICT DYNAMICS
Finally, one last issue for humanitarians to consid-
er is how their responses contribute to conflict 
dynamics, and how their activities are perceived 
by parties to the conflict. While humanitarians 
may be committed to upholding the principles of 
neutrality, impartiality, and independence, hu-
manitarian assistance does not exist in a vacuum, 
and as such responders must continually be aware 
of how they fit into the broader context.
By 2015 in South Sudan, all of the POC sites were 
in areas controlled by the government, and the 
POC sites’ residents were primarily civilians 
associated with the opposition. Given that the 
highest concentration of humanitarian services 
were within POC sites, it was easy for this to be 
misinterpreted to mean that humanitarians 
favored the opposition. Indeed, during the looting 
of the World Food Program warehouse in Juba in 
July 2016, one civilian remarked to the author 
“humanitarians always give food to the Nuer, not 
to the Dinka.” He explained that in stealing the 
food, civilians were simply reinstating a better 
balance of assistance. Although humanitarians 
had consistently worked to deliver assistance on 
the basis of need alone, perceptions can be just as 
powerful as reality in determining the operating 
environment for humanitarians.
Indeed, in some cases, responding impartially to 
needs can actually lead to humanitarians being 
perceived as less neutral. This can create dilemmas 
for humanitarian actors in deciding how to target 
assistance. One humanitarian official in South 
Sudan recalled that her organization was responsi-
ble for distributions in a number of locations 
across the country, and typically prioritized the 
areas with greatest need first. When the organiza-
tion came under criticism by the government for 
working disproportionately in opposition areas, 
they decided to do their next distribution in a 
government held location. The needs existed there, 
but were not as high as other locations waiting for 
assistance. “In trying to avoid looking politicized, 
we became politicized,” she said. These types of 
trade offs are unfortunately very common for 
organizations that need to be able to work on both 
sides of a conflict, and can at times also be a 
practical measure to reduce threats to civilians. In 
southern Unity State, actors often aimed to do 
simultaneous distributions in government and 
opposition held areas in order to reduce the 
likelihood of civilians in the opposition area being 
attacked after receiving food.
What can contribute to even greater dilemmas are 
situations in which delivering assistance impar-
tially can mean potentially playing into a military 
or political strategy. Following the attack on the 
Malakal POC site in February 2016, thousands of 
Dinka individuals left the site and occupied homes 
in Malakal town. Prior to the outbreak of conflict, 
Malakal had been one of the most ethnically 
diverse cities in the country, but over subsequent 
years, efforts were made to homogenize the city 
and bring it under exclusively Dinka control 
– most notably through the 28 states declaration, 
which placed Malakal town under Dinka leader-
ship. When the Dinka left the POC site for 
Malakal town, they undoubtedly had some level of 
humanitarian needs. However, these individuals 
were also being supported by the local army, and 
humanitarians worried that the level of need may 
not exceed the risk that by providing assistance, 
humanitarians could further entrench the ethnic 
redistribution of the city that had been initiated by 
the government. Ultimately humanitarians 
decided to provide a minimum level of assistance 
to the Dinka population in town, but aimed to 
limit it exclusively to the previous POC popula-
tion, and only deliver the services that were most 
critical.
These types of dilemmas are unfortunately not 
uncommon in a POC site context, and the risks of 
“getting it wrong” are far more significant than in 
a traditional IDP camp setting. If humanitarians 
or peacekeepers are perceived to not be neutral, it 
can compromise not only the protection of IDPs in 
the sites, but also the ability of humanitarians and 
peacekeepers to fulfill their mandates elsewhere in 
the country.
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 6   PROTECTING CIVILIANS  
IN POC SITE CONTEXTS
Humanitarians are not the only actors to struggle with maintaining a balance of operations inside and 
outside of POC sites. For UN missions, POC sites can present overwhelming challenges, both in pro-
viding effective protection for the sites themselves, as well as for maintaining protective efforts else-
where. Under-resourcing, lack of cooperation from the parties to the conflict, and ongoing hostilities 
all present serious constraints to the mission in their ability to fulfill their protection responsibilities. 
Many of these challenges may have existed even before the emergence of a POC site, so when the need 
to provide static protection to tens of thousands of people is added, these challenges can seem 
insurmountable.
Nevertheless, experiences from historic protected 
sites (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2) 
provide ample evidence of why “getting it right” 
with the protection of civilians is so crucial in 
POC site environments – arguably more so than in 
traditional IDP camp settings. When IDPs place 
their trust in peacekeepers, surrender their weap-
ons, and forfeit their self-protection strategies, 
they become more vulnerable – their lives are 
quite literally in the hands of peacekeepers. Given 
that POC sites typically emerge spontaneously, 
UN missions may have no choice but to accept this 
role, even if they lack the resources necessary to do 
so. This can create a difficult environment for 
peacekeepers and conflict-affected populations 
alike.
The following chapter considers lessons from 
South Sudan in regard to protecting civilians in 
POC site contexts. While some of these elements 
may also be relevant in traditional IDP camp 
settings, the unique protective imperative and 
risks associated with the POC site model merits 
additional discussion of these issues here.
MANDATE
Historically, one of the greatest challenges facing 
missions in contexts with protected sites was 
having mandates that were not fit for purpose, or 
which were not updated quickly enough following 
changes in the context or the emergence of pro-
tected sites. In the absence of an appropriate 
mandate, no amount of understanding of the 
issues or desire to intervene will enable a mission 
to fulfill the necessary protective tasks. History 
suggests that to be successful, peacekeeping 
mandates in a POC site context must:
1 Work under Chapter VII authority
2 Have protection of civilians as the first priori-
ty, including being given priority in resource 
allocation and decision-making within the 
mission
3 Clarify that the protection of civilians respon-
sibility applies “irrespective of the source of 
the threat” (namely, including when perpetrat-
ed by government actors)
4 Clearly articulate that protecting POC sites 
should entail one component of the protection 
mandate, but not its entirety – the protection 
of civilians mandate should apply to civilians 
across the country
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5 Not include any elements that could be seen to 
contradict the protection mandate, namely 
tasks relating to supporting the state or capaci-
ty building
As the following section will highlight, it is imper-
ative that the Security Council act quickly to 
update mandates in light of contextual changes. In 
South Sudan, it took nearly six months for the 
mandate to be changed from its previous 
state-building focus, during which time the 
Mission continued to support government actors 
and institutions – even as this same government 
was committing egregious human rights violations 
against its own people. One interviewee recalled 
that months into the crisis, UNMISS was still 
providing transportation and logistical support for 
government officials.
As mentioned above, another crucial element for 
the UN Security Council to consider in the man-
date is the scope of the protection of civilians 
mandate, and how this relates to POC sites. In 
South Sudan, there were differing perspectives 
about the relationship between the POC sites and 
the Mission’s protection of civilians mandate. The 
sites were at times likened to being the embodi-
ment of the mandate, and at other times were 
described as being the biggest hindrance to it. 
There was likewise debate as to whether the 
existence of POC sites was a sign of successful 
protection, or to the contrary, whether the sites 
were the most visible indicator of UNMISS’ 
protection failures. In some cases, maintaining the 
sites appeared to be equated with the entirety of 
the mandate itself. To avoid a situation in which 
the POC sites exist indefinitely, the mission must 
continue to work towards improving conditions 
elsewhere and creating an environment that is 
conducive for people to leave. This should be 
clearly reflected in the mandate – as is the case 
with UNMISS’ mandate, despite the continued 
confusion on the ground.
80 Jort Hemmer, We are laying the groundwork for our own failure – The UN Mission in South Sudan and its civilian protection strategy: an early assessment, Clingendael 
Institute, January 2013, https://goo.gl/T9c0HK, 4.
81 Hemmer, We are laying the groundwork for our own failure, 4.
82 UN Security Council, S/Res/2155, “Resolution 2155 (2014),” May 27, 2014, https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11414.doc.htm.
REALIGN THE RELATIONSHIP 
WITH THE GOVERNMENT
As highlighted above, a second area that is essen-
tial following the emergence of POC sites is for the 
mission to reassess its relationship with the gov-
ernment. While it is not necessarily the case that 
the government will be the driver of displacement 
into the sites, the fact that civilians have chosen to 
seek refuge with the UN instead of with the 
government is indicative of a situation in which 
the government is either unable or unwilling to 
protect its citizens, or in which civilians have lost 
confidence in the protective capacities of the state. 
As soon as possible after the outbreak of violence, 
the mission (ideally working together with hu-
manitarians) should analyze the role of the gov-
ernment in the conflict and the reasons civilians 
are choosing to seek refuge with the UN. This 
analysis will assist the Security Council to appro-
priately revise the mandate, but equally impor-
tantly, the outcome of this analysis needs to then 
be translated into actions and changes in opera-
tional posturing.
Prior to the outbreak of conflict in December 2013, 
UNMISS worked extensively with the government 
and its forces. Even when the government perpe-
trated attacks against its civilians, the Mission’s 
mandate was first and foremost to support the 
state. A paper from early 2013 noted, “behind 
closed doors, Force Commander Moses Obi has 
supposedly sent a very clear message that his 
troops will not challenge the [Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army].”80 The report goes on to quote 
another UNMISS official, who said, “we won’t step 
in if the army turns on communities.”81
With the emergence of conflict in South Sudan in 
December 2013, it became impossible for UNMISS 
or the Security Council to ignore the human rights 
abuses committed by the state. Even after the 
mandate was updated to prioritize protection of 
civilians from threats “irrespective of the source,”82 
however, UNMISS troops often struggled to reflect 
this shift in their day-to-day operations. UNMISS 
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often avoided direct posturing against government 
forces, which lengthened response times and 
reduced the protection offered in and around the 
POC sites. An HCT statement in November 2014 
vaguely concealed its frustration in this regard: 
“The HCT would welcome a realignment of 
UNMISS’ resources and deployment to reduce 
displacement in South Sudan. Among other things 
this will require the establishment of a presence or 
regular patrolling in opposition areas.”83 The 
Mission’s capitulations to government demands 
were seen as inexcusable by many humanitarians.
UPDATE RELEVANT 
STRATEGY DOCUMENTS
The mandate is one crucial component of deter-
mining a mission’s approach, but equally impor-
tant are the documents that guide day-to-day 
operations. Once a mandate has been updated and 
the relationship with the government reassessed, it 
is crucial that the mission review and revise the 
documents that guide operational implementation 
– particularly relating to the protection of civilians 
aspects of the mandate. A review of the Mission 
Concept is required following any major mandate 
change, but this should also include a revision of 
the mission-wide Protection of Civilians Strategy, 
as well as a timely review of other more general 
documents such as the Military and Police 
Concepts of Operations and Operational Plans 
and Orders.
Although this may initially appear a bureaucratic 
step, history has shown that missions sometimes 
face challenges in actualizing changes to the 
mandate – particularly when they involve a 
significant shift in focus or different relationship 
with a key actor. Incorporating these mandate 
revisions into the relevant operational documents 
can promote a swifter adaptation to the new 
context. As will be discussed later in this chapter, 
providing regular and robust training for different 
sections and contingents, including on the man-
date, is also a key determinant of success.
83 South Sudan Humanitarian Country Team, Protection of civilians inside UNMISS bases, November 24, 2014, para. 10.
84 UN DPKO, Challenges, lessons learned and implications of the protection of civilians sites in South Sudan, 3.
85 For example, this sentiment is reflected on page 31 of Michael Arensen’s publication, If We Leave we are Killed: “the existence of the POC sites has become a 
convenient scapegoat for why UNMISS cannot successfully carry out its mandate outside its own perimeters.”
CONDUCT TRANSPARENT TROOP 
RATIONALIZATION EXERCISES
The global DPKO Policy on Protection of Civilians 
makes clear that any mission with a protection 
mandate must give priority to the protection of 
civilians when considering deployments and 
resourcing. Given political constraints, troop 
caveats, and competing mission activities, howev-
er, the process of shifting troops can be challeng-
ing. Nevertheless, conducting open troop rational-
ization exercises that consider the threat 
environment, resource constraints, and capacities 
of individual contingents is essential.
In South Sudan, there was regular debate about 
the impact of POC sites on the Mission’s troop 
footprint. A frequently cited statistic was that “40 
to 45 percent UNMISS troops tied up with POC 
[site]s. After adding protection of staff and logs 
bases, only 37 left for patrolling.”84 Humanitarians 
often asked how many of this 40-45 percent would 
have been charged with protecting the bases even 
in the absence of a POC site, and why certain 
contingents were stationed in locations with 
seemingly little protection needs, but they never 
received a clear answer. As a result, many humani-
tarians began to feel that the POC sites were being 
used as a scapegoat for failing to provide protec-
tion elsewhere,85 and that UNMISS leadership and 
troops simply did not want to take the risks that 
come with a forward-leaning approach to the 
protection of civilians. Having open and transpar-
ent conversations about troop rationalization can 
promote trust and understanding between actors, 
and avoid these types of situations.
Conducting inclusive troop rationalization exer-
cises also help non-mission actors to advocate on 
the mission’s behalf for additional resources. Many 
humanitarian organizations conduct advocacy 
with the UN Security Council and troop contrib-
uting countries, and if they are convinced of the 
need for more troops, they can be an important 
ally in advocating to increase the resources availa-
ble to the mission. Humanitarians are sometimes 
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reluctant to engage in this advocacy without first 
being assured that the existing troops are utilized 
to maximum capacity.
ENSURE ADEQUATE RESOURCING
Once the mission has conducted a thorough troop 
rationalization exercise, it is imperative that the 
UN Security Council evaluate the capacity of the 
mission to protect the new sites within its existing 
troop capacity. In light of the significant protec-
tion demands of POC sites, it is unlikely that a 
mission will be able to effectively provide static 
protection to the sites while maintaining pa-
trolling and projection elsewhere. As such, if the 
Security Council wants the mission to fulfill both 
aspects of this type of protection of civilians 
mandate, they will likely need to increase the 
troop ceiling and request troop contributing 
countries to assign additional personnel.
In addition to force strength, however, the Security 
Council will also need to ensure that the troops 
who are deployed are adequately trained, re-
sourced, and willing to implement their mandates. 
Too often, troops arrive to a country without even 
the most basic supplies needed to sustain them-
selves – much less protect civilians. Ensuring 
troops have sufficient rations, weaponry, and other 
essential materials is crucial, and troop contribut-
ing countries that consistently deploy troops who 
are underequipped should be held accountable.
HOLD TROOPS ACCOUNTABLE 
TO THE MANDATE
Having adequate troop numbers is nevertheless 
insufficient to ensure effective protection of 
civilians if the troops are unwilling to implement 
their mandate. The events in Juba in July 2016 
showed, once again, that there continue to be 
serious challenges in this regard. During the 
fighting in Juba, UNMISS troops abandoned their 
posts when fighting neared the POC sites, and 
86 UN Independent Special Investigation Team, Executive Summary of the Independent Special Investigation into the violence which occurred in Juba in 2016 and 
UNMISS response, November 1, 2016, http://goo.gl/Dhiwmx.
87 UN Independent Special Investigation Team, Executive Summary, 6.
88 When joining a peacekeeping mission, each TCC outlines conditions of the deployment such as the locations to which their troops can be deployed, and the types of 
activities they can undertake. While some TCCs impose very few restrictions, others heavily control the way their troops can be asked to engage.
failed to respond to an attack on a humanitarian 
compound less than a mile from their base where 
over a dozen people would eventually be sexually 
and physically assaulted. Many of the recommen-
dations from the Independent Special Investigation 
into the violence which occurred in Juba in 2016 
and the UNMISS response will be relevant for 
future POC site contexts, particularly on the need 
for accountability when troops fail to protect.86 
One such recommendation was to have TCCs 
reaffirm (in writing) their willingness to imple-
ment the mandate and follow the rules of engage-
ment. Another useful recommendation was that 
“Recognizing that failures by peacekeepers to act 
when civilians are attacked rises above the level of 
simple underperformance, the Secretariat should 
draw on the thorough and systematic follow-up 
procedures established to address allegations of 
sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers.”87
Equally, the Security Council should encourage 
TCCs to ease their caveats.88 Having troops who 
are unable to work on the front lines or who will 
not engage during combat is ultimately detrimen-
tal to the protection of civilians and the strength 
of the mission as a whole. These types of troops 
create an inflated sense of capacity and numbers, 
and prevent other troops from being received who 
could provide a more effective response. Likewise, 
the inability to disclose TCC caveats also placed a 
strain on trust between actors and on the ability of 
operational sections of the mission to develop a 
comprehensive response strategy. While recogniz-
ing that troop caveats are a highly political issue, it 
is also important that DPKO headquarters recog-
nize the challenges created by failing to openly 
discuss them. In South Sudan, the Senior 
Protection of Civilians Advisor was largely re-
sponsible for drafting the Mission’s Protection of 
Civilians strategy, but even he did not have access 
to information on the troop caveats. It is impossi-
ble to develop an effective approach to protection 
of civilians if those in charge of the strategy do not 
even know the parameters in which they are 
working.
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HOLD HOST GOVERNMENTS 
ACCOUNTABLE FOR 
SOFA VIOLATIONS
While it is imperative for the Security Council to 
hold the mission accountable for fulfilling its 
mandate, there also needs to be accountability for 
violations of the Status of Forces Agreement. 
When SOFA violations go unaddressed, it severely 
hinders the capacity of a peacekeeping mission to 
fulfill its mandate. In South Sudan, the Mission 
was repeatedly blocked from traveling to vio-
lence-affected areas, and at times prevented from 
leaving its bases at all. Such infringements repre-
sent clear SOFA violations, and yet the failure of 
the Security Council to impose punitive measures 
meant that these types of actions by the parties to 
the conflict went largely unaddressed and as a 
result continue even at the time of writing.
INVEST IN ANALYSIS AND 
MAINTAINING ADEQUATE 
NUMBERS OF PROTECTION 
OF CIVILIANS ADVISORS
In an environment as difficult as the POC sites, the 
UN needs to adequately resource and empower 
sections like the Protection of Civilians Unit 
whose purpose it is to consider how, despite the 
many challenges, the mission can provide better 
protection to civilians. Strong and empowered 
protection of civilians advisors can help the 
mission to navigate the challenges such as limita-
tions in the number of troops, and can also help 
provide critical analysis of the areas with the 
greatest protection needs.
At the time of writing, there are only four protec-
tion of civilians advisors in South Sudan. For a 
country the size of France in which the UN has 
IDPs in Malakal POC site relocate after attack in February 2016. © IOM / Muse Mohammed
61Lessons from South Sudan for Future Operations
said there is a “potential for genocide,”89 having 
only four protection of civilian advisors is vastly 
insufficient. At minimum, there should be one 
protection of civilians advisor in each major 
UNMISS base, and they should work closely with 
the local UN commanders and humanitarian 
protection actors to design and rehearse strategies 
for protecting civilians should they come under 
threat.
Equally important is creating the space for a 
mission and humanitarians to fully maximize 
analytical capacities to support effective interven-
tions. While it is well recognized that there are 
sensitivities in information sharing between 
humanitarians and peacekeepers, experiences in 
South Sudan show that there were at times also 
blockages in internal information sharing within 
the mission. For example, although the Joint 
Mission Analysis Center often had critical infor-
mation about political or conflict developments, 
their information did not always reach Force or 
the Protection of Civilians unit who attempted to 
develop response plans that could have benefitted 
from such information.
DEVELOP LOCALIZED PROTECTION 
OF CIVILIANS RESPONSE PLANS
Linked to the above, protection of civilians advi-
sors can play a crucial role in developing localized 
response plans. While most peacekeeping mis-
sions with a protection of civilians mandate 
should have an overarching protection strategy, 
developing tailored, context-specific plans for the 
POC sites and field locations where the UN 
mission has a static presence can be crucial. Doing 
this ensures that the threats in each location are 
well understood, and that the UN troops are aware 
of the likely scenarios and their response options. 
These types of plans can help mitigate the impacts 
of under-resourcing that can potentially accompa-
ny the presence of a POC site, and can also help to 
avoid situations in which the mission is caught off 
guard by threats that could have been easily 
predicted. Engaging with troop contingents about 
responses to likely scenarios can also help mission 
89 Adama Dieng, UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, Statment to the Security Council, New York, November 17, 2016, https://goo.gl/D6ydIW.
leadership at state or national level to anticipate 
likely blockages, such as a contingent being 
required to gain permission from their capital 
prior to engaging with an armed element.
Protection of civilians response plans are most 
effective when developed jointly with actors who 
have different perspectives and understandings of 
the threat environment. Ideally, a protection of 
civilians advisor should work with the Protection 
Cluster to develop the plan. The Protection Cluster 
representative should then be responsible for 
engaging with other protection actors and the 
affected community. This type of joint process also 
helps to create buy-in from the relevant actors. The 
UNMISS Protection of Civilians unit and 
Protection Cluster worked together closely on a 
number of such plans, which was generally agreed 
to be a good practice.
One lesson from this experience, however, was 
that it is crucial to inform and train troop contin-
gents on the localized plans every time there is a 
troop rotation. In one instance in South Sudan, a 
thorough protection of civilians response plan had 
been developed for an area, but when violence 
broke out shortly after a troop rotation, the new 
contingent completely failed to uphold their 
responsibilities in the plan and instead bunkered 
down in their base. This could have been avoided 
had there been more regular discussions and 
trainings of the troop contingents.
Linked to the above, another useful tool can be the 
development of protection “hotspot” matrices. 
These matrices have been used by humanitarians 
in a number of countries to help inform peace-
keeping missions on areas where humanitarians 
perceive there to be the greatest threats to civil-
ians. The matrices can then be used to guide 
patrolling.
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ENSURE ROBUST TRAINING AND 
REHEARSING FOR TROOPS
A lesson that repeatedly emerged in South Sudan 
was the need for more robust training of troops. 
For all the reasons already outlined in this paper, 
civilians in POC sites are far more heavily depend-
ent on peacekeepers than they would be in tradi-
tional IDP camps. In such a situation, the UN has 
a tremendous responsibility to ensure that its 
troops are able to uphold their protection respon-
sibilities. Some of this may be beyond the control 
of the mission at country level (for example, the 
total number of troops or the mandate), but other 
aspects can be improved through regular engage-
ment and capacity building by mission leadership 
in the field.
Following the attack on the Malakal POC site in 
February 2016, DPKO and various NGOs 
launched inquiries into UNMISS’ responses. A 
finding that was shared across many of these 
reports, was the needed for more specific and 
scenario-based trainings. According to the Center 
for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), “Despite train-
ings on the Mission’s rules of engagement (ROEs), 
some peacekeepers still seemed to misunderstand 
the Chapter 7 protection of civilians mandate, as a 
unit from at least one troop contributing country 
(TCC) asked for written confirmation they could 
use lethal force in response to this attack.”90 This 
inaction from troops during the Malakal attack 
had serious negative impacts for the civilian 
population and the reputation of the UN Mission, 
and could have been avoided through better 
training and engagement with the TCC.
90 Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), A Refuge in Flames: The February 17-18 Violence in Malakal POC, 2016, http://goo.gl/lYyWDy, 6.
BE AWARE OF CONFLICT DYNAMICS 
WHEN CONSIDERING THE 
BALANCE OF THE RESPONSE
A final element when considering how to provide 
effective protection responses in POC site settings 
relates to conflict sensitivity. Even more than in a 
traditional IDP camp setting, conflict sensitivity in 
contexts with POC sites is crucial to the safety of 
IDPs and the ability of humanitarians and peace-
keepers to fulfill their mandates. Depending on 
the geographic positioning of the POC sites, their 
demographic composition, and the role of peace-
keepers elsewhere in the country, providing static 
protection to a large population may create tension 
with the authorities. The government may believe 
that the mission is trying to create a state within a 
state, and undermine the sovereignty of the central 
government.
In South Sudan at the end of 2016, UNMISS did 
not have a single base in opposition-held areas. 
These types of imbalances can lead to perceptions 
that the UN mission lacks neutrality – the govern-
ment may argue that the UN mission favors the 
opposition as it is only offering static protection to 
“opposition sympathizers” within their bases, 
while members of the opposition may make the 
case that the UN mission favors the government 
by only setting up bases in government-held areas, 
and not protecting civilians from new government 
attacks in opposition-held locations. While neither 
of these accusations is objectively true, perceptions 
can be just as damaging as facts. Peacekeeping 
missions will need to continually monitor the 
context and local dynamics, and consider percep-
tions when designing their intervention strategies. 
The next chapter will look in greater detail at the 
risks associated with perceptions of a loss of 
neutrality.
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In considering the issue of militarization of POC 
sites, their location in UN bases presents both 
opportunities and challenges. Being housed in UN 
premises alone does not prevent militarization, 
and arguably, the potential negative impacts of 
militarization can be more far-reaching. Proactive 
measures must be put in place to prevent combat-
ants and weapons from entering the sites, to screen 
and demobilize individuals who surrender at the 
gates, and to manage weapons that have been 
confiscated or seized. While the resources availa-
ble to do this are greater in POC site settings than 
might be the case in traditional IDP camps, this is 
nevertheless a complex issue and can place a strain 
on UN missions that are already overstretched.
The UN Mission in South Sudan has made consid-
erable efforts to develop strategies and approaches 
to maintaining the civilian character of the POC 
sites, and approaches have evolved and been 
refined in the three years since the sites first 
emerged. While challenges still persist, there are 
many positive examples to draw from. The follow-
ing chapter reflects on the lessons from these 
efforts, with the hope that this can help to inform 
demilitarization efforts in future POC site 
settings.
THE IMPORTANCE OF 
MAINTAINING THE CIVILIAN 
CHARACTER OF POC SITES
Prior to considering approaches to maintaining 
the civilian character of POC sites, it is worthwhile 
to first consider why this issue is uniquely impor-
tant in POC site settings compared to traditional 
IDP camps. There are two broad categories of risks 
in this regard: those risks that are common to 
militarization of any displacement camp, and 
those risks that are unique or exacerbated in POC 
site settings. This section will look at both types of 
risks, but will spend less time on the former given 
that these are already well known from other 
humanitarian contexts.
Arguably the greatest risk of militarization in any 
displacement camp is that with a real or perceived 
loss of civilian character, a camp can become a 
target of attack. If parties to a conflict have reason 
to believe that combatants are hiding among 
civilians, they may argue that the military impera-
tive outweighs the protection to civilians offered 
under international humanitarian law. Such a 
scenario can prove devastating to the civilian 
population, and there may be limited legal remedy 
available if parties to the conflict can effectively 
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Maintaining the civilian character of IDP and refugee camps has been a challenge ever since displace-
ment camps first emerged. Refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodian border were notoriously saturat-
ed with armed actors in the late 1970s and 1980s, as were the refugee camps in eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo following the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Over time, humanitarians and peace-
keepers have become more aware of the potential for militarization in refugee and IDP camps, but 
despite the best efforts of peacekeepers and humanitarians, it is nevertheless not always possible to 
prevent armed actors and weapons from entering into sites.
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make the case that the camp has become a legiti-
mate military target.91
Another common risk of militarization in dis-
placement camps is the potential for an increase in 
weapons to lead to greater criminality and vio-
lence inside the sites. It is well recognized that 
idleness, frustrations over displacement, and 
increased consumption of alcohol and intoxicants 
can create an environment that is ripe for violence. 
Adding weapons into this context can further 
enable violence and criminality inside the sites, 
both between members of the community as well 
as within households.
A third common risk is that combatants may use 
displacement sites as “R&R destinations,” and may 
visit the sites when they need to restock on sup-
plies, rest, or recruit additional personnel. In such 
a situation, the camps (and assistance provided 
therein) can inadvertently become complicit in 
fueling the conflict. The diversion of assistance is a 
highly sensitive issue, particularly given that 
resources are becoming increasingly limited and 
donors are imposing stronger requirements to 
account for how assistance is used. If there is proof 
that funds or resources have been diverted, donors 
may withdraw funding for assistance in the future. 
The recruitment of civilians to join the conflict is 
equally problematic, particularly as too often, 
forced recruitment includes both adults and 
children. Not only does this further undermine 
the civilian character of the site, but it also has 
damaging long-term impacts on the ability of 
families and communities to recover.
In addition to these common risks, however, there 
are additional concerns that are unique to POC 
site settings. First and foremost, should a POC site 
come under attack as a result of a perceived loss of 
civilian character, the impacts for the displaced 
population can be far more damaging. As dis-
cussed in previous chapters, the housing of POC 
sites inside UN bases can create a false sense of 
security among IDPs and can raise expectations 
among the civilian population that they will be 
protected in incidents of violence. Given the 
91 Rule 10 of the ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law database states that “Civilian objects are protected against attack, unless and for such time as they are 
military objectives” (emphasis added). For more information, see https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule10.
frequent limitations on peacekeepers’ ability or 
willingness to provide protection, this assumption 
can have dangerous consequences. If a normal IDP 
camp came under attack as a result of being 
perceived to be a legitimate target, IDPs would 
undoubtedly flee as early as possible. In a POC site, 
IDPs may be more likely to remain in their shel-
ters, both because it is likely more difficult to 
escape, as well as because they expect peacekeep-
ers to protect them. If this assumption proves 
wrong, the results can be devastating.
A second distinct aspect of militarization in POC 
site contexts is the impact it can have on the 
perception of the UN. If combatants and weapons 
are seen to enter a site, parties to the conflict may 
believe that the UN is deliberately permitting the 
site to be used as an R&R destination. This type of 
assumption can have a detrimental impact to the 
perceived neutrality of the UN as a whole, and as 
mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, the 
perceived loss of neutrality of the UN mission can 
have an impact on their ability to fulfill other 
aspects of their mandate – be it protecting civil-
ians in other parts of the country, working with 
the parties to the conflict on finding a political 
resolution to the crisis, or supporting peacebuild-
ing activities. If there are issues of the humanitari-
ans being conflated with the UN mission in the 
eyes of the parties to the conflict or the general 
population, this can also jeopardize the provision 
of humanitarian assistance and protection.
Finally, a third and underestimated risk of milita-
rization in POC sites is the potential impact it can 
have on the trust and relationship between the UN 
mission and humanitarian actors. During inter-
views for this publication, three senior humanitar-
ian officials in South Sudan independently ex-
pressed the view that UNMISS was deliberately 
permitting the militarization of the sites in order 
to further justify the need to close sites down. “It 
was UNMISS that started this by allowing the 
weapons to come in, and then they used it as a tool 
to argue that [the POC sites are] a militarized 
zone. They want the POC sites gone, and this was 
one way of making a case for it,” said one senior 
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humanitarian official. While research for this 
publication found no evidence that UNMISS was 
deliberately permitting militarization, the fact that 
this is the perception of numerous senior humani-
tarian officials speaks to the potential for militari-
zation to corrode relations between the mission 
and humanitarian actors.
ASSESS THE LEVEL OF 
MILITARIZATION
In designing a strategy to maintain the civilian 
character of POC sites, a first important step is to 
assess the existing level of militarization. If a camp 
is entirely saturated by armed actors, this will 
require a fundamentally different type of interven-
tion than in sites where there is a presence of only 
a few former combatants. The UN mission will 
need to consider the multiple factors, ranging 
from the flow of weapons, presence of active 
combatants, and levels of recruitment.
When conducting these assessments, it can benefit 
the UN mission to draw on individuals and 
entities with existing expertise in this issue. In the 
case of South Sudan, humanitarians at times felt 
that because UN missions were not accustomed to 
administering displacement camps, they were 
perhaps not as familiar with the issue as humani-
tarian actors who had worked in IDP and refugee 
camps around the world and encountered this 
issue repeatedly elsewhere. In the words of one 
senior humanitarian official, “The Mission is not 
used to IDP camps…They see some weapons, and 
think that that’s representative of the entire 
population. But if you throw a net over any part of 
society, you will have spoilers within it, you will 
have criminals within that.” The official went on to 
explain that the presence of a few weapons should 
not necessarily be interpreted to mean that the 
camp had completely lost its civilian character, 
and that the specific contextual details require 
closer examination before coming to such a 
conclusion.
92 In UNMISS’ official response to this publication they contest that humanitarians should be involved in the process of assessing the causes of militarization in POC 
sites, and cite the November 2016 Special Report of the Secretary General (S/2016/951) which recommended that UNMISS be responsible for ensuring external 
security of the sites.
Other humanitarians emphasized that drawing on 
individuals with expertise in the local conflict 
dynamics can be useful in understanding cultural 
norms relating to military activity and likely 
patterns of where and how militarization might 
occur. One humanitarian official pointed out, for 
example, that by 2015 most of the POC sites in 
South Sudan were far from the front lines of the 
conflict, and would not be a logical place for 
combatants to use as an R&R destination. “There 
is no evidence that you can launch military opera-
tions from the POC sites,” he said, “they are not 
near to any active armed activities.” Political 
mobilization, on the other hand, could be much 
more likely, as could the potential for there to be 
“inactive” personnel living in the camps who 
could be called upon if conflict nears (though in 
contexts like South Sudan, this could essentially be 
any male of fighting age). He explained that the 
specific geographic location of POC sites in 
relation to parties to the conflict will largely 
determine the type of militarization that may 
occur, and thus needs to be carefully considered.
Another crucial factor in this assessment is to 
understand why militarization is occurring (if it 
indeed is). People may be hiding weapons because 
they lack trust in the UN, or because they are 
simply waiting for the right time to attack. These 
two motivations require vastly different types of 
responses and interventions. It can be useful to 
remember that POC sites are often a small micro-
cosm of the broader context, and dynamics outside 
may be replicated within the POC site. In South 
Sudan, small arms proliferated even among 
civilian communities (often for self-protection or 
protection of cattle), and interviewees highlighted 
that the presence of a weapon should not necessar-
ily be equated to military affiliation.
If the UN mission, humanitarians, and conflict 
analysts are able to work together closely in 
assessing the characteristics and causes of milita-
rization in a site, this can greatly improve the 
likelihood of developing a strategy that will result 
in effective outcomes.92 To do this however, the 
actors have to be able to trust one another and 
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openly share information. Public messaging about 
militarization can be detrimental to this process, 
and will be discussed in greater detail at the end of 
this chapter. In South Sudan, some humanitarians 
felt that the UN Mission jumped to conclusions 
prematurely and created risks by broadcasting 
their concerns about militarization. As a result, 
“Many of us hid information from UNMISS 
because we didn’t want to fuel their perception 
and narrative that the camps were militarized,” 
said one humanitarian official. The resultant 
breakdown in information sharing can be highly 
damaging.
DEVELOP AND AGREE ON ROBUST 
SCREENING PROCEDURES 
AND DDR PROCESSES
Once the level of militarization has been deter-
mined, UN mission and camp management can 
move forward with developing a strategy to 
maintain or reinstate the civilian character of the 
site. If a POC site has only recently formed, hu-
manitarian and peacekeeping officials in POC site 
settings should assume that militarization is (or 
will be) a concern regardless of existing evidence. 
With this in mind, it is important that robust 
screening and DDR procedures be agreed between 
camp management and mission officials as early as 
possible in the crisis.93
In some cases, the initial screening process may be 
fairly straightforward. During the eruptions of 
violence in South Sudan in both 2013 and 2016, 
“VIPs” and senior ex-combatants identified and 
separated themselves during the influx of IDPs 
into the UNMISS bases. VIPs in particular may 
feel that they deserve a different standard of 
treatment than the general IDP population, and 
will often make their presence known to the UN 
mission or humanitarians. In other cases, uni-
formed men may surrender themselves at the gates 
of POC sites, making it easy to identify them for 
DDR processes.
93 UNMISS rightfully pointed out in their official response to this publication that the initial screening of individuals for weapons is a process led by the UN mission, 
while the DDR process can be far more complex (and may involve both mission officials and humanitarian actors). It is precisely because these two processes are so 
complex and involve different sets of actors that close coordination is essential – without prejudice to the fact that the UN mission retains overall responsibility for 
maintaining the civilian character of POC sites.
Far more complicated, however, are cases of 
ununiformed men whose affiliation with armed 
actors is unknown. The high potential to receive 
these types of cases necessitates a robust screening 
process – one that is designed and implemented by 
DDR specialists and by actors who have a strong 
contextual knowledge. In some locations, cultural 
expectations of men to defend their homes may 
create difficulties in differentiating between career 
combatants and individuals who were simply 
forced by circumstance to take up arms. This is 
discussed in greater detail in Box 7.
An added complication is a situation in which the 
government or controlling party demands that 
combatants be handed over to authorities. In 
South Sudan in July 2016, the government gave the 
UN Mission a list of names of VIPs and persons 
affiliated with the opposition who were known to 
be in the POC site, and demanded that they be 
remanded to the government for questioning. In 
this particular case, the individuals left the site 
before the UN Mission was forced to make a 
decision on how the situation would be managed, 
but this type of problem should be anticipated in 
future POC site contexts and can be particularly 
difficult to resolve.
Linked to the above, it is crucial that the UN 
mission and humanitarians agree on SOPs for how 
cases of VIPs and former combatants are man-
aged. It is far easier to rebuff demands to hand 
over ex-combatants and rebuke accusations that 
camps are militarized if the UN mission is able to 
demonstrate that former combatants have under-
gone a robust DDR process and are civilians in the 
true sense of the word.
There are many different modalities for how DDR 
programs can be implemented. Below are some 
questions that can help to think through the 
various options:
 B Will ex-combatants be separated into a differ-
ent site or area, or integrated with the general 
IDP population? If separated, for how long and 
where?
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BOX 7: CULTURAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF COMBATANTS
In considering the level of militarization in a 
displacement site, it is important that humanitari-
ans and peacekeepers are aware of their own 
cultural bias in understanding what constitutes a 
combatant. Due to comparatively strong security 
and justice mechanisms in many western states, 
and the decline of armed community defense 
forces over the past century, individuals originat-
ing from western countries may perceive anyone 
who takes up arms to be a combatant. While this 
is understandable given the paradigm from which 
they originate, the identity of an armed individual 
in other countries cannot always be defined as 
linearly.
In many countries, serving in the defense of your 
community is not exclusively a profession, but may 
be an expectation of any male of a certain age. 
There may be an implied or explicit requirement 
that during times of violence, any able-bodied 
man will take up arms. Joining an armed group 
may also serve as a self-protection strategy, par-
ticularly in situations where there is a threat of 
consequences for anyone who does not join. It can 
likewise act as a survival mechanism and sense of 
community for young or orphaned boys who have 
no other functioning support systems. In such 
contexts, “combatants” cannot be seen as a uni-
form category. While an individual may meet the 
legal definition, the risks and needs of a career 
combatant can be very different from someone 
who has been forced to take up arms by 
circumstances.
When discussing the specific circumstances in 
South Sudan, one analyst explained “Like so many 
things in South Sudan the definition of a combat-
ant is complicated by decades of war, and cultural 
expectations around the role of men.” He ex-
plained that because men (including boys) are 
expected to fight in defense of their communities, 
they are then often perceived to be potential future 
combatants even if they have not yet taken up 
arms. While the issue of “future combatants” may 
be less relevant from a disarmament, demobiliza-
tion, and reintegration (DDR) perspective, the 
equating of men and fighters in the eyes of the 
parties to the conflict may have significant impli-
cations on perceptions of the neutrality of POC 
sites.
In considering combatants from a DDR perspec-
tive, humanitarians and peacekeepers will also 
need to be careful to differentiate combatants from 
people who merely share a political ideology with 
one of the parties to the conflict. “People don’t lose 
their political ideology when they flee from con-
flict,” said one humanitarian official. Basing our 
understanding of whether someone is a combatant 
based on whether the support the ideals of a 
political party can lead to a flawed interpretation. 
These types of distinctions have an important 
bearing on our understanding of the composition 
of POC sites. While a site might predominantly 
host supporters of an opposition party that does 
not necessarily mean that the site is itself com-
posed of opposition forces.
 B Will there be any restrictions on the ability of 
ex-combatants to leave the sites? If so, how will 
this be monitored?
 B If the presence of a VIP or high profile 
ex-combatant jeopardizes the security of a 
POC site, how will this be managed? Will they 
be placed in a separate site?
 B Who will provide the DDR program, the UN 
mission or a humanitarian actor? Is there an 
organization that can provide individual case 
management for ex-combatants and VIPs?
Humanitarian actors and the UN mission should 
be aware that the question of whether ex-combat-
ants and VIPs should be separated is particularly 
difficult. While their presence can indeed create 
risks for the general IDP population, ex-combat-
ants also have rights and needs themselves, which 
must be respected. This dilemma is discussed in 
greater detail in Box 8.
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BOX 8: AN ETHICAL DILEMMA: THE SEPARATION OF VIPS AND 
EX-COMBATANTS FROM THE GENERAL IDP POPULATION
When ex-combatants or VIPs enter a POC site, the 
risks to the general IDP population, UN, and 
ex-combatants themselves are significant. 
Authorities often track the movements of 
“high-value individuals,” and may be aware that 
they are being housed in the UN base. Such a 
situation can pose substantial challenges: the UN 
mission may be accused of sheltering criminals or 
picking sides in the conflict, the general IDP 
population could be threatened, and the ex-com-
batants themselves could be placed at greater risk 
of attack or abduction if they are known to seek 
refuge in a confined, easily breached site.
In such a situation, humanitarians and peacekeep-
ers will have to carefully decide whether to sepa-
rate VIPs and ex-combatants into a different 
location, or whether to integrate them within the 
general IDP community. Arguments in favor of 
integration are based primarily on ex-combatants’ 
rights under international humanitarian law. If an 
individual surrenders their weapon and uniform, 
and signals their intention to withdraw from 
armed activity, they are legally considered a 
civilian and have the same rights as any other 
member of the IDP population. Integrating them 
directly with the general IDP community is the 
most egalitarian approach to dealing with this 
sensitive issue, and also decreases the risks to the 
ex-combatants.
This is indeed the approach that was ultimately 
taken in South Sudan. An UNMISS guidance note 
directed that, “As the default option, all ex-com-
batants admitted to the POC site will be granted 
the same level of protection, no more and no less, 
than other civilians within the POC site. This 
must be clearly indicated to the individuals before 
their admission, that is, at the same time it is 
explained that their uniforms and weapons will 
not be returned if they choose to seek entry.”94
Arguments against integration relate primarily to 
the concerns described in the first paragraph 
above: high-profile individuals may draw further 
94 UNMISS, Supplemental Guidance No. 3 to the UNMISS Guidelines on Civilians Seeking Protection at UNMISS Bases (2013), 2015, http://goo.gl/KG8h0t.
threats to the general IDP population, to the UN 
mission, and may contribute to increased recruit-
ment and weaponization in the camp. Some 
individuals feel strongly that the risks to the (ex) 
combatants should not be prioritized over the 
risks to the general IDP population. To take this to 
the hyperbolic extreme, they argue that integrat-
ing ex-combatants and VIPs so as to reduce risks 
to them could arguably be equated to using the 
other IDPs as a human shield.
Separating out ex-combatants is standard practice 
in refugee settings, where the risks of doing so are 
much lower. Typically, ex-combatants are placed in 
a different site until they can undergo a compre-
hensive DDR process. While this would be ideal in 
POC site settings as well, circumstances in POC 
sites make this far more complicated. Not only is 
there risk of attack to ex-combatants in IDP 
(including POC) site settings, but the space con-
straints imposed by being within a UN base may 
make separating out VIPs and ex-combatants 
physically impossible.
Ultimately, the approach will need to be based on 
a thorough risk assessment to all parties con-
cerned (the general IDPs, UN, and ex-combatants), 
and the results of the assessment will need to 
weighed against the rights of each party. 
Humanitarians and peacekeepers may also want 
to discuss the dilemma with the communities 
themselves – often, members of the affected 
community will have ideas and solutions that had 
previously not been considered by the internation-
al personnel.
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INSTITUTE A WEAPONS-FREE ZONE
One approach to maintaining the civilian charac-
ter of sites that was supported almost unanimously 
by interviewees was the establishment of a weap-
ons-free zone around the POC sites. Although the 
formation of these zones came very late in the 
evolution of the crisis in South Sudan (nearly three 
years after the sites were first created), they are 
today being recognized as an important tool that 
should be replicated elsewhere.
In South Sudan, the weapons-free zone constitutes 
a 200-meter perimeter around the outside of POC 
sites which is cleared of vegetation and in which 
weapons are prohibited. The clearing of vegetation 
from these areas has given UNMISS greater visibili-
ty from watch towers, and has led to more effective 
patrolling around the POC sites. SOPs outlining 
the prohibited actions and expectations from 
UNMISS were endorsed in late 2016, which may 
serve as a useful starting point for future missions.
There are a few potential risks with weapons-free 
zones that have been noted by community mem-
bers, and which should be taken into consideration 
in future responses. First, by clearing the vegeta-
tion surrounding the sites, women will likely have 
to walk further in search of firewood. Changes in 
the number of GBV cases should be carefully 
monitored by humanitarian protection actors to 
assess whether there is an increase in the number 
of incidents following the clearing of vegetation, 
and if so, humanitarians and peacekeepers will 
have to work together to find solutions (whether it 
is firewood patrols or helping women access 
alternative sources of fuel). A second issue high-
lighted by one community member is the question 
of what will happen with the weapons free zone in 
case of a security deterioration. “[The weapons free 
zone] is going well for now,” he said, “it’s good that 
they can see what is happening outside. But the 
question is, if there is fighting, will they still 
patrol? What will happen to us?” He went on to 
express concern that in such a scenario, the lack of 
vegetation will leave the POC site even more 
95 CIVIC, A Refuge in Flames: The February 17-18 Violence in Malakal POC, 2016, 26.
96 UN Security Council, S/2016/951, Special report of the Secretary-General on the review of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, November 10, 
2016, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/951, 11.
97 UN DPKO, Challenges, lessons learned and implications of the protection of civilians sites in South Sudan, 4.
exposed. While this has less to do with militariza-
tion and more to do with the general security of 
the POC site, it is nevertheless an important 
consideration when planning for potential weap-
ons free zones.
REINFORCE PERIMETER 
SECURITY AND SCREENINGS
Another element that received widespread support 
during interviews was the need for better perimeter 
security and gate screenings at POC sites. Although 
all POC sites in South Sudan have some form of 
fencing and berm, these barriers are notoriously 
porous, and in some cases constitute only a chain 
link fence. One of the major critiques of the UN 
Mission after the attack and burning down of the 
Malakal POC site had to do with the failure to 
repair a known hole in the fence, which ultimately 
was used by the attackers to gain entry. In a report 
released shortly after the attack, a researcher 
observed six different holes in the perimeter fencing 
which had yet to be repaired (even some weeks after 
the original incident occurred).95
Two separate UN publications in 2016 emphasized 
the importance of strengthening perimeter security. 
In the Special Report of the Secretary General, the 
author notes “To be effective, [screening] measures 
must be supplemented by improved perimeter 
protection in order to keep out combatants who 
might seek to circumvent screening.”96 A DPKO 
lessons learned note further expanded that “practi-
cal measures such as the construction of more and 
better observation towers and lighting, and im-
proved technology – such as electronic fencing and 
day/night CCTV cameras – may increase the 
effectiveness of and alleviate, to an extent, the scale 
of the protection forces committed.”97
Strengthening the perimeter security also enhanc-
es trust between IDPs and the UN mission. 
Following the attacks on the Malakal and Juba 
POC sites in February and July 2016 respectively, 
UNMISS worked to reinforce the perimeter of the 
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UNMISS compound area (the section that sepa-
rates the IDPs from UNMISS personnel), but did 
not make similar improvements to the perimeter 
around the POC sites. This imbalance did not go 
unnoticed by the IDPs. “You’ve seen the wall they 
built around their base – they only fence them-
selves inside, they don’t worry about protecting 
us,” said an IDP in Juba. This sentiment was 
further reinforced during the special investigation 
into the events of July 2016, which found that “lack 
of preparedness, ineffective command and control 
and a risk-averse or ‘inward-looking’ posture 
resulted in a loss of trust and confidence – particu-
larly by the local population and humanitarian 
agencies – in the will and skill of UNMISS.”98
Enhancing perimeter security can avoid weapons 
being snuck into the sites through holes in the 
fencing, but in addition to this, it is also important 
to ensure that there are robust weapons searches at 
the gates to the sites. In South Sudan, screenings at 
the gates are done by a local private contractor, 
and both UNMISS and humanitarian staff ex-
pressed concern during interviews that the search-
es at times lacked the necessary level of rigor. 
UNMISS has recently started to take steps to 
correct this, including by requesting the United 
Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) canine 
presence when large deliveries of charcoal and 
supplies go into the sites, but ensuring effective 
individual searches at gates remains a challenge.
DEVELOP A CLEAR POLICY FOR 
CONFISCATED WEAPONS
Another lesson to come from South Sudan was 
that if weapons are surrendered by ex-combatants 
at the gates, found during patrols in the weapons 
free zone, or confiscated during searches inside the 
sites, there needs to be a clear SOP on how the 
weapons will be dealt with. At a minimum, the 
weapons need to be documented, recorded in a 
database, and placed in a secure holding facility 
98 UN Independent Special Investigation Team, Executive Summary, 5.
99 UNMISS, Standard Operating Procedures: Weapons Free Zones, 2016, article 6.3.
100 UNMISS, Additional Guidance: Supplement to ‘Guidelines on Civilians Seeking Protection at UNMISS Bases, December 29, 2013, http://goo.gl/54TbtL, para. 9.
101 Small Arms Survey, A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, 2013-2015, December 2016, goo.gl/Sdv8sX, 45.
102 Small Arms Survey, A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, 45.
until a decision is reached as to what will happen 
with them long-term.
In South Sudan, this initial phase of the process is 
well established. Weapons that have been surren-
dered or confiscated are placed into the custody of 
a Formed Police Unit (FPU), who maintain a 
Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM) 
unit where the materials are stored. An UNPOL 
Assessment Team investigates the circumstances 
around the weapon (whether it was used in any 
incidents, where the weapon came from, etc.) and 
consolidates any evidence that might be relevant 
for future prosecution or holding.
The process of what happens to weapons after this 
stage becomes far less clear. There appear to be 
three main options: first, the weapons can be held 
indefinitely in the WAM units; second, the weap-
ons can be destroyed; or third, the weapons can be 
returned to the government or another controlling 
authority. In some cases, the decision of which 
option is pursued has been clearly articulated by 
the Mission. The SOP on the Weapons Free Zone 
says, for example, “Violators of the [weapons free 
zone] detained for serious prohibited activities 
(possession of weapons, assault, rape, robbery, etc.) 
will be handed over to local authorities as soon as 
is possible.”99 Both the violator and the weapon are 
given to the authorities in such a scenario.
In other cases, it is less clear how the determina-
tion is made of which option to pursue – particu-
larly if a weapon is found on its own without its 
owner being present. Initial guidance indicated 
that “UNMISS should pass collected weapons to 
the relevant authorities rather than take them into 
storage itself,”100 and indeed there have been 
documented incidents in which weapons were 
handed back to local commanders,101 but reported-
ly this practice was ordered to come to an end on 
January 23, 2014 when DPKO headquarters sent a 
code cable to then SRSG Hilde Johnson ordering 
the Mission to either destroy the weapons or hold 
them indefinitely.102 Nevertheless, the practice of 
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handing over weapons appears to have continued. 
In a Joint Operations Center (JOC) meeting on 
August 24, 2016, representatives from JOC and 
FPU announced that weapons that belonged to the 
government were returned to them. This news 
came as a surprise to multiple representatives from 
UNMISS civilian sections in attendance, as well as 
to the humanitarian actors in the room. 
Subsequent interviews for this publication reaf-
firmed that when weapons are determined to be 
government property, the weapons are transferred 
back to the army.
What no one was able to clarify during this 
research was how it was verified whether the 
weapons were indeed government assets. 
“Typically weapons aren’t marked or registered 
here, so we can’t trace ownership,” said one weap-
ons expert. “There was an attempt to do marking 
and registration years ago but it failed,” they 
explained. As such, while the UNPOL Assessment 
Team can investigate the likelihood of a weapon 
belonging to the government, it is not possible to 
verify whether this is indeed the case.
In looking at how this issue could be dealt with in 
the future, there are a few areas a mission or 
DPKO may want to consider:
First, the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy 
(HRDDP) stipulates that “United Nations support 
cannot be provided where there are substantial 
grounds for believing there is a real risk of the 
receiving entities committing grave violations of 
international humanitarian, human rights or 
refugee law and where the relevant authorities fail 
to take the necessary corrective or mitigating 
measures.”103 The HRDDP applies regardless of a 
mission’s mandate or the identity of the armed 
actor, and should be carefully considered when 
designing an approach to managing confiscated 
weapons. While it could be argued that merely 
“returning” weapons does not constitute “sup-
port,” without a proper means for verification, it is 
impossible to determine whether the weapons are 
indeed the property of one particular group. Even 
if this verification could indeed take place, 
103 UN General Assembly and Security Council A/67/775–S/2013/110, Human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security 
forces, March 5, 2013, http://goo.gl/mUu9cF.
however, providing weapons to an armed group 
who is known to commit violations of internation-
al law goes against the spirit of the HRDDP. DPKO 
headquarters may want to consider articulating a 
policy for such situations.
Second, any SOP on surrendered weapons should 
apply equally in all areas of a country, and to all 
parties to the conflict. Handing over weapons to 
one party to a conflict but not to another can lead 
the UN mission to seem not neutral. As has been 
discussed previously, the perceived or real loss of 
neutrality can have severe impact on the safety of 
IDPs and the ability of the UN mission to fulfill its 
mandate.
Third, in the absence of a clear verification mecha-
nism, the mission may want to consider a policy of 
exclusively destroying the weapons. Holding them 
indefinitely (or until such time as the conflict has 
ceased) may also be an option, but this should only 
be pursued if the mission is confident that the 
weapons can be safely secured and stored over an 
extended period until the conflict has come to an 
end.
EMPLOY A CONFLICT-SENSITIVE 
APPROACH TO COMMUNICATIONS 
ABOUT MILITARIZATION
A final important component when considering 
issues around militarization of POC sites is how 
communications about weapons will be managed. 
As has been discussed above, any action that lends 
the perception that POC sites are militarized can 
reinforce the argument that the sites are legitimate 
targets for attack. Publicizing the presence of 
ex-combatants, weapons, or high-level personnel 
in the site can all contribute to this outcome.
UN missions will need to carefully consider these 
issues when designing their public information 
strategies. In South Sudan, one of the areas where 
this issue became most sensitive was in showcas-
ing the results of the Mission’s weapons searches 
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inside the POC sites. On various occasions, 
UNMISS posted pictures of confiscated weapons 
on their Flickr and Twitter accounts, ostensibly to 
show the good work being done by the Mission. 
Humanitarians repeatedly expressed concern 
about this during interviews, particularly given 
that the government had made regular accusations 
that the camps were militarized and hinted at 
potential attacks.104 Posting photos of confiscated 
weapons only further reinforced this narrative, 
and increased the potential risks to IDPs. In the 
words of one senior humanitarian official, “They 
are generating all kinds of risks. In a context 
where social media has been known to be used for 
hate speech and for incitement of hate crimes, 
[publicly discussing confiscated weapons] is just 
dangerous.”
While it is normal for the mission to want to 
publicize the good work it is doing, this needs to 
be managed in a very careful and conflict-sensitive 
manner, particularly on issues relating to militari-
zation of sites. It may be preferable for the UN 
mission to adopt a policy of not publicly sharing 
images or updates on activities relating to weapons 
or ex-combatants inside the sites.
104 Radio Tamazuj, PoC Juba residents deny having weapons amid incitement 
fears, October 14, 2016, https://goo.gl/Yf024t.
BOX 9: FOR CONSIDERATION: COULD BETTER 
PHYSICAL PROTECTION BY PEACEKEEPERS LEAD TO 
LESS MILITARIZATION?
While most humanitarians and peacekeep-
ers would argue that there is no excuse for 
bringing weapons into a civilian displace-
ment camp, it may nevertheless be useful to 
consider whether there is a link between 
perceptions of safety and security, and the 
level of weaponization of a POC site. “Of 
course they want to keep their weapons,” 
said one humanitarian in South Sudan, 
“they have seen the UN fail to protect them 
over and over again.” Despite the fact that 
IDPs in South Sudan have tacitly accepted 
“Ground Rules” set out by UNMISS and 
have therein agreed to refrain from bringing 
weapons into the sites, there is nevertheless 
a concern that IDPs sometimes stash 
weapons because, inter alia, they feel unsafe 
relying exclusively on the UN for protection 
– particularly given that each of the POC 
sites are surrounded by communities that 
are hostile to the POC site inhabitants. In 
such a situation, it is worth asking: could 
increased protection by peacekeepers lead to 
fewer weapons entering the sites?
Image: UNMISS Tweet 9.26 PM, October 25, 2015  
https://goo.gl/Vm1S1l.
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Maintaining internal security in any IDP camp is 
an exceedingly challenging undertaking, even in 
the best of circumstances. In traditional IDP sites, 
this responsibility falls first and foremost to the 
local authorities. Due to the inviolable status of 
UN bases, however, the responsibility for security 
in POC sites is likely to sit with the UN mission 
– including preventing and responding to crimi-
nality, domestic or gang violence, and other 
serious offenses that would normally be managed 
by the national police. But how should this be 
done? To date, there are still no global guidelines 
to help missions navigate the unique legal or 
operational context of POC sites.
The following chapter provides an overview of the 
security and justice mechanisms used in the South 
Sudan POC sites. The conversation about ap-
proaches to justice is still evolving in South Sudan, 
and while an ideal solution has yet to be reached, 
the UN Mission in South Sudan has continued to 
adapt over the past three years and has made 
noteworthy progress. This chapter looks at the 
pros and cons of the justice and rule of law meth-
ods tested thus far, and provides considerations for 
future operations that may be faced with this 
issue.
LEGAL STATUS AND JURISDICTION 
INSIDE POC SITES
Prior to looking at the specific approaches to 
security inside POC sites, it is useful to first quickly 
review the jurisdictional considerations. This is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, but in 
short, UN missions typically sign a Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) when entering a country, and 
this SOFA generally grants UN bases inviolable 
status. While the land under the base remains the 
territory of the host country, the inviolable nature 
of the base means that national jurisdiction within 
the site is to a certain degree suspended. 
Authorities can still exercise jurisdiction, but only 
if the UN mission grants them permission to enter 
the base and to exercise their powers.
The impacts of this legal limbo are less acute when 
the UN base exclusively houses UN personnel, but 
when a UN base also hosts a POC site, the implica-
tions of this jurisdictional vacuum become far 
more significant. In the case of the UN Mission 
South Sudan (and indeed the vast majority of UN 
missions), the UN does not have an executive 
mandate, and as such cannot formally adopt the 
functions of a state. While the SOFA grants 
permission for the UN to police its bases, it cannot 
exercise any form of judicial mandate. As a result, 
UNMISS can investigate “threats” to peace and 
security inside their bases, but it cannot investi-
gate “crimes” as this requires a threat to be as-
sessed against a body of laws.
 8   LAW, JUSTICE, AND SECURITY  
INSIDE POC SITES
POC sites represent a cross-section of the local population. While there can be a temptation to view 
IDPs as “innocent victims,” in reality, there are criminals and offenders inside POC sites just as there 
are in any other community. The stress and trauma of displacement can likewise contribute to an 
increase in negative coping mechanisms, which can further compound risks to other members of the 
displaced population. In such a situation, having an effective security and justice system is crucial.
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The most significant challenge of this jurisdictional 
vacuum is the impact on due process. The assess-
ment of whether a POC site resident poses a threat 
to peace and security in the site is made by UNMISS 
alone. There is no trial, jury, or judge, and the 
accused is not offered legal representation or the 
opportunity to formally launch a defense. These 
challenges are well recognized by UNMISS and they 
have taken a cautious approach to dealing with 
alleged perpetrators as a result, but this is neverthe-
less an inherent struggle of having IDPs living in an 
inviolable site where the UN does not have an 
executive mandate and the authorities cannot be 
relied upon for judicial support. “We try to avoid 
arresting people,” said one UNMISS official, “being 
put in the holding facilities violates their human 
rights. But we do it if someone poses a serious threat 
to the POC [site].” The impacts of this complex 
system are discussed in greater detail below.
OVERVIEW OF JUSTICE AND 
SECURITY MECHANISMS IN 
SOUTH SUDAN’S POC SITES
Given the uniqueness and complexities involved 
with security and rule of law in POC sites, it is 
difficult to draw out lessons without first having a 
clear overview of the types of justice and security 
mechanisms that may exist. With this in mind, the 
first section below provides an overview of the 
mechanisms used to maintain security inside the 
POC sites in South Sudan. After considering these 
structures, the second half of the chapter goes on 
to consider lessons for the future.
105 CIVIC, Under Fire: The July 2016 Violence in Juba and UN Response.
UN POLICE
In South Sudan, UN police (UNPOL) individual 
police officers and formed police units (FPU) 
maintain a 24/7 presence in the POC sites, includ-
ing static presence at gates and at sentry posts, as 
well as patrolling inside the sites. UNPOL officers 
are the primary focal points for any disturbances, 
and they may request support from FPU depend-
ing on the nature and severity of the incident.
Prior to the renewed outbreak of fighting in 
December 2013, UNPOL’s primary mandate in 
South Sudan was to support capacity building of 
the host state police. With the emergence of POC 
sites, UNMISS’ mandate changed and UNPOL 
became increasingly focused on the maintenance 
of peace and security inside the POC sites.
Compared to UNMISS troops, UNPOL officers 
and FPUs have historically been more constrained 
by the boundaries of the POC sites. If a distur-
bance occurs outside the POC site perimeter, 
UNPOL and FPU typically must wait for UNMISS 
troops to respond. This has led to instances in 
which women have reportedly been abducted and 
assaulted within earshot of a POC site gate, but the 
police stationed there have failed to respond.105 
Incidents such as these erode the trust between 
IDPs and the UN mission, and can also lead to 
tensions with humanitarian actors who can 
become frustrated with a perceived lack of com-
mitment to protecting civilians.
OVERVIEW OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE MECHANISMS IN SOUTH SUDAN POC SITES: 
UN Police: used to maintain general peace and 
security and provide a deterrent to criminality
Community Watch Groups: community-based 
mechanism used to alert UN police to incidents 
that could affect peace and security 
Informal Mitigation and Dispute Resolution 
Mechanism (IMDRM): used to mediate 
non-threatening incidents and disputes
Traditional courts: unauthorized courts that 
follow similar structures to informal courts in 
rural areas of South Sudan
Holding facilities: used to temporarily detain 
individuals who are assessed to be a threat to the 
peace and security of the POC
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COMMUNITY WATCH GROUPS
A second security mechanism inside POC sites are 
the Community Watch Groups (CWGs). CWGs 
were established to act as a deterrent to criminal 
activity and increase the community’s involve-
ment in their own security. While UNPOL per-
sonnel retain a full-time presence, given the size 
and population of the sites, it is impossible for 
UNMISS alone to provide the robust coverage 
needed to prevent criminal activity or violence 
– particularly at night when visibility is reduced 
and the potential for criminality increases. CWGs 
are intended to monitor the situations inside the 
sites and alert UNMISS police to any disturbances, 
as well as provide greater community ownership 
over security issues.
CWGs have assumed a large degree of authority 
inside the POC sites in South Sudan – arguably 
beyond what was originally envisioned or set out 
in their mandate. UNPOL provides training to the 
CWGs and members are required to sign a code of 
conduct, but they are nevertheless largely autono-
mous within the community. Despite being 
unarmed and not having the official power to 
detain individuals, CWGs have been regularly 
accused of abusing their positions and overstep-
ping their mandate. UNMISS officials recalled 
during interviews that they had found evidence 
suggesting that members of the CWGs had set up 
illegal detention facilities inside the sites, and had 
at times recovered materials which had presuma-
bly been used by the CWGs to restrain people and 
impose corporal punishment.
The amount of training and oversight provided to 
the CWGs appeared to have a significant impact 
on their compliance with their mandate, as well as 
on the level of trust placed in the CWGs by the 
IDP community. One camp resident explained 
that there was a relatively high level of trust in the 
“older” CWG members (namely, those who had 
received training and mentorship by UNPOL over 
a longer period), but with CWG members who 
were newly recruited or integrated, there were 
greater issues. In one instance, a group of men in a 
106 UNMISS, Guidelines on Informal Mitigation and Dispute Resolution Mechanism in Protection of Civilians Sites, August 2015, 1.
107 UNMISS, Guidelines on IMDRM, 2.
Juba POC site established an independent CWG 
called N4, which served more as a vigilante group 
than as a formal police organization. “They are not 
trained, and they are not accountable to anyone,” 
said one IDP, who also reported that N4 would 
frequently beat suspects before handing them over 
to the justice mechanisms. N4 was eventually 
disbanded and some of its members integrated 
into the formal CWG, but IDPs reported that the 
community still is less trusting of former N4 
members than of their older CWG peers.
INFORMAL MITIGATION AND DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION MECHANISM (IMDRM)
When the CWG or other camp leader identifies an 
individual who they believe poses a threat to peace 
and security in the site or who has allegedly 
committed a crime, the case is referred to 
UNMISS for follow-up. Depending on the severity 
of the alleged incident, UNMISS may pass the case 
to one of two main mechanisms: the Informal 
Mitigation and Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
(IMDRM), which deals with cases that “do not 
individually pose a substantial threat to public 
safety or order within the POC sites, but cannot be 
left unaddressed,”106 or to the UNMISS “holding 
facilities,” for cases that involve violence, sexual 
assault, or other serious threats.
The IMDRM is designed to function as a media-
tion tool to resolve minor disputes. Because of the 
jurisdictional issues discussed above, the IMDRM 
does not have adjudicatory powers and cannot 
assess whether a crime has been committed or 
impose punitive measures – it can merely help 
affected parties to come to a mutually agreeable 
solution. The IMDRM guidelines outline that the 
following actors may participate in IMDRMs: 
community leaders, members of the CWGs, the 
accused IDP, and the aggrieved IDP or their 
representatives. UNMISS and humanitarian actors 
may be “involved in the process in an advisory 
capacity,” but do not have an official function.107 
Any resolution must be in line with international 
law, and can include compensation, community 
service, and counseling.
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In practice, almost no one interviewed for this 
publication had heard of the IMDRM, with the 
exception of those individuals who were directly 
involved in developing or implementing the 
mechanism. Even humanitarian and UN Mission 
officials who work in the POC sites on a daily basis 
on issues to do with security, justice, and adminis-
tration were not familiar with the mechanism. 
Similar findings emerged during a study by Justice 
Africa on criminality inside the POC sites: “When 
questioned: ‘what are the different options availa-
ble for dealing with disputes and crime in this PoC 
site?’ no single respondent mentioned IMDRM.” 
The paper went on to conclude “Contrasted with 
the primacy placed upon IMDRM as a key policy 
for addressing criminality and insecurity in the 
PoC sites by UNPOL, this finding [that POC site 
residents are largely unaware of the mechanism] is 
noteworthy.”108
Indeed, although IMDRM has promise as a 
potential future dispute resolution mechanism, it 
is difficult to say that it has had much of an impact 
thus far in South Sudan. The fora that both POC 
site residents and international personnel suggest 
is used much more frequently are the traditional 
justice mechanisms that have unofficially emerged 
inside the POC sites.
TRADITIONAL JUSTICE
Although traditional courts have no official 
authority inside South Sudan’s POC sites, many 
humanitarians, UNMISS officials, and IDPs 
themselves suggest that it is these courts that serve 
as the primary dispute resolution mechanism 
inside the POC sites.
The exact structure and composition of the tradi-
tional courts varies from site to site in South 
Sudan, but typically the court is led by an elder or 
chief, and may include representatives from 
different counties of origin of the IDP communi-
ties. In some cases, the elders and chiefs acting as 
the judges inside the POC sites held similar 
leadership or judicial functions in their home 
counties pre-displacement, and as a result, they 
108 Justice Africa, Justice displaced: field notes on criminality and insecurity in South Sudan’s UN Protection of Civilians Sites, 2016, http://goo.gl/DLXOMo, 27.
109 Justice Africa, Justice displaced, 27.
may benefit from having pre-existing trust from 
members of the community. In sites where there 
are members of different ethnic groups, there are 
generally separate courts serving the different 
communities.
Due to the similar functions and composition of 
the traditional courts and the IMDRM, it can at 
times be difficult to differentiate between the two 
mechanisms. Indeed, multiple UNMISS officials 
suggested that IMDRM and the traditional courts 
are actually one and the same – IMDRM repre-
sents how the process is supposed to work, whereas 
the traditional courts represent what occurs in 
practice. The same individuals generally sit on the 
formal IMDRM panel and the informal traditional 
courts. There are two primary differences between 
the mechanisms: the types of cases heard, and the 
approach to punishments and restitution. First, 
while the official IMDRM is not intended to hear 
cases involving violence or substantial threats to 
peace and security, the traditional courts often do 
not make this distinction. Unlike the IMDRM, the 
traditional courts also hear cases on issues that are 
considered crimes locally, but which are not 
recognized as crimes by international law. These 
include cases such as adultery or having a child out 
of wedlock. The importance of recognizing local 
constructs and prioritizations of crimes cannot be 
overstated, and is discussed further in Box 10.
The second major distinction between the official 
mechanism (IMDRM) and the unofficial tradi-
tional courts is the approach to punishments and 
restitution. While the IMDRM is intended to use 
only small compensation, community service, or 
counseling, the traditional courts favor other 
measures that are often not supported by the UN 
or international law. This can include forcing 
survivors of sexual assault to marry their attack-
ers, requiring the parents of a child born out of 
wedlock to marry and pay dowry, and using large 
numbers of cattle as compensation for serious 
crimes. In some cases where it is not possible for 
sufficient cattle or resources to be gathered while 
in the POC site, cases may be deferred until 
families return to their places of origin.109
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BOX 10: THE IMPORTANCE OF ADDRESSING  
LOCAL CONCEPTS OF CRIMES
When approaching justice and security issues inside 
POC sites, it is important that the UN mission and 
humanitarians recognize that their understanding 
of crimes and justice priorities may differ substan-
tially from what the IDP community sees as priori-
ties. Even if local concepts of crimes are inconsistent 
with international law or with the beliefs of interna-
tional personnel, it is nevertheless essential that 
these issues are recognized and addressed by the 
UN mission and humanitarian actors.
One of the most common examples of the diver-
gence between the priorities of the UN Mission in 
South Sudan and IDPs in the POC sites relates to 
the issue of adultery. Whereas UN justice and 
security mechanisms inside the POC sites do not 
address cases of adultery, incidents of adultery are 
one of the most common cases to appear before 
traditional courts in the POC sites. Justice Africa 
reported that, “From the viewpoint of the Camp 
Chairperson in Juba PoC site 1, UNPOL was 
apparently wasting their time detaining people 
accused of rape, when they should instead be using 
the holding facilities to punish adulterers.”110
While it is understandable that UN missions would 
be reluctant to use IMDRM to address issues of a 
sensitive nature, there must also be recognition 
that failing to include these types of cases is likely 
to result in the proliferation of parallel, traditional 
justice systems in the POC sites. This does not 
necessarily mean that these sorts of cases should be 
included in the formal mechanisms, but rather that 
the UN mission needs to understand and acknowl-
edge local concepts of crimes, and proactively 
engage on these issues. In the case of the quote 
above, it is evident that further awareness raising is 
needed with the camp chairperson to help him 
understand the severity of rape and the importance 
of preventing and responding to it. While there are 
differing opinions about whether it is appropriate 
for a UN mission to work to change concepts of 
adultery as a crime, if nothing else, it is well within 
the mandate of UN missions to ensure that any 
punishments used to address this perceived crime 
are at a minimum consistent with international 
law.
IDPs and UNMISS officials have a uniquely 
different perception of the level of influence of the 
traditional courts. While both actors informally 
acknowledge that the traditional courts exist, it is 
possible that UNMISS has not yet fully taken on 
board the extent of the courts’ authority in the 
community. This became particularly apparent 
when discussing procedures for serious offenses: 
whereas UNMISS officials typically believed that 
the decision on how a case is managed is made by 
UNMISS (with inputs from humanitarians and 
members of the IDP community), the IDPs ap-
peared to view UNMISS’ engagement as merely a 
temporary intervention while the permanent 
decision is made by the traditional courts. While 
the reality is undoubtedly somewhere between the 
two, this shows the level of differences in percep-
tions of where justice decisions are made.110
110 Justice Africa, Justice displaced, 24.
111 For example, the UN’s Interim Standard Operating Procedures: Detention in United Nations Peace Operations, 2010.
HOLDING FACILITIES
One of the greatest challenges for UNPOL in 
South Sudan’s POC sites was managing cases of 
individuals who were believed to pose a significant 
threat to peace and security. Given the intended 
short duration of the POC sites, none of the 
original guidance or plans foresaw a scenario in 
which UNMISS would be responsible for adminis-
tering internal justice over a sustained period. To 
the contrary, the limited pre-existing SOPs on 
detention111 presumed an environment in which a 
detainee would be remanded to government 
custody within 48 hours – a situation which was 
made impossible by the role of the government in 
the conflict. Nevertheless, serious offenses did 
occur in the sites and required action from 
UNMISS to protect the other IDPs. In the first 
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months, incidents were dealt with on a case-by-
case basis. Individuals were at times detained by 
UNMISS temporarily, but in the absence of a 
formal facility, UNMISS had to devise makeshift 
holding areas – including one instance where an 
individual was reportedly held temporarily in an 
UNMISS vehicle. In May 2014, UNMISS set up 
“holding facilities” in the POC sites to detain 
individuals who were deemed to pose a serious 
threat to the sites. Over the subsequent two and a 
half years, over 3,800 people have passed through 
the facilities.
Due to the wide variety of types of cases brought 
to the holding facilities, the duration of stay differs 
substantially. As one UNPOL officer explained, 
“There is no standard with regards to length of 
detention since IDPs are held based on an assess-
ment of the extent to which they pose a threat to 
the security of the POC site.”112 Being held in the 
holding facility is not a punitive measure, but is 
rather designed as a mechanism for maintaining 
the security of the site. Individuals are held until 
they are deemed to no longer pose a threat to the 
community, or until such time as they can be 
handed over to the national authorities or ex-
pelled. The majority of persons are released within 
a few days or weeks, but a smaller number of 
individuals are held for months or even years.
Conditions in the holding facilities were initially 
very problematic, with repeated cases of minors 
being held together with adults and standards of 
living inside the cells that bordered on being 
hazardous to the health of the detainees. Although 
there was improvement over time, many humani-
tarian and UNMISS officials expressed concern 
during interviews that even two and a half years 
after their initial inception, conditions remain far 
below acceptable international standards. 
“Conditions are barely ok for 72 hours, much less 
months or years,” said one UNMISS official. The 
holding facilities are constructed out of shipping 
containers with a few small windows cut into the 
sides, and while this allows for some minimal 
112 South Sudan Protection Cluster Meeting Minutes, July 14, 2015.
113 UN DPKO, Challenges, lessons learned and implications of the protection of civilians sites in South Sudan, 5.
114 South Sudan Protection Cluster Meeting Minutes, July 14, 2015.
115 UNMISS, Note of Guidance For UNMISS, Security of the IDP Population in the POC Sites, 2014.
ventilation, it does not prevent the containers from 
reaching upwards of 45 degrees Celsius. Detainees 
must be escorted from the containers each time 
they want to use the toilet, which has led to attacks 
on corrections staff as well as escapes. The perime-
ter around the holding facilities is weak and easily 
breachable, and has resulted in numerous escapes 
over the past three years – including 20 individu-
als in one month alone in 2014.
Perhaps the greatest concern for many humanitar-
ian and UNMISS officials is the absence of due 
process for individuals in the holding facilities. In 
a DPKO lessons learned paper in 2016, the authors 
noted “There is perhaps no issue where the tension 
between Mission practice and normative stand-
ards is as clear as in the challenges surrounding 
detention.”113 While cases are reviewed regularly 
during Case Review Conferences, accused parties 
do not have the opportunity to have representation 
or defend themselves. “Holdees do not have legal 
representation since there is no trial,” explained 
one UNPOL officer.114 UNMISS makes a determi-
nation of whether the individual continues to pose 
a threat to the POC site, and if so, there are three 
options available: the individual can be handed 
over to the government (provided a risk assess-
ment has concluded that they will not be subjected 
to persecution or cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment), they can be expelled from the site, or 
they can continue to be detained.115
During the assessment of whether a person can be 
handed over to authorities, UNMISS considers not 
only the potential security risks to the individual, 
but also whether they would be granted livable 
conditions in a government jail, and whether they 
will have access to due process before the law. As 
one UNMISS official pointed out, however, there is 
irony that “We are not upholding the same stand-
ards [in UNMISS holding facilities] that we 
demand of the South Sudanese government.” He 
explained that if the UN were independently 
assessing the UNMISS holding facilities, the 
conditions in the containers and the lack of due
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BOX 11: WHICH RIGHT TO VIOLATE?
The legal and security context in South Sudan 
posed unique dilemmas with regard to the treat-
ment of serious offenders. On the one hand, 
transferring individuals to government custody 
created a risk of persecution and ill-treatment, and 
could arguably constitute refoulement.116 On the 
other hand, detaining individuals indefinitely 
without due process could be seen as unlawful 
detention. These dilemmas raised an uncomforta-
ble question for humanitarians and UN Mission 
officials: if every approach to dealing with serious 
offenders results in the violation of a human right, 
which right should be violated?
In South Sudan, it was ultimately decided that in 
most cases, the risks associated with potential 
persecution at the hands of the government 
outweighed the risk of indefinite detention in the 
POC site. The decision was based largely on a 
practical risk assessment rather than a pre-de-
fined, rights-based approach. It is possible, howev-
er, that at a certain point this balance may change. 
After years in a holding facility, the negative 
impact of detention without trial on a person’s 
psyche may be greater than the potential physical 
risks that could come with being transferred to the 
government. At such a point, an individual’s own 
prioritization of their rights may change.
Another factor to be considered are the rights of 
the victim and the community. While every 
individual has the right to be protected from 
unlawful detention, survivors of serious offenses 
and potential future victims also have the right to 
be protected from individuals who are known to 
pose a potential threat. Indeed, the initial basis for 
UNMISS’ use of detention was done under the 
protection of civilians element of its mandate. In 
this sense, considerations on approaches to man-
aging serious offenders must consider not only the 
rights of the offender themselves, but also the 
rights of the community to be safe from harm.
There is no easy answer to any of these questions, 
and each case will likely have to be assessed on an 
individual basis – and will have to continue to be 
reevaluated over time. At the end of this chapter 
there is a discussion that considers options for 
alternatives that would improve the due process 
challenges, and which would ideally support 
greater respect for the rights of victims and offend-
ers alike. Unfortunately, each of those potential 
alternatives also come with substantial risks, 
meaning further consideration of this issue will be 
needed before an acceptable approach can be 
reached.
process would not meet the minimum thresholds 
set out in international law. “When I first saw the 
holding facilities, I couldn’t believe that these were 
sites run by the UN,” he said.116
In cases where handover or expulsion is deemed 
unviable, individuals may be detained indefinitely, 
despite never receiving a trial. In the Juba POC 
holding facility alone, there are two individuals 
who have been detained for over two years. These 
types of cases essentially mean the Mission is 
faced with the uncomfortable question of which 
right to violate: handing individuals over to 
116 The principle of non-refoulement under international law refers to the right of an individual to be protected from being returned or transferred to a territory or 
authority where there is credible reason to believe that they would be subjected to persecution or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. It is most known for its 
application in refugee settings, but is also firmly grounded in International Human Rights Law.
authorities could constitute refoulement if the 
individual is subjected to persecution or ill-treat-
ment, but holding them indefinitely without trial 
arguably constitutes unlawful detention. This is 
discussed further in Box 11.
When asking why conditions in the holding 
facilities have not been further improved, a num-
ber of potential reasons were offered by interview-
ees. First, some members of UNMISS’ senior 
leadership reportedly expressed concerns that if 
conditions in the holding facilities were made too 
comfortable, people would deliberately attempt to 
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be detained. Second, senior officials reportedly 
argued that with all of the funding needs in the 
POC sites, the Mission should not commit re-
sources to improving conditions for “the trouble-
makers.” Third, some members of the senior 
leadership reportedly made statements arguing 
that “these are our camps, we can do what we want 
with them.” This last point was of particular 
concern to some humanitarians, who felt that it is 
precisely because it is a UN facility that conditions 
should meet international standards.
A final factor that appears to have prevented 
improvements is the continued belief that the 
holding facilities are temporary, and that UNMISS 
should not invest resources as cases should be 
handed over to the government. Unfortunately, 
after three years it is difficult to classify the hold-
ing facilities as temporary, and the attempts at 
handing over cases have thus far been largely 
unsuccessful: in one case, four serious offenders 
were transferred to the government for prosecu-
tion, but the individuals were released shortly 
thereafter. Anecdotal reports suggest that at least 
some of these individuals subsequently returned 
to the POC site. Transfers to the government have 
been suspended since this time, and the govern-
ment is also now reluctant to accept cases without 
being provided financial or material support from 
the Mission.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE 
FUTURE: DECIDING ON AN 
APPROACH TO JUSTICE AND 
SECURITY INSIDE POC SITES
UN missions faced with the emergence of a POC 
site may have little choice but to accept a de facto 
role for maintaining peace and security within the 
site – as much for the security of IDPs as for their 
own. While there may be little alternative, it is 
nevertheless critical that this be discussed with the 
mission’s senior leadership and that an agreement 
is reached on an approach. To be effective, there 
needs to be commitment from the mission leader-
ship and UN headquarters to not only take on a 
security and justice role, but to also meet relevant 
international standards when doing so. As one 
interviewee argued, “If the UN is going to take on 
the responsibility for addressing criminality in the 
sites, they need to commit to investing the re-
sources to do it properly.”
Most importantly, in the case of holding facilities 
this means ensuring sufficient resources and 
commitment to enable the mission to uphold the 
Interim Standard Operating Procedures for 
Detention in United Nations Peace Operations and 
the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners. In particular, under no circumstances 
should minors be detained with adults, or women 
with men. Food and other provisions must be 
provided in accordance with the minimum 
standards. In cases where these standards exceed 
what is provided in the remainder of the POC site, 
a discussion will need to be had between the UN 
mission and humanitarian actors to determine an 
appropriate balance. This is discussed in greater 
detail in Box 12.
Once an approach has been agreed by senior 
leadership, this needs to be clearly communicated 
to all segments of the mission. UNMISS officials 
recalled during interviews that the lack of under-
standing and awareness of the holding facilities 
had at times created challenges in gaining the 
necessary support from more operational sections 
within the Mission. For example, food for the 
detainees is normally provided by an external 
contractor, but when security prevented the 
contractor from being able to access the POC site, 
UNPOL and Corrections sought support from 
Mission Supply. Supply in turn told them that it is 
not their responsibility to provide meals for the 
holding facilities, which left Corrections to try to 
find a solution on their own. Such situations can 
be avoided if a mission-wide directive is issued to 
all sections explaining the holding facilities and 
need for collective support and engagement.
To assist field missions in navigating these discus-
sions, it could be beneficial for DPKO at headquar-
ters level to develop guidance on how to manage 
security and justice inside POC sites. The level of 
complexity involved in the jurisdictional and 
operational implications of providing security in 
POC sites cannot be underestimated, and mission 
staff may not have the bandwidth to be able to 
extensively deliberate these issues in the midst of a 
crisis. Likewise, there are aspects of these
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discussions (particularly relating to mandates and 
rule of law in inviolable bases) that require further 
deliberation and agreement at an international 
level. As one DPKO official said in a 2014 article 
though, “Between the Security Council’s capacity 
to create legal direction for peacekeepers on 
overarching questions and DPKO’s ability to 
provide policy guidance, establishing practical 
answers to these challenging questions is an 
achievable goal.”117
ESTABLISH CLEAR SOPS ON 
HOW DIFFERENT TYPES OF 
CASES WILL BE MANAGED
A second point that came out clearly during 
interviews was the importance of UN missions 
setting out clear SOPs for how different types of 
threats will be managed in POC sites. Although in 
South Sudan there is a cursory explanation of this 
in the UNMISS document Implementation of the 
Note of Guidance to UNMISS on Security of the 
IDP population in the PoC sites,” this only differen-
tiates between “serious offenses” and individuals 
who are “not a serious threat,” without explaining 
what types of incidents would fall into these two 
categories. The absence of a more detailed SOP has 
resulted in a large degree of ambiguity for UN 
police officers, who subsequently often fall back on 
the standards that would be applicable in their 
home countries when deciding whether to detain 
an individual. While a certain degree of flexibility 
is not a bad thing per se, there is a need for greater 
consistency and predictability for which cases will 
be brought to holding facilities, which cases will be 
sent to the IMDRM, and which cases will be left to 
the community or family to resolve. It may be 
difficult to predict every type of incident that 
could occur in a POC site, but the mission can 
nevertheless articulate approaches to broad 
categories of threats.
117 Ralph Mamiya, “Legal Challenges for UN Peacekeepers Protecting Civilians 
in South Sudan,” American Society of International Law 18, no. 26, 2014.
BOX 12: APPROPRIATE STANDARDS IN HOLDING 
FACILITIES
One of the dilemmas faced by UNMISS 
with regard to the holding facilities in 
South Sudan was the level and type of 
assistance that should be provided to the 
detainees. Given the basic conditions in 
the POC sites in South Sudan, meeting 
international standards of assistance in 
detention could mean providing detainees 
with a higher level of services than were 
available to the remainder of people in the 
POC sites – including the victim of the 
offense. This created an understandable 
level of discomfort for some in the UN 
Mission, who felt this would essentially be 
rewarding perpetrators and punishing 
victims.
While poor standards in POC sites should 
not be an excuse for bad conditions in 
holding facilities, actors will nevertheless 
need to discuss and agree on an appropri-
ate balance. Whereas IDPs living in POC 
sites have the freedom to supplement the 
support available to them, to advocate for 
greater support, or to leave if they are 
unhappy with the conditions in the site, 
these same options are not available to 
people in the holding facilities. Arguably, 
this creates a higher duty of care to detain-
ees than is the case for the general POC 
site population. Nevertheless, finding an 
appropriate balance is a delicate issue and 
needs to be considered carefully.
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Likewise, many interviewees felt it would be useful 
to develop guidelines to assist in decision making 
about whether long-term detainees (or “holdees” 
as they are called in UNMISS) should be trans-
ferred, expelled, released, or continue to be de-
tained. Some cases could be resolved in a more 
timely manner if there were clearer guidance – for 
example, it is unlikely that an individual who has 
reportedly committed a non-violent theft will need 
to be detained over an extended period, and 
having clear guidance could avoid them having to 
be held until the next case review conference. 
Humanitarians further emphasized during 
interviews that while the Case Review Conference 
is a beneficial initiative, it is important to examine 
options for increasing the representation of de-
tainees. Ideally this would be an independent 
party, but it could equally be an UNMISS official 
who is mandated to act as an advocate for the 
detainees or an ombudsman.
One last area that can be useful is to establish a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the 
government. An MOU can be a bridge towards 
eventually transferring cases back to the govern-
ment, and can likewise ensure greater consistency 
and accountability. This was attempted in South 
Sudan, but the government ultimately rejected the 
draft – ostensibly because of provisions requiring 
the exclusion of the death penalty. Other missions 
have had some success in streamlining this pro-
cess by including an annex to the SOFA which 
outlines key points and red lines for transfers (for 
example, the prohibition of torture or capital 
punishment), so that if and when it came time to 
hand someone over, much of the work was already 
done.
UNPOL in Bentiu POC site. February 2016. © IOM / Muse Mohammed
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COMMIT SUFFICIENT RESOURCING
As mentioned above, if missions decide to take on 
a role in justice and security inside POC sites, they 
must commit to doing it effectively. An essential 
precursor to this is providing sufficient resources 
to enable the mission to meet relevant internation-
al standards (namely, the Interim Standard 
Operating Procedures for Detention in United 
Nations Peace Operations, and the Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners). In 
South Sudan, the absence of sufficient funding has 
had an impact not only on the conditions and 
fulfillment of rights for detainees, but also in the 
ability of the Mission to maintain a safe and stable 
environment in the holding facilities. The exceed-
ingly basic conditions made it difficult for 
UNMISS staff to compel good behavior through 
dynamic measures (for example, by granting or 
retracting privileges such as having extra time 
outside the holding cell). Instead, UNMISS staff 
were forced to withhold the limited provisions 
available to the individuals, further deteriorating 
their human rights. A shortage of handcuffs, riot 
gear, and individual holding spaces also makes it 
much more difficult for corrections staff to manage 
a detainee who poses a threat to themselves, other 
detainees, or the UNMISS staff.
Likewise, as mentioned above, not only are the 
security perimeters around the holding facilities 
weak in preventing detainees from escaping, they 
are also incapable of protecting detainees and staff 
from external threats. During the eruption of 
conflict in Juba in July 2016, bullets and mortars 
fell inside the POC sites, but there were no bunkers 
or HESCO barriers in the holding facility areas. If 
holding facilities are constructed in future POC 
sites, the mission should ensure adequate safety 
measures for detainees and staff.
118 Justin Lynch, “UN peacekeepers fled, used tear gas on South Sudan civilians,” Associated Press, October 5, 2014, http://goo.gl/73dFHG.
PRIORITIZE ROBUST TRAINING 
AND COMPLAINTS MECHANISMS
Having SOPs for how cases should be managed is 
not enough if the persons responsible for imple-
menting the strategy do not know what is expected 
of them. Training UNPOL officers and FPUs in 
this regard is an essential step. Particularly impor-
tant is to train and rehearse responses to ongoing 
incidents – an initiative which is currently under-
way in South Sudan. This relates to common types 
of incidents within a site (riots, alcohol-induced 
fights, targeted violence, etc.) as well as incidents 
that could occur immediately outside perimeter 
gates (for example, abductions or sexual violence). 
Rehearsing responses can help to improve the 
quality and timeliness of interventions, and can 
also avoid peacekeepers resorting to controversial 
tactics such as the use of tear gas on women and 
children, as has been observed in South Sudan.118 
Likewise, as discussed in Chapter 4, it is critical 
that staff be trained on how to manage sensitive 
cases with respect for the confidentiality and 
dignity of the survivor.
A second important set of training initiatives 
relates to the Community Watch Groups. 
Experiences in South Sudan have shown that 
increased training has a direct correlation to the 
quality of the response provided by the CWGs. 
Likewise, ensuring that there is close supervision 
and a robust complaints management procedure 
can help to quickly identify any problematic issues 
or individuals and enable a timely intervention.
A third area for training is with the traditional 
justice mechanisms. Rather than pretending these 
courts do not exist, it would be far more produc-
tive for UNMISS and humanitarians to proactively 
engage with and monitor the courts to encourage 
them to adopt more sensitive approaches that 
respect the rights of the victims and the alleged 
perpetrators. Courts are often held in public, even 
when dealing with cases of sexual violence, and 
the resolutions imposed are at times highly detri-
mental to the victims. Working with the courts to 
raise awareness of rights and find alternatives 
could be a crucial intervention.
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Finally, a fourth area for training is with the 
individuals involved in the holding facilities. 
While UNMISS developed an SOP on the 
Management of UNMISS Holding Facilities, these 
SOPs relate primarily to disturbances at the sites. 
Developing and training staff on guidelines for the 
day-to-day management of the sites, including the 
rights of holdees, is critical. Likewise, holdees need 
to have the opportunity to lodge complaints about 
their treatment in the facilities. Establishing a 
complaints mechanism or ombudsman for the 
holding facilities should be a priority for the UN 
Mission and promotes greater accountability and 
transparency.
POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES
Despite the high level of commitment from some 
in UNMISS to strengthening the quality of securi-
ty and justice measures provided by the Mission, 
the situation is far from resolved. In a paper by 
Justice Africa released in 2016, the author notes 
“The dominant narrative used by UNMISS regard-
ing the management of criminality and insecurity 
in the PoC sites depicts a securitised, sanitised 
version of the reality; prisoners in their makeshift 
jails are known as “holdees” in “holding facilities,” 
crimes are called “security incidents,” adjudication 
is called “mitigation,” and so on. While this serves 
the defensible purpose of insulating the Mission 
from recrimination by the Government of South 
Sudan whilst remaining consistent with its man-
date, it obscures the lived experiences of the 
displaced communities.”119
In this context, it is necessary to constantly reflect 
on whether there are alternatives that could 
possibly yield a better outcome. Given the jurisdic-
tional issues inside the POC sites, such alternatives 
are unfortunately very limited. Nevertheless, 
below are a few options that could enable a more 
robust approach to due process.
119 Justice Africa, Justice displaced, 4.
120 Stimson Center, Establishing Safety and Security at Protection of Civilians Site: Lessons from the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, September 2015, 
https://goo.gl/LRVp6x, 11.
CONFER AN EXECUTIVE MANDATE TO 
THE UN MISSION INSIDE POC SITES
A first option would be to give UN missions an 
executive mandate inside their bases. While this 
may initially appear to be an extreme option, 
various forms of executive mandates have existed 
in other UN missions – ranging from full execu-
tive mandates in Kosovo and East Timor, to more 
limited “urgent temporary measures” in the 
Central African Republic. If the greatest hin-
drance to due process is the absence of a legal 
framework and authority inside the sites, applying 
some form of executive mandate could mitigate 
this issue – provided the mission has the support 
of the state to do so.
The biggest weakness to this approach is that not 
only would it require a tremendous resource 
investment, but it would also be highly unlikely 
that the host government would agree to such a 
mandate. The Stimson Center reflected “This 
quasi-executive mandate has proven useful in the 
context of the Central African Republic, where 
state security forces, including police, are extreme-
ly weak. However, core peacekeeping principles 
require that peacekeeping missions operate with 
the strategic consent of the main parties to the 
conflict, and the South Sudanese government is 
highly unlikely to consent to such a mandate, so 
there is little possibility for UNMISS to be granted 
greater law enforcement authority.”120 
Nevertheless, the dynamics of each POC site 
context will need to be assessed individually, and 
in some cases it could be possible for the mission 
to be granted a degree of executive powers. This 
would then carry its own challenges, however, as 
depending on the degree of authority provided by 
the mandate, the UN may have to grapple with 
issues of setting up courts, investigative teams, and 
prisons.
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ESTABLISH A HYBRID COURT TO 
MANAGE CASES INSIDE POC SITES
A second option would be to establish a hybrid 
court. It is likely that such a court would require 
the endorsement of both parties to the conflict and 
major ethnic groups, but the composition of the 
court could be adapted to ensure adequate rep-
resentation. There are at least three potential 
compositions for such a court: first, it could 
include representatives of the government together 
with the UN mission; second, representatives of 
the government, IDP community, and UN mis-
sion; or third, representatives of the government 
and IDP community, without the presence of the 
UN.
There are three main challenges that could emerge 
with such an approach: first, it is likely that the 
government may oppose the creation of a separate 
court that sits outside of the existing judicial 
mechanisms. There may indeed be laws preventing 
parallel courts from existing, as is the case in 
South Sudan. Second, depending on the role of the 
government in the conflict, IDPs in the sites (and 
humanitarian actors) may strongly object to the 
inclusion of government representatives on a court 
panel. And third, even if the representation issues 
could be resolved, the UN mission is likely to 
struggle to gain agreement on which legal system 
will be used, the types of cases that will be heard, 
and the appropriate remedies.
EMPOWER TRADITIONAL 
JUSTICE MECHANISMS
A third option would be to formally recognize and 
empower the traditional justice mechanisms that 
already exist within the camp, and confer upon 
them the authority to deal with serious threats. 
Given that these courts are already trusted by the 
IDP community, it is likely that there would be a 
high degree of acceptance for such an approach. In 
order for this to be a viable option, however, there 
would have to be much closer engagement between 
the traditional courts and the UN mission and 
humanitarians. An agreement would have to be 
reached on appropriate remedies and red lines 
– namely, compliance with international law. In 
the absence of the involvement of a government 
actor (such as would be included in the hybrid 
court example above), the UN would have to take 
greater responsibility for ensuring compliance 
with these agreed standards, and may need to 
dedicate a full time international observer to be 
placed in the court to monitor compliance.
As in the case of a potential hybrid court, however, 
the government may be unlikely to authorize this 
approach as it would essentially constitute a 
parallel judicial system. Experiences from South 
Sudan also show that traditional justice mecha-
nisms within the POC sites are particularly 
difficult to control and can become unwieldy even 
when clear guidelines are in place.
TRANSFERS TO GOVERNMENT WITH 
CLOSE CASE MANAGEMENT
A fourth and final option is for the UN mission to 
transfer cases to the government, but maintain 
very close case management for each individual 
who is transferred. This would require daily visits 
to the government jails and courts to ensure that 
individuals are being treated fairly and are benefit-
ting from due process. It would likewise require 
the UN mission to provide mentorship and capaci-
ty building to state institutions. While this may 
sound like a significant resource investment, it is 
likely to be less intensive than managing holding 
facilities in the sites themselves.
Although this is arguably the most viable option 
from the perspective of UN missions, this option 
also comes with the greatest risks – particularly in 
contexts where the government has perpetrated 
human rights violations, is an active party to a 
conflict, or has a weak judicial or penal system. If 
members of the IDP community do not trust that 
they will be treated fairly if handed over, this could 
create significant tensions in the POC sites be-
tween the IDPs and the UN mission. If transfers 
result in escapes, ill-treatment of prisoners, or 
other negative outcomes, it could also have a 
significant impact on the reputation of the UN and 
thus affect its ability to fulfill other aspects of its 
mandate.
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 9   HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION  
IN POC SITE CONTEXTS
This chapter was authored by Lisa Monaghan
Humanitarians and peacekeepers have comple-
mentary, but distinct approaches to protection. 
Whereas “protection of civilians” in a peacekeep-
ing context focuses heavily on physical security 
and is often connoted with a militarized or secu-
ritized approach, humanitarians emphasize the 
fulfillment of rights and ability to live in safety 
and dignity. POC site contexts require both types 
of protection interventions, but the short-term 
nature of POC sites may contrast with long-term 
protection approaches favored by humanitarians. 
As addressed in Chapter 3, while POC sites may be 
envisaged by UN missions to provide short-term 
respite from immediate violence, for communities, 
displacement can be a longer-term protection 
strategy. This can create tension between actors in 
understanding the functionality and longevity of a 
POC site. This can also lead to the adoption of an 
emphasis around the notion of “return,” “reloca-
tion,” and “durable solutions” to decongest or close 
POC sites that can create new harm dynamics for 
the civilian population.
The following chapter offers considerations on 
humanitarian approaches to protection in POC 
site contexts. It emphasizes the need for independ-
ent humanitarian analysis and a defined humani-
tarian protection strategy, to ensure that the 
humanitarian element of the protection response 
is upheld even within POC sites administered by a 
peacekeeping mission.
FINDING THE FRAME: PROVIDE AN 
APPROPRIATE PROTECTION ANALYSIS
At the outset of any armed conflict or displace-
ment, it is imperative that humanitarian protec-
tion actors and the broader international response 
architecture agree to the fundamental realities of 
the context: namely, the drivers of violence endan-
gering civilians. For an operational protection 
response, having an accurate understanding of 
conflict at the regional, national, and local levels 
significantly increases the capacity of humanitari-
an actors to anticipate what will happen and 
intervene to address threats to civilians. This 
understanding will likewise be crucial in enabling 
actors to effectively triage and prioritize areas for 
responses. Compared to traditional IDP settings, 
however, humanitarians may face greater chal-
lenges in POC site contexts in being able to inde-
pendently define the protection narrative, which 
can have direct operational implications and 
impacts on protection outcomes.
RECOGNIZE THE IMPACT OF OTHER 
ACTORS ON THE PROTECTION 
ANALYSIS AND NARRATIVE
It is important to recognize that within the coun-
try structure, a peacekeeping mission is likely to 
be a dominant political actor and may set the tone 
and framing for the protection narrative. If hu-
manitarian actors do not agree with the analysis 
or tone being struck, this can create a tension 
between these two sides of the international 
response. This is exacerbated where a) the peace-
keeping mission is anticipated to have a role in 
facilitating a peace process should one be required 
or b) where the peacekeeping mission provides 
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security sector and state building support to the 
Government, if the Government and its armed 
forces represent a significant protection threat to 
the population in the POC sites. In such contexts, 
there may be a conflict in the role of the mission 
and a humanitarian response: the role of the 
former is to plan and support the optimal resolu-
tion of conflict and the peace-process, and the role 
of the latter is to plan for the worst-case scenario. 
Rather than complementary approaches, these are 
diametrically opposing worldviews of the operat-
ing environment.
In South Sudan, one former UNMISS staff mem-
ber argued in an interview that “the SRSG [Hilde 
Johnson] was the international face to the response 
to South Sudan, and set the tone, but unfortunate-
ly what she said never matched reality.” This 
statement echoes a 2013 report from the 
Clingendael Institute in which an UNMISS staff 
member is quoted as saying “we are laying the 
groundwork for our own failure” by failing to 
develop a strategy that reflects the potential for 
there to be violence perpetrated by the 
Government. The paper goes on to express con-
cern that the SRSG’s dealings with the 
Government of the Republic of South Sudan were 
perhaps too personalized, and that this may have 
jeopardized her impartiality. Within and outside 
of the Mission, some held the perception that the 
SRSG was not being critical enough with govern-
ment officials.121
If a humanitarian emergency occurs within a 
development or state-building context (as was the 
case in the Central African Republic and South 
Sudan) it can fundamentally affect the lens 
through which the conflict is viewed, and impact 
the willingness and capacity of UN actors to 
respond. In South Sudan, the humanitarian 
community found itself grappling with the exist-
ence of a UN Mission with Chapter VII responsi-
bilities that was established before the onset of the 
2013 crisis. The Mission had an extensive political 
mandate, with leadership and resources firmly 
121 Hemmer, We are laying the groundwork for our own failure.
122 Hemmer, We are laying the groundwork for our own failure, 3.
123 UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), The Centrality of Protection in Humanitarian Action, December 17, 2013, https://goo.gl/EMGQSL.
124 IASC, Policy on Protection in Humanitarian Action, October 14, 2016, https://goo.gl/rJe3Qh.
allocated to the function of capacity building and 
state-building functions such as security sector 
reform, which at times appeared to come at the 
expense of apolitical approaches to civilian protec-
tion and interventions designed to prevent, deter, 
or mitigate harm. The Clingendael Institute has 
described the process engaged in by UNMISS as 
one of “protection through political process.”122
In the immediate outbreak of conflict, the pre-cri-
sis political priorities continued to define the 
post-crisis narrative. This had an impact on two 
fronts: first, the continued proactive support for 
the Government and its security apparatus, even 
after the outset of the war, according to one former 
UNMISS staff member “confirmed the inability of 
UNMISS to play the role as neutral arbitrator 
between the parties to the conflict.” And second, 
this continued UNMISS support for the govern-
ment appeared to result in a de facto acceptance of 
the Government’s position that the POC sites were 
obstacles to a peace process rather than sites of 
refuge for civilians feeling violence. Senior NGO 
representatives have shared hostile meetings where 
Government officials described people living in 
POC sites as traitors and rebels. “POC sites be-
came a political problem to be fixed, demonstrable 
proof of the failure of the peace process. 
Government officials were furious,” said one 
senior humanitarian of meetings with the 
Government in 2014.
Despite the potential political environment of new 
POC site contexts, recognizing that protection 
analysis and response is a collective responsibility 
of the humanitarian community is the first step. 
This is clearly outlined in the Inter Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC) statement on The 
Centrality of Protection in Humanitarian Action123 
and the IASC Policy on Protection in 
Humanitarian Action.124 In South Sudan, this 
collective responsibility was tested during conver-
sations about the closure of POC sites, where it 
became clear that actors did not always share a 
common understanding of the context. There were 
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distinct strands of analysis, which varied from 
interpreting the outset of the war as a temporary 
blip in an otherwise straight trajectory of “South 
Sudan ever-better,” to those that saw it as a precur-
sor to a larger conflict, along further and clearer 
ethnic splits.
With the Mission, leadership almost exclusively 
focused on the POC sites themselves, and perceived 
there to be an urgent need to “decongest” the bases. 
The onus was on humanitarians to prove the 
context was not safe enough for people to leave, 
rather than on UNMISS to demonstrate that there 
were not threats to the IDP population living inside 
the POC sites, and/or to create an environment for 
IDPs to leave. This required extraordinary efforts 
on the part of humanitarians to provide coun-
ter-factual arguments to UNMISS regarding 
context, IDP returns, and the reasons for IDPs 
staying in the sites. The Protection Cluster, REACH 
and IOM Displacement Tracking unit all worked to 
continually monitor these dynamics, which created 
a significant drain on limited humanitarian protec-
tion resources and went against the calls for shared 
responsibility for collective action in the face of 
obvious mass violence.
The challenge in South Sudan for humanitarian 
actors was not simply to articulate the protection 
threats as related to the POC sites or to advocate 
for more appropriate UNMISS responses to the 
dangers around the POC sites, but also to shift the 
focus to the wider context, away from viewing the 
POC sites as the locus of analysis. Humanitarian 
protection actors were expected to respond, scale 
up, and expand to new locations across the coun-
try, while they at the same time bore almost the 
sole responsibility to provide the proof for the 
need for these protection interventions.
RESOURCE HUMANITARIAN 
PROTECTION BASED ADVOCACY
Once humanitarian actors have defined an inde-
pendent protection analysis and narrative, the 
next step is to proactively advocate for actions to 
improve the protection environment. Targets for 
such advocacy may include the parties to the 
conflict themselves, the peacekeeping mission or 
other regional mechanisms, or international 
forums such as the UN Security Council.
Given the breadth and scale of protection threats 
that can precipitate the creation of POC sites, the 
humanitarian protection community will need to 
mobilize across organizational and coordination 
levels to appeal to multiple advocacy targets. 
Linking the context analysis to advocacy efforts 
that target decision makers is critical to resource 
mobilization and, in situations where the UN 
mission’s analysis is perceived to be flawed, will be 
essential in countering the direct access of the 
SRSG and mission leadership to senior decision 
makers. Humanitarian protection actors (particu-
larly those outside the UN system) may struggle to 
gain the same level of access to high-level bodies.
NGOs in particular must recognize the need for 
swift and clear coordination and consolidation of 
resources in regard to advocacy on POC sites. In 
South Sudan, a significant challenge for promoting 
a humanitarian protection narrative in 2013-2014 
was the asymmetry in resources between NGOs, 
UN agencies, and the peacekeeping mission. 
While there were some in-country protection and 
advocacy resources, these were far outpaced by the 
sophisticated system available to the UN – par-
ticularly through its infrastructure in New York. 
This disparity created an often-insurmountable 
discourse. In the future, NGOs should assess 
where to invest advocacy and analysis resources to 
support a consistent, clear, and public narrative, 
and should leverage access to member states in 
New York and capitals. Efforts in South Sudan 
were undermined by long periods of introspection 
on whether to counter the UNMISS narrative, and 
what the role of NGOs should be towards the UN 
– i.e. are NGOs there principally to support the 
UN and not undermine peacekeeping efforts, or 
are they there for accountability over international 
efforts within the country.
Aligning in-country, capital level, and UN head-
quarter level advocacy is an imperative, but one 
donor frequently expressed frustration that NGOs 
were not engaged at the headquarter level. “This 
makes our job so much harder,” they said. “We are 
trying to tell head-office that there is a war, the 
SRSG is saying there is no war, and no NGOs are 
telling our bosses there is a war. Where are we are 
supposed to find all this money?”
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ARTICULATE COMMUNITY BASED 
CONTEXT PERSPECTIVES
A clear added value of the perspective of humani-
tarian protection actors is their ability to gather 
information on community perspectives, articu-
late this, and program around it. Peacekeeping 
missions and development actors, as well as the 
diplomatic community, often (but not always) 
operate towards institutional reform. This creates a 
system bias towards working almost exclusively 
with authorities. One donor in South Sudan 
described this trend as “isomorphic mimicry: civil 
servants will seek out other civil servants.” 
Humanitarians have unique community access 
and understanding developed through daily 
programming at site-level, and can collect infor-
mation that allows the international community to 
understand this at a more individual and commu-
nity level.
UTILIZE THE SPECIAL PROCEDURES 
OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
Humanitarian protection actors, spearheaded by 
the Protection Cluster, should not underestimate 
the value of mobilizing the Special Procedures of 
the Human Rights Council, UN Security Council 
mechanisms, and engagement with DPKO in 
working to achieve a balanced narrative and 
advocating for accountable responses to mass 
violence. Special Procedures125 are a useful re-
course that are available to humanitarian protec-
tion actors, particularly where humanitarian 
actors may not have the expertise or seniority to 
access decision makers and conversations. South 
Sudan benefitted from a number of visits from 
Special Procedures, including the Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally 
Displaced Persons, who visited South Sudan in 
November 2013, the SRSG for Children and 
Armed Conflict in June 2014 and February 2016, 
the SRSG on Sexual Violence in October 2014, and 
the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide 
May 2014 and November 2016. Each of these visits 
presented significant advocacy opportunities for 
protection issues.
125 Special procedures are experts who report and advise on human rights issues. Some of these include the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, the SRSG for 
Children and Armed Conflict, and the SRSG on Sexual Violence in Conflict. 
REASSESS THE ROLE AND RELATIONSHIP 
WITH THE GOVERNMENT
In new POC site contexts, humanitarian actors 
will need to adapt quickly to changes in relation-
ship dynamics with state and non-state actors, and 
put in place clear steps to advocate for the reduc-
tion of protection threats. The need to redefine the 
relationship with state authorities, particularly 
where the state itself is the perpetrator of violence, 
has a severe impact on how the international 
community articulates the context, the solutions, 
and the operational framework to address needs. 
Chapter 6 discusses the challenges in this for 
peacekeeping missions that may have both a state 
building and a protection of civilians mandate 
mandate, but UN agencies may also have similarly 
conflicting mandates in the case of a conflict, to 
provide emergency assistance while also providing 
support to states and state capacity.
In South Sudan, the role of the Government and 
its armed forces, the SPLA, in the conflict signifi-
cantly challenged the humanitarian community 
and UNMISS alike to find suitable ways to assist 
and protect people living within the POC sites.
For humanitarians, a primary struggle came in 
reconfiguring the relationship with government 
ministries. Prior to the outbreak of conflict, the 
humanitarian operation paled in comparison to 
development initiatives that would support gov-
ernment capacity. One former cluster coordinator 
noted during an interview that the inability of UN 
agencies, in particular, to quickly orient them-
selves away from a business model that functioned 
around strengthening social protection mecha-
nisms within the government and legislative 
reform, hindered the ability to find quick, commu-
nity-oriented approaches to the displaced popula-
tions living inside the POC sites. Agencies such as 
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
and the United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA) continued to work closely with the 
Ministry of Gender and Social Affairs far into 2014 
as a primary partner in their response. These 
attempts to engage line ministries were 
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incongruous to the feelings of IDP populations 
towards the Government. Partners who have a 
community-based approach to programming were 
more rapidly able to adapt to the context.
Trying to reconcile the role of the Government in 
the displacement of the population into POC sites 
is a challenge that can be existentially difficult to 
operations, but also must be quickly surmounted. 
In the case of South Sudan, the egregious role of 
the SPLA created a fundamental obstacle to the 
modus operandi of response in the country to that 
point. In other contexts, humanitarians may find 
that rather than the state being the primary 
perpetrator, the state may not be able to provide 
safety and security, resulting in a security vacuum 
for affected populations. The analysis of the role 
(or lack thereof), of the state will be critical to 
determining the likely next steps of the affected 
population and the feasibility of them returning to 
their area of origin or to another onward location.
ESTABLISH A COHERENT STRATEGY 
TO ADDRESS THE NEEDS INSIDE 
AND OUTSIDE THE POC SITES
After having established the framework for clear 
humanitarian analysis, developing a strong hu-
manitarian protection strategy is the next step to 
finding an appropriate operational framework of 
how to address the POC sites and how to anchor 
them within the larger response.
CREATING AN OVERALL 
PROTECTION STRATEGY
The emergence of POC sites, or any significant 
operation that bring peacekeepers and humanitar-
ians closely into each other’s operational sphere, 
requires a strong, independent humanitarian 
strategy. There are two distinct differences within 
the strategies of humanitarian and peacekeeping 
Eight year old girl in her shelter in UN House POC site in Juba. © NRC / Adriane Ohanesian
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actors: a) UN missions operate as a single entity 
with different composite parts (civil affairs, politi-
cal affairs, force, etc.), whereas humanitarian 
operational planning pulls together the approach 
of different entities into a single strategy; b) hu-
manitarian strategies are external and public 
documents to guide a cohesive vision, compared to 
UN mission documents that are primarily for 
internal use and are often confidential.
As discussed in Chapter 6, peacekeeping missions 
and Protection of Civilians Advisors regularly 
update mission-wide Protection of Civilians 
Strategies, which should reflect the presence of 
POC sites within them where such sites exist. In 
South Sudan, these strategies were quickly updat-
ed in the aftermath of the outbreak of war. 
Humanitarians are required to both influence the 
POC strategies to ensure the most proactive and 
appropriate engagement of the peacekeeping 
resources, while also developing a strategy that 
defines the distinct humanitarian operating 
priorities and parameters for protection.
In South Sudan, the Humanitarian Country Team 
(HCT) Protection Strategy126 was designed as the 
counterweight to the UNMISS strategy docu-
ments. The Emergency Directors visit to South 
Sudan in March 2014 recognized “the need for a 
new narrative on the humanitarian response in 
South Sudan. The extent and brutality of the 
violence and the scale and urgency of the humani-
tarian needs are not being adequately communi-
cated internationally,” and the need for the re-
sponse must be more clearly placed within a 
“protection framework.”127 As part of the roll out 
of “Centrality of Protection,” this strategy was 
intended to be a bridge with the UNMISS strategy, 
and was designed to meet the need for a much 
wider protection strategy within the humanitarian 
response.
Unfortunately, the HCT Protection Strategy that 
materialized in South Sudan was arguably too 
conceptual in its approach – it did not lend itself to 
being operationally on par with the UNMISS 
Protection of Civilians strategy, and effectively did 
126 South Sudan Humanitarian Country Team, Protection Strategy, 2015, http://goo.gl/AKjc2i.
127 UN Emergency Director’s Group, Mission to South Sudan, 19-21 March 2014, Summary Report, 2014, http://goo.gl/riUOYY, 2.
not speak the same language. Despite the articu-
lated need for practical guidance, the HCT strate-
gy remained as a principles document, which was 
described by one interviewee as “the compilation 
of pre-existing mandates of UN agencies, not a 
vision for action.” Likewise, the strategy did not 
deal address practical challenges, and was unable 
to deal with the operations within the POC sites, 
including how to manage all the layers of coordi-
nation and bureaucracy in working with a mission. 
Ultimately, the strategy failed to provide a clear 
framing of operational protection priorities and 
approaches.
Protection actors, at the outset of a conflict or 
population movement, will need to quickly grap-
ple with trying to define these interlinked yet 
conceptually different layers. An effective strategy 
should define the overall humanitarian view of the 
protection threats and issues, and offer a broad 
operational framework and a POC site specific 
framework that can address the priorities and 
distinction of humanitarian protection actors 
operating in a POC site. While there is a need to 
develop a strategy to create distinction with the 
mission, humanitarians internally require a clear 
and joint world view on how to approach issues, of 
which the relationship with the mission is only a 
component part. An HCT Protection Strategy 
should promote dialogue between the mandated 
agencies, maximize complementarity, and share 
resources to ensure the highest protection impact 
of humanitarian operations. It is important that a 
humanitarian strategy is a clearly actionable 
document that leans on issues that require the 
greatest concerted effort.
ENSURE A CLEAR DEMARCATION OF 
PROTECTION ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES 
AND DECISION-MAKING SYSTEMS TO 
MAXIMIZE PROTECTION OUTCOMES
Operating within a response dominated by the 
POC site model is likely to bring to the fore key 
questions about how the mandates of protection 
actors are to be implemented, coordinated, and 
where the locus of decision-making lies for the 
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humanitarian community. In any given humani-
tarian situation, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Areas of 
Responsibility Leads (UNICEF, UNMAS, 
UNFPA), and their direct NGO counterparts are 
likely to serve as the key actors through which 
protection response are developed, advocacy is 
coordinated, and priorities are defined. Further, 
the Humanitarian Coordinator has been tasked 
with leadership on Human Rights Up Front128 and 
its implementation under the “One UN” model, 
which in situations like South Sudan involves a 
triple hatted role of being the Deputy SRSG. Yet, 
while there is a range of actors, the functioning of 
the cluster itself is designed in South Sudan as one 
of co-leadership (UN and NGO), with minimal 
staffing to facilitate and coordinate a wider re-
sponse across a partnership structure. When 
positioned side by side, the peacekeeping mission 
is comparatively well resourced.
Converging protection actors in POC sites may 
experience a range of issues, which can include: 
having too many protection actors with similar 
mandates; UN institutional priorities that are 
mismatched to the context; insufficient resources 
to fulfill mandated obligations; gaps in mandated 
responsibilities; challenges in ensuring NGOs are 
active participants in discussions and not just 
“partners” to the UN; and space for independent 
humanitarian decision-making. In a 2016 report, 
the former HC Toby Lanzer noted, “my biggest 
frustration, perhaps, was that there really is such a 
horizontal situation in the following way. You’ve 
got a lot of different institutions, each which is 
arguably as equal as the other, and there is very 
difficult command and control in an environment 
where actually police officers or even civilian 
peacekeeping staff would be expecting command 
and control. For example, we could not tell an 
NGO you have to go do this, and an NGO could 
not tell a police officer, you have to go do this.”129
128 The UN Secretary General’s office explains that “Human Rights up Front is a Secretary-General initiative to strengthen prevention of serious concerns that cut across 
the UN’s three pillars of peace and security, development, and human rights. The initiative seeks to bring the UN System together in a way that is mutually supportive, 
helps prevention, and prioritises human rights.” See more at: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/ban-ki-moon/human-rights-front-initiative.
129 Arensen, If We Leave we are Killed, 24.
130 UN, “Delivering as One,” General Assembly of the United Nations, accessed April 21, 2017, http://www.un.org/en/ga/deliveringasone/.
131 UNMISS, Interview: Hilde F. Johnson – New mission, new approach, July 27, 2011, http://goo.gl/iJvhR8.
RECOGNIZE THE CONFLICT IN SENIOR 
LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATION 
OF PROTECTION ISSUES
At the senior leadership level, representation and 
decision-making by the UN can be challenged as a 
result of the “Delivering as One” (or One-UN) 
system. In 2005, the UN policy was established 
which hoped to create a “‘more effective, efficient, 
coherent, coordinated and better performing 
United Nations country presence with a strength-
ened role of the senior resident official and a 
common management, programming and moni-
toring framework.”130 While the One-UN frame-
work was intended to promote stronger responses, 
it has proved problematic in settings where hu-
manitarians need to be able to speak independent-
ly from the peacekeeping mission, including on 
issues of political significance that might contra-
vene the position of the UN.
In South Sudan, the concerns about One-UN 
related predominantly to policy-level deci-
sion-making. Within the One-UN approach, the 
SRSG sets policy and the UN institutions (includ-
ing the “blue UN,” also known as the humanitari-
an UN or the agencies, funds, and programs) 
follow. In a 2011 interview, then SRSG Hilde 
Johnson said:
UNMISS will be a strong, integrated Mission. This 
means that the United Nations will be working as 
one in South Sudan. UNMISS will focus on the 
security and political mandates, and enabling 
conditions for development, while the UN 
Country Team will be concerned with the 
development and humanitarian side. All three 
pillars will come together in one integrated 
whole…. As the SRSG, I will supervise and oversee 
these pillars, and the Country Team will work in 
tandem with us in an integrated way. I will also 
be the main interlocutor for the UN system in 
relation to institutional mechanisms, donors, 
actors and conferences, for example.131
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This is difficult when UN Cluster Lead Agencies 
are expected to support policies set by the SRSG 
that are at odds with the wider analysis of the 
humanitarian community or the cluster they 
represent.
This became a significant concern in 2014 when 
UNHCR supported an UNMISS policy that went 
against the views of operational actors within the 
protection cluster. UNHCR reportedly took this 
decision based on the instruction of the SRSG in 
2014 for UNHCR and IOM to support efforts to 
relocate people from the POC sites. Given this 
position was not held by the extended Protection 
Cluster, it compromised trust in and integrity of 
the cluster approach. Following this event, actors 
lost confidence in the Cluster Lead Agency as they 
felt they did not act as a good faith actor who could 
be trusted to represent the Protection Cluster in 
the relevant forums with UNMISS. Given the 
Cluster Lead Agency is supposed to represent the 
views and priorities of the Cluster partners, but 
under One-UN is also expected to follow the 
instruction of the SRSG as the senior UN official, 
it is important that protection partners immedi-
ately recognize this tension and its implications, 
and design a clear mechanism to ensure cluster 
priorities are accurately represented in relevant 
forums and are appropriately actioned.
NGOS SHOULD BE GRANTED PRESENCE IN 
COORDINATION AND REPRESENTATION
NGOs can offer invaluable contributions to the 
strategic direction and approach of the humanitar-
ian response, but only if they are granted entry 
into the fora where such issues are discussed. In 
South Sudan, NGOs provided a significant portion 
of the humanitarian protection services and 
response, and yet most of the UNMISS meeting 
platforms were exclusive to UN agencies. 
Exploring strategies for an independent NGO 
voice, while also using the protection cluster, is 
critical to close the gap in dialogue between the 
humanitarian and peacekeeping operational 
protection response.
There remain practical obstacles to the coordina-
tion in POC sites that are linked to the multitude 
of tiers of coordination. This includes the struc-
tures of national coordination, state level 
coordination, site coordination and UN-UNMISS 
coordination all compressed into one location. 
One of the obstacles to developing an operational-
ly focused protection strategy and coordination in 
this compressed environment lies at the heart of 
structural issues within the humanitarian sector 
itself. The platforms between humanitarians and 
UNMISS are, and remain, predominantly UN led, 
and often do not permit NGO participation. As a 
result, the degrees of separation between the UN 
Mission and operational cluster partners can be 
significant.
PROVIDE CLEAR OPERATIONAL 
TASKS AND SPACE FOR 
HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION
Operations within the POC sites raise an issue of 
the difference in worldview between the peace-
keeping mission, UN agencies, and NGOs. While 
not inherently at odds with each other, there can 
be challenges in adjusting to different modalities 
of operations, which is required when working in 
such close proximity. When considering the issue 
of how to respond to the POC sites, the Protection 
Cluster and its partners will need to explore the 
immediate needs and response, including scale up 
capacity and mainstreaming of protection, and the 
provision of integrated and specialized services, 
where required. Resource mobilization for these 
efforts takes place in a competitive financial arena 
where other clusters are also delivering on imme-
diate lifesaving needs.
Inside and outside the POC sites, it is critical to 
support interventions that enable communities to 
expand their decisions and reduce conflict. Clear 
prioritization of activities will be required of the 
Protection Cluster. In South Sudan there was 
considerable variation of activities between POC 
sites based in part on humanitarian access to the 
POC sites outside of Juba and living constraints in 
them (with humanitarians living on site, in ‘hubs’ 
in all POC sites outside of Juba) and the mandate 
of organizations willing to work in each area. 
Striking the balance between “softer” protection 
interventions and hard service provision was often 
a struggle. Focusing on attempting to fill hard gaps 
in a difficult operating context is imperative to 
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make sure that priority is given to programming 
that addresses critical gaps that affect the safety 
and security of IDPs and the functioning of the 
humanitarian operations.
While being able to draw on regular IDP pro-
gramming, the reality is that the operating space 
for programming is much more constricted in 
POC sites, and interventions will have to be 
designed with the POC site specifically in mind, 
altering the shape from more conventional pro-
gramming. Humanitarian actors need to be aware 
of how space limitation militates against imple-
menting appropriate and targeted protection, 
especially to vulnerable populations, and a peace-
keeping mission is an unfamiliar counterpart on 
many on these tasks. Below are some of the protec-
tion interventions humanitarian actors can 
consider that can be useful in a POC site 
environment.
PROTECTIVE PRESENCE
Given the divergent analysis of the efficacy of the 
use of force and the need for militarized interven-
tions, balancing discussions on who is best placed 
to provide protective presence in and around POC 
sites is critical. It should not be assumed that the 
UN Force is the only or even the most appropriate 
option. Humanitarian protection partners will 
need to decide if and how to engage on the issue of 
patrolling, who it feels is best placed to patrol, 
whether to input into patrol planning, and which 
mechanisms to use to do this. In South Sudan this 
was done through Civil-Military coordination 
mechanisms, via OCHA, and through the 
Protection Cluster. But, ensuring that humanitari-
an actors look beyond the ‘force’ components is 
also important of protection actors’ role. This 
includes promoting the engagement of civilian 
sections of a peacekeeping mission, as well as 
critically promoting the encouragement of alterna-
tives where possible.
Based on an analysis of the risk posed to the 
community, and the feasibility of UNMISS action, 
humanitarian protection partners in South Sudan 
provided protective accompaniment services to 
assist women collecting firewood, going to mar-
kets and water points, and to bury their family 
members. This included “patrols” around 
perimeter fencing and inside the POC site. 
Checkpoint monitoring of ad hoc and formal 
checkpoints around the POC sites also continues. 
Ultimately, in South Sudan, many of these activi-
ties have become too dangerous due to the sheer 
level of violence around the perimeter, but the 
unarmed civilian strategy provided much needed 
support and protection to populations at risk of 
violence in the interim, with force as the last rather 
than first resort.
ENABLE COMMUNICATIONS 
WITH THE COMMUNITIES
Establishing robust communication with commu-
nities is crucial to the success of programming in 
POC sites. In South Sudan, the Protection Cluster 
worked with an organization that supported 
community based radio programming and assist-
ed in the dissemination of information. This was 
critical given that UNMISS, CCCM and other 
humanitarians at times inadvertently created 
multiple and overlapping community “leadership” 
structures in an effort to try to understand what 
was going on and find a means of communication. 
As many of the initial displaced populations came 
from urban settings, community structures did 
not always exist in the same way as they would in 
remote or rural settings, and so the replication of 
engagement strategies humanitarians would 
pursue in a “normal” context did not work in the 
POC sites, and had the negative consequence of 
reinforcing local “elites” within the POC. 
Allowing people to more broadly access informa-
tion significantly reduced tensions. Protection 
actors play a critical bridge between communities 
and humanitarians working within the POC sites 
and can alert actors on community tensions and 
potential conflict.
PROTECTION MAINSTREAMING
Protection mainstreaming is a core principle of 
humanitarian responses, and protection actors 
have a crucial role to play in offering practical 
support to other humanitarian actors. Given the 
resource and space constraints of POC sites, close 
collaboration is needed between protection actors 
and other sectors to ensure that the needs of 
vulnerable populations are met inside the sites. In 
South Sudan, for example, one protection 
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organization worked closely with a sanitation 
organization on technical designs for latrines and 
ramps to allow for persons with disabilities to 
access toilet facilities. Protection actors should be 
aware that in the rush to prevent disease outbreak 
and erect shelters, other sectors face enormous 
pressures. A pragmatic and technical approach to 
mainstreaming, including supporting fundraising 
for resources that may be considered “non-critical” 
(such as the provision of latrine lights and alterna-
tive fuel strategies) can be the most effective way of 
improving the immediate protective environment. 
This form of practical assistance is significantly 
more effective to support protection mainstream-
ing that the “training and lecturing” approach that 
can at times be taken by protection actors.
DISTRIBUTION SUPPORT
Distributions, though essential, can be a high-risk 
environment and may also require support from 
protection actors. In the POC sites in South Sudan, 
protection partners supported distributing organi-
zations with the identification of vulnerable 
persons, design of conflict mitigation strategies, 
and support of post distribution monitoring. 
Within the POC sites, issues of crowd control had 
become a severe challenge at distributions. In 
mid-2014, due to crowd control issues, force 
protection was introduced to distributions in Juba. 
This risked enveloping the entire response in the 
POC sites into a hostile relationship between IDPs 
and humanitarian actors. The need to engage 
UNPOL and FPUs to reduce tension around 
distributions has been critical to ensure that the 
use of force inside POC sites has not escalated.
ESTABLISHING COMMUNAL 
SPACES AND SERVICE POINTS
Despite the space limitations in POC sites, it is 
critical that land be set aside for communal areas 
and service points. Given the highly limited area 
available, competition for space can occur even 
between the humanitarian actors themselves, not 
just IDPs. At the outset of large arrivals to POC 
sites in South Sudan, the clamor to provide servic-
es also meant there was limited space to include all 
facilities required to meet SPHERE standards. 
Protection partners should work closely with 
CCCM to identify appropriate allocations to 
establish clinics and other spaces for community 
engagement, in particular GBV related activities 
and other sensitive programming.
PROTECTION MONITORING
Establishing protection-monitoring networks 
within the POC sites and other concentric re-
sponses is critical to informing the context for the 
displaced population. In South Sudan, partners 
working inside the POC sites (particularly in the 
neighborhoods that people had been immediately 
displaced from and “areas of ancestral origin”) 
enabled an analysis of threats and capacities of 
displaced populations. This is strongly linked to 
discussions on feasibility of onward movement.
POC sites can be the sight of overwhelming 
protection threats to populations – a combination 
of internal protection threats as well as the exter-
nal perimeter environment. Populations face risks 
moving to and from the POC sites, and within the 
POC sites. Given the protracted nature of the 
displacement into the POC sites, the population in 
the POC sites face threats common to IDP and 
refugee camps that arise from the congested living 
space.
PROTECTION ISSUES LINKED 
DIRECTLY TO THE POC SITES
Finally, humanitarians should be aware that in 
POC site settings, the increased space limitations 
and constraints imposed by the mission may 
impact the ability of humanitarian actors to 
mitigate risks of harm. Unlike informal settle-
ments and camp-like settings, space cannot 
readily be expanded. In South Sudan, the risks 
associated with internal overcrowding are com-
pounded by the physical, external pressure on 
POC sites, which keep the vast majority of the 
population contained inside. While the 
Government of South Sudan police and security 
forces are unable to enter the POC sites, they have 
consistently imposed checkpoints and other 
armed presence directly outside the POC site, 
creating an extreme pressure around the direct 
perimeter. To compound the compression of the 
POC sites, the sites have faced sustained violence 
in the immediate perimeter. In addition to the 
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notable attacks on Bor and Malakal POC sites, 
daily assaults on the POC sites have included, but 
are not limited to armed actors shooting into the 
sites, abducting people along the perimeter fence, 
harassing women entering and leaving the POC 
sites, and establishing checkpoints and barracks 
directly outside the POC site.
There have been reports of these checkpoints being 
manned by child soldiers – a direct affront to the 
peacekeepers directly inside. Because of these 
threats faced outside the POC site, and as part of 
communities’ maladaptive attempts to self-protect, 
men rarely exit the POC sites, and severe restric-
tions have been placed by both the army and 
UNMISS on the ability of IDPs to move in and out 
of the sites themselves. The ethnic nature of the 
conflict, and desire of the opposing parties to the 
conflict to be punitive to the populations living 
inside the POC sites, places an enormous strain on 
the physical environment of the POC site. While 
movement restrictions can occur in other IDP 
settings, including camps, the likelihood is that in 
a future POC setting, populations will not feel that 
they can easily move in and out of the site itself to 
conduct their livelihoods. With this very limited 
population movement in and out of the POC sites, 
the discussions on durable solutions and longer-
term strategies for the populations living inside 
the POC site are a challenge for the international 
community.
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Finding exit strategies and solutions for IDPs in 
POC sites is no easy feat, however, particularly if 
the conflict is still ongoing. There is a risk that 
eagerness to move people out of the sites can result 
in people being forced to leave prematurely, and 
that instead of being provided with a meaningful 
alternative solution, the IDPs can simply be 
displaced to a secondary location. Nevertheless, 
humanitarians and UN mission staff alike must 
recognize the importance of continuing to assess 
options for supporting solutions for the displaced 
populations in POC sites.
The following chapter examines possible ap-
proaches to durable solutions and exit strategies in 
POC sites, and reflects on the lessons from South 
Sudan.
UNDERSTANDING THE COMPLEXITIES 
OF RETURNS FOR IDPS
While the UN mission may be eager to see IDPs 
leave POC sites, it is important that they recognize 
the complexities involved in doing so for IDPs. 
Even if fighting has come to a halt, there may be 
other extenuating factors that make it difficult for 
IDPs to return or resettle elsewhere. “We underes-
timate the profoundly difficult choices people 
face,” said one senior humanitarian official. Many 
of these complexities can be best illustrated 
through examples from the Malakal POC site.
A first challenge can relate to changes in the 
dynamics or demographics in people’s areas of 
origin or pre-displacement locations. Particularly 
in locations where displacement is protracted, 
people may find that their pre-displacement homes 
have become unrecognizable during the time they 
have been displaced. Prior to the outbreak of 
fighting in December 2013, for example, Malakal 
was one of the most diverse cities in South Sudan. 
Many of the inhabitants of the Malakal POC site 
(predominantly of the Shilluk ethnic group) had 
lived in Malakal town prior to their displacement, 
and it was viewed as an urban, cosmopolitan city. 
Today, Malakal town is almost entirely 
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While POC sites can offer temporary protection when the needs are most acute, UN bases are not 
designed to host displaced communities indefinitely. To provide a safe and dignified quality of life for 
the IDPs, solutions need to be found that either enable IDPs to relocate elsewhere, or which make the 
sites more livable long-term. As discussed in Chapter 3, however, UN missions are likely to see POC 
sites as a “temporary” protective measure, and thus may be eager to see IDPs leave and reluctant to 
consider options such as the conversion of POC sites into long term settlements. Indeed, as POC sites 
become more protracted, it is likely that pressure will increase from the UN mission, authorities, and 
possibly even some humanitarian agencies to close the sites and find alternative solutions for the site 
residents.
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homogenously Dinka (the ethnic group who has 
been pitted against the Shilluk during the war), 
and many Shilluk homes are occupied by Dinka 
soldiers and their families. IDPs in the POC site 
have voiced concern that they can no longer return 
to their homes in Malakal town – even aside from 
the fact that many of their homes have been 
occupied, the ethnic environment has now become 
essentially prohibitive. Many of these individuals 
may prefer to wait in the POC in the hopes that 
the dynamics may change rather than abandoning 
the possibility of ever returning to their homes by 
agreeing to settle elsewhere.
A second set of challenges relates to issues around 
suggesting that IDPs should relocate to their areas 
of ethnic origin. In Malakal, the UN Mission and 
some humanitarian organizations encouraged 
IDPs to leave the POC site and “return” to Wau 
Shilluk, the nearby county that is predominantly 
composed of communities from the Shilluk ethnic 
group. Many humanitarians expressed concerns 
about this suggestion, first, that it was not what the 
IDPs wanted, second, that it would contribute to 
ethnic redistribution of the country, and third, 
that this was a population being told to go to an 
area to which they had no personnel connection. 
This suggestion appeared to demonstrate a funda-
mental lack of contextual understanding and a 
paternalistic interpretation of people’s ethnic 
identities. “It would be like telling a New Yorker 
that they should go back to Norway because that’s 
where their ancestors are from,” said one humani-
tarian official. While international personnel may 
not immediately understand the relationship 
between individuals and their areas of ethnic 
origin, it is important that this be carefully as-
sessed before such suggestions are posed.
Another dynamic that came out of the Malakal 
example, as well as other POC sites, is the issue of 
urbanization. Prior to the outbreak of conflict, 
Malakal was the second largest city in the country, 
and for many IDPs, “returning” to Wau Shilluk 
would mean going to a predominantly rural area 
where they would not be able to exercise the same 
livelihoods as before the war. Equally, some IDPs 
may have become more urbanized as a result of 
their displacement. Many individuals have fled 
from rural areas to the POC sites, which are 
located in large cities. While freedom of 
movement is not perfect, IDPs nevertheless have 
become more accustomed to city life, and may face 
difficulty returning to the rural way of life they 
inhabited before the war. “The urbanization 
dynamic cannot be underestimated,” said one 
humanitarian official.
While these challenges are not insurmountable, it 
is important to keep them in mind during conver-
sations about returns, relocations, and the closure 
of POC sites. Violence may not be the only factor 
that inhibits people from leaving the site, and IDPs 
may prefer to continue living in poor conditions in 
a POC site rather than “accepting defeat” and 
giving up their pre-war home. Any attempt to find 
solutions for IDPs must take into consideration 
these and other site-specific issues that may create 
barriers for the IDP population.
PRINCIPLES AND APPROACHES 
TO DURABLE SOLUTIONS 
AND EXIT STRATEGIES
Before moving into the specific lessons from South 
Sudan, it can be useful to consider two issues: the 
principles underpinning approaches to solutions, 
and the broad types of solutions that can be 
anticipated or supported in POC site settings.
PRINCIPLES
Looking first at the principles: for humanitarian 
actors, the principles that guide solutions interven-
tions are set out in the IASC Framework on 
Durable Solutions for IDPs, and the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement. These two 
documents emphasize the importance of solutions 
being voluntary, informed, safe, and dignified, 
regardless of whether they apply to the “tradition-
al” durable solutions (return, local integration, or 
resettlement/relocation), or other transitional 
solutions (such as relocations between POC sites 
or to temporary external locations). The four 
principles are seen as an essential foundation for 
any solutions effort supported by humanitarian 
actors. On an operational level, the global Camp 
Coordination and Camp Management Cluster has 
developed Camp Closure Guidelines to assist 
field-level camp managers and coordinators to 
99Lessons from South Sudan for Future Operations
“plan, organize, implement and coordinate camp 
closure as an integral part of the camp manage-
ment lifecycle.”132
Given that historically, peacekeeping missions 
have not been involved in facilitating durable 
solutions for displaced individuals, set policies or 
principles in this regard have not yet been defined 
by DPKO. During interviews with UNMISS 
officials in Juba, it appeared that there was general 
agreement that the principles outlined above 
should apply to permanent or durable solutions, 
but there was less consensus about whether the 
principles should apply to transitional solutions. 
“Relocation from one site to another site is differ-
ent from return from a site to a community,” said 
one senior UNMISS official. “The decision on 
where a person is protected should be left to the 
person giving protection.”
Humanitarians and UN mission officials should 
thus be aware that when considering solutions for 
IDPs in POC sites, it is possible that actors may 
have different principles guiding their work that 
can have a significant impact on approaches and 
tactics. DPKO headquarters may want to consider 
articulating a policy that outlines the principles 
UN missions should follow when dealing with 
returns or relocations in POC sites to help provide 
clarity and accountability in future operations.
APPROACHES TO SOLUTIONS
Operational approaches to solutions and exit 
strategies in POC site settings can be grouped into 
four broad categories:
• Durable solutions – often in line with the 
“traditional” solutions mentioned above 
(return, integration, and resettlement/
relocation)
• Transitional solutions, such as transferring 
IDPs to a transit site en route to a final 
settlement
• Relocations of IDPs within/between sites
• Site closures
132 Global CCCM Cluster, Camp Closure Guidelines, 2014, http://www.globalcccmcluster.org/system/files/publications/Camp_Closure_Guidelines.pdf, 3.
133 Global CCCM Cluster, Camp Closure Guidelines, 3.
134 Global CCCM Cluster, Camp Closure Guidelines, 3.
Within these four categories, varying levels of 
support and engagement may be provided by 
humanitarian actors and peacekeepers. The Camp 
Closure Guidelines distinguishes between three 
broad types of movements:
• Spontaneous: Displaced population voluntarily 
returns to their home areas or integrate into 
the local community without assistance or 
persuasion from external agencies.
• Assisted: Logistical and/or financial assistance 
are provided by government and humanitarian 
agencies to allow people to return home or 
resettle in a different region.
• Forced: Camp population is dispersed and 
driven out of the camp by force by one or more 
of the parties involved in the conflict, landown-
ers, or due to other external forces beyond their 
control.”133
In POC site contexts, “forced” movements as 
mentioned above are likely to be driven by the UN 
mission rather than authorities given that in such 
contexts the UN mission functions as the camp 
administration.
In addition, the guidelines highlight the potential 
for an “official closure” of a camp, which entails 
the “official removal of the status that recognises a 
particular area or site as a camp.”134 Although the 
Guidelines note that “official closure” is often the 
final phase of one of the previous solutions men-
tioned above, in South Sudan, removal of official 
status was also discussed as a solution in and of 
itself. This is discussed in more detail below.
PRACTICAL COMPLEXITIES AND 
ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS
In any displacement setting, the preferred solution 
is generally one that is pursued by the IDPs inde-
pendently. It is not uncommon in normal IDP and 
refugee camps to see large spontaneous move-
ments of people returning home or moving to 
settle in a second location. These types of 
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movements generally require little support from 
humanitarian actors, and provided they are truly 
informed and voluntary, they can be an ideal 
outcome. One risk associated with this model, 
however, is that authorities or influential commu-
nity members may be making promises to the 
IDPs that are inaccurate or which are not known 
to humanitarian actors – for example, assurances 
that IDPs will be registered and given rations in 
their pre-displacement location. Understanding 
any commitments made to the IDPs can be essen-
tial in determining if and how humanitarian 
engagement might be needed.
Another solutions option that was discussed 
periodically in South Sudan but never implement-
ed, was for humanitarians or the UN Mission to 
assist IDPs to reach border crossings and seek 
refuge in neighboring countries. This was at times 
believed to be the best protection option available 
to the population, particularly given the level of 
threats to the POC sites. Ultimately this was never 
implemented for a number of reasons: first, taking 
an IDP to or across a border is essentially “creat-
ing” a refugee. This would require extensive 
discussions with the neighboring countries, and 
would also require reflection about whether in 
transferring IDPs even further away from their 
homes, humanitarians could be further extending 
their displacement and preventing durable solu-
tions. A second, practical consideration, were the 
logistics of doing this: in a context of 200,000 IDPs 
in POC sites, how do you move all those people to 
the border? How do you ensure they stay safe 
along the way? A third concern was the potential 
for this to impact upon an individual’s ability to 
qualify for asylum – if, for example, a country of 
asylum argues that the individual did not “flee” 
their country due to fear of persecution so much as 
be delivered from it by the UN for reasons of 
material assistance. Although this would be a very 
literal reading of the Refugee Convention, increas-
ing restrictions on asylum seekers mean that these 
types of extreme scenarios nevertheless must be 
considered.
135 UNMISS, Note to File: Legal ramifications related to designation of UNMISS PoC sites as IDP camps on non-UNMISS premises, August 4, 2014 para. 12.
136 UNMISS, Note to File, para. 12.
Other interventions that have taken place in South 
Sudan were more directly aimed at reducing 
UNMISS’ responsibility over the sites or reclaim-
ing UNMISS land. In 2014, UNMISS discussed the 
possibility of transferring the POC sites into 
humanitarian control, thus making them a “tradi-
tional” IDP camp rather than a POC site. This 
would constitute a form of “official closure” as 
described in the Camp Closure Guidelines, but 
would be seen as a “solution” in itself rather than 
the functioning as the final administrative step 
after solutions have been achieved. Such a change 
would mean that the sites would no longer benefit 
from having inviolable status or UNMISS protec-
tion within the gates, and the government or actor 
controlling the area would be able to enter the sites 
at their discretion. An internal UNMISS memo 
cautioned that “Changing the legal character of 
the UNMISS POC sites to ‘regular IDP sites’ 
effectively means stripping the current population 
of the safety and physical protection they currently 
have against the government authorities or other 
parties from whom they fled in December 2013.”135 
It went on to explain that, “it can be anticipated 
that all ex-combatants will be arrested once the 
Government has unimpeded access to the site.”136
A final option that has been pursued in South 
Sudan is the use of coercive measures, often as 
part of forced relocations or camp closures. It is 
worth noting that the use of force or deterrents is 
not consistent with the principles guiding solu-
tions supported by humanitarians, and humani-
tarians generally have expressed serious concerns 
about these types of approaches. On a number of 
occasions, however, the UN Mission in South 
Sudan forcibly dismantled IDP shelters and 
relocated IDPs from one POC site to another, and 
in one instance, removed residents from a POC 
site and transferred them to a site in town despite 
vocal resistance from many humanitarian actors. 
These types of tactics are strongly discouraged and 
are discussed in greater detail below.
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Despite being one of the three traditional durable 
solutions, to date integration has rarely been 
discussed in the context of South Sudan’s POC 
sites. Arguably the discussion of transferring POC 
sites to humanitarian leadership was the closest 
thing to a conversation about integration, but the 
intention and timeframe of this was inconsistent 
with a genuine solutions intervention. 
Increasingly, humanitarian actors are pushing for 
UNMISS to consider a conversation about a 
longer-term plan that recognizes the potential for 
POC sites to exist for a number of years to come, 
and potentially eventually transition into a normal 
settlement. As one camp management specialist 
said, “Camp closure isn’t just about facilitating 
people to go home, but also can be about transi-
tion of a site for those who wish to remain into 
something more resembling an urban space.”
LESSONS FROM SOUTH SUDAN
When the POC sites first emerged in South Sudan, 
the existing guidelines mandated that IDPs only 
be allowed to stay for 72 hours. It quickly became 
clear that IDPs would need refuge over a more 
extended period, but the UN Mission was never-
theless determined to reclaim their space and find 
alternatives for the IDPs as quickly as possible. The 
result was that from February 2014 onwards, there 
were nearly constant conversations and efforts to 
return and relocate populations, and to close POC 
sites. Box 13 shows a timeline of some of these 
initiatives.
Nevertheless, a focus on returns would permeate 
the humanitarian response throughout the dura-
tion of the crisis, and continues to this day. A 
beneficial outcome of these extensive discussions 
and interventions is that they have provided ample 
lessons for future operations. Below is an overview 
of some of the key lessons to emerge from South 
Sudan, with the hope that these can assist future 
missions and humanitarians as they consider 
solutions or exit strategies for IDPs in POC sites. 
The lessons below relate to all forms of solutions 
and exit strategies (durable, transitional, reloca-
tions between sites, and closures) unless specified 
as otherwise.
CAREFULLY CONSIDER THE TIMING 
OF SOLUTIONS INITIATIVES
Supporting returns and relocations for IDPs in 
POC sites is a delicate exercise that must balance 
the rights of the displaced persons with the needs 
of the UN mission. While the eagerness to reclaim 
UN mission space and reduce risks associated 
with the sites is understandable, it is important 
that this desire for expediency does not compro-
mise the quality of the intervention. Rushing to 
move IDPs or close a site is likely to create tensions 
with humanitarians, and to damage the relation-
ship between IDPs and the mission long-term. 
Likewise, prematurely encouraging or forcing 
IDPs to leave sites while conflict persists can also 
place them in significant danger and may even 
contribute to fueling the conflict. One interviewee 
argued that “fear of failure to provide protection 
[in the POC sites] should not be the governing 
motivation [for pushing people out]…moving 
people to areas where they are equally or more at 
risk isn’t a solution to anything but visibility.”
Less than three days after the fighting stopped in 
Juba in July 2016, senior UNMISS officials were 
already pushing humanitarians to relocate the 
IDPs who had newly entered an UNMISS base. 
One email from a senior UNMISS official repeat-
edly emphasized that this needed to be done 
immediately, saying “We need to immediately 
relocate the IDPs in Tomping to POC3. Numbers 
are swelling and the earlier we relocate them, the 
better… Kindly inform and support [the camp 
management organization] and other partners in 
UN House POC to immediately start planning for 
receiving about 3,000 IDPs immediately.” This 
email and subsequent messages like it created 
considerable frustration among the humanitarian 
community, who not only did not have the capaci-
ty to relocate 3,000 people immediately, but who 
were also concerned that UNMISS did not seem to 
recognize that their own restrictions at UN House 
were preventing humanitarians from being able to 
construct appropriate shelters to accommodate the 
new caseload within a short period. Other basic 
services (including water and sanitation facilities) 
were likewise already overstretched, and 3,000 
additional people could not be added without 
creating significant risks.
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Having an open conversation between humanitar-
ians and the UN missions about constraints each 
actor is facing can help reduce misunderstandings 
and enable actors to find an acceptable way for-
ward. In the case above, it was rumored that one 
troop contingent was threatening to withdraw 
from UNMISS if the IDPs were not removed from 
their office and accommodation area. The Mission 
was likewise reportedly under pressure to identify 
new space for an incoming Regional Protection 
Force. While these pressures make the urgency 
expressed above more understandable, the failure 
to openly communicate these issues led to anger 
and frustration rather than collaborative search 
for solutions.
While the above example relates to relocations 
between sites, the importance of timing with 
regard to returns and relocations outside of sites is 
arguably even more acute. In early 2015, humani-
tarians planned to relocate a large group of IDPs 
from Bor POC site to Akobo and Leer. The move-
ment was ultimately halted by the government, 
which while frustrating at the time, may have 
actually been positive in the long term. Shortly 
after the relocation was suspended, Leer was 
engulfed in a new wave of fighting which saw some 
of the worst human rights violations and ethnic 
cleansing of the entire conflict.137 Likewise, if 
people are forced to move out of POC sites while 
the conflict is still ongoing and while the potential 
to return to pre-displacement livelihoods is still 
minimal, there is a greater risk that these individ-
uals will be forced to turn to negative coping 
mechanisms and survival tactics. As one humani-
tarian pointed out, “If people go out of Bentiu now, 
they are going to have no choice but to put on a 
uniform. Already, the majority of soldiers in that 
area are young boys. Everyone will end up in the 
army.”
137 For more on the Unity Offensive, see Human Rights Watch, They Burned It 
All: Destruction of Villages, Killings, and Sexual Violence in Unity State, South 
Sudan, July 2015, https://goo.gl/evbggY.
ENSURE THAT A FOCUS ON RETURNS 
AND RELOCATIONS DOES NOT DETRACT 
FROM OTHER PROTECTION ISSUES
Discussions of durable solutions should be an 
ongoing process throughout the displacement 
lifecycle. The goal of every humanitarian and UN 
mission official should be to create an environ-
ment in which displaced persons can safely and 
voluntarily achieve a resolution to their displace-
ment – whether it is through returning to their 
pre-displacement homes, relocating elsewhere, or 
integrating into the local community.
While the achievement of durable solutions is the 
ultimate protection goal, focusing on a preferred 
end state (often that IDPs leave the UN base) 
should not detract from addressing other more 
immediate protection concerns. To the contrary, 
addressing major protection risks is a fundamental 
precursor to the attainment of meaningful solu-
tions for IDPs. Linked to the section above, there 
is a need to carefully consider the timing and 
context, and on this basis determine how protec-
tion efforts should be prioritized. Focusing on 
returning or relocating IDPs at the expense of 
addressing other significant protection issues can 
Male students outside of NRC school in UN House 
POC site, Juba. © NRC / Adriane Ohanesian
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cause tensions in the humanitarian community 
and can lead to questions about motives and 
contextual understanding.
While the achievement of durable solutions is the 
ultimate protection goal, focusing on a preferred 
end state should not detract from addressing 
other more immediate protection concerns. To 
the contrary, addressing major protection risks is 
a fundamental precursor to the attainment of 
meaningful solutions for IDPs.
One example of this challenge in South Sudan 
came in December 2016. Following the visits of the 
Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide 
and a delegation of the Human Rights 
Commission, there was extensive discussion about 
the “potential for genocide”138 in South Sudan, and 
recognition that “there is already a steady process 
of ethnic cleansing underway in several areas of 
South Sudan.”139 When the UNHCR Protection 
Cluster Coordinator prepared a first draft of a 2017 
Protection Cluster Strategy, most cluster members 
assumed that the strategy would focus predomi-
nantly, or at least partly, on these overwhelming 
risks. Instead, the draft of the proposed strategy 
focused exclusively on supporting returns and 
relocations of IDPs from the POC sites, and failed 
to acknowledge (or even make any reference to) 
the ongoing discussions about ethnic cleansing or 
the risk of genocide. Members of the Protection 
Cluster and other coordination bodies expressed 
concern that this focus would not only lead to 
humanitarian actors dedicating the majority of 
their efforts to a very narrow area of work, but that 
this could also provide an excuse for the UN 
Mission to avoid addressing the most significant 
threats to communities’ safety and security.
In situations of active conflict, durable solutions 
should always be part of the discussion, but should 
not be the only discussion. In South Sudan, many 
actors described the frustration of seeing this 
conversation move in circles, often at times when 
the security environment was not perceived to be 
even remotely permissible for returns. “It’s taken 
138 Adama Dieng, Statment to the Security Council.
139 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Media Advisory: UN human rights experts says international community has an obligation to 
prevent ethnic cleansing in South Sudan, Juba, November 30, 2016, http://goo.gl/lCj98X.
time and resources that we don’t have,” said one 
humanitarian. “Of course we need to look at 
[solutions] throughout, but focusing on that when 
Upper Nile [State] is ablaze, Unity [State] is ablaze, 
just seems a bit crazy. It’s a poor use of people’s 
time.” It is essential that protection actors carefully 
sequence and prioritize protection risks to ensure 
that efforts are focused on where the needs are 
greatest. Being free from major threats is a funda-
mental first step towards the achievement of 
solutions, and thus needs to be prioritized when 
considering long term exit strategies.
ENSURE A SOUND EVIDENCE BASE FOR 
ASSUMPTIONS RELATING TO SOLUTIONS
In the eagerness to reclaim UN mission space and 
help IDPs achieve solutions, there is a risk that 
assumptions among the UN mission and humani-
tarians can proliferate without necessarily being 
verified. Some of the most common assumptions 
in South Sudan related to the safety of particular 
areas or viability of returns, but assumptions can 
also pertain to issues relating to IDPs’ motives for 
staying inside the sites, as well as security of the 
sites themselves. Both international personnel as 
well as members of the affected community may 
make assumptions, and as such, it is critical that 
these be identified and tested as soon as possible to 
enable informed decision-making on behalf of 
both communities.
The humanitarian sector is slowly becoming more 
rigorous in their approach to data collection, and 
today it is possible to collate concrete evidence and 
empirical data to assist in planning and deci-
sion-making. The use of intentions surveys, focus 
group discussions, and key informant interviews 
can help in understanding dynamics within sites, 
and independent assessments that incorporate 
security risk analysis combined with humanitari-
an protection assessments can assist in establish-
ing a holistic understanding of the context outside 
the sites. It is likewise important to remember that 
the perception of international personnel about 
any given issue may differ substantially from the 
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perception of the affected community, and that 
regardless of the facts, perceptions often have a 
greater impact on outcomes than the objective 
reality on the ground. In situations where reality 
and perception differ substantially in the IDP 
community, humanitarians and the UN mission 
will need to consider how to support IDPs to have 
better access to information. Go-and-see visits and 
telephone connection programs can help in this.
When UN mission officials or humanitarians 
make unsubstantiated assumptions, it is impera-
tive that other members of the community ques-
tion this logic. In one case in South Sudan, a 
narrative emerged that “the POC sites are less 
protective than IDPs’ areas of ethnic origin.” 
While this would be very positive if it were indeed 
true, independent contextual analysis did not 
support this conclusion. Developing a solutions 
strategy based on these kinds of false assumptions 
can lead to a situation in which humanitarians are 
responsible for placing IDPs in greater danger, and 
should be avoided at all costs.
BE AWARE OF CONFLICT DYNAMICS WHEN 
DEVELOPING A SOLUTIONS STRATEGY
Previous chapters have discussed the need for 
conflict sensitivity when designing general inter-
ventions in POC sites. Interventions that relate to 
supporting population movements in the form of 
returns or relocations are arguably even more 
sensitive as they are not only affected by the 
conflict dynamics, but also have the ability to 
contribute to them.
Earlier sections of this chapter discussed challeng-
es for the Shilluk population in the Malakal POC 
site, and how they are often encouraged to “return” 
to Wau Shilluk (their area of ancestral ethnic 
origin) despite many of them having never lived 
outside of Malakal town. In addition to the chal-
lenges this poses from a livelihoods perspective, 
encouraging this movement also has the potential 
to unwittingly play into the political strategies of 
the parties to the conflict. The Dinka authorities at 
local and national level have demonstrated a clear 
interest in creating an ethnically homogenous 
Malakal town, and by assisting in moving all the 
Shilluk to a neighboring county, humanitarians 
and the UN mission could arguably be seen to 
support attempts to ethnically cleanse the area.
The risk of supporting ethnic cleansing is one that 
emerges frequently in areas of conflict where 
attempts to homogenize an area are an aim of a 
party to a conflict, and humanitarians must 
continually monitor these tactics to ensure that 
humanitarian activities do not unknowingly 
contribute to such strategies. If an ethnic group 
chooses to leave an area as their preferred means 
of protecting themselves, then humanitarians can 
of course support this, but humanitarians and the 
UN mission should never independently encour-
age or drive a movement that contributes to ethnic 
redistribution of the country. Humanitarians will 
likewise need to be aware of the risk of contribut-
ing to ethnic redistribution as it relates to moving 
people into areas in order to further reinforce 
ethnic dominance in an area. In South Sudan, 
humanitarians were at times requested to support 
government-facilitated movements of Dinka 
families into Malakal town from other parts of the 
country, many of whom subsequently settled in 
Shilluk homes and made it increasingly difficult 
for the Shilluk to return.
EXERCISE CAUTION WITH 
“TRANSITIONAL SOLUTIONS”
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, 
another risk that can come along with efforts to 
initiate IDP departures from POC sites is to focus 
on “transitional” solutions. These types of solu-
tions may not offer permanent settlement options 
for the displaced person, but in theory should 
assist them to reach an intermediary point in 
which the realization of durable solutions would 
eventually become possible. This could include 
placing people in transit sites closer to their 
preferred areas of settlement, or helping them 
temporarily find refuge in other areas while their 
preferred location remains unstable.
While transitional solutions can be an important 
tool, the aim should be that they help people 
transition to a solution rather than transition from 
a POC site. If the primary focus is to remove IDPs 
from a site, then this can lead to less emphasis on 
the suitability of the proposed transitional solution 
of its appropriateness as an improved option. In 
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some cases in South Sudan, including for those 
IDPs in the Malakal POC site, it was suggested 
that IDPs should be placed in displacement camps 
in counties neighboring their preferred destina-
tions, which some humanitarians felt was essen-
tially proposing secondary displacement as a 
solution. The pros and cons of such efforts need to 
be carefully considered and discussed with the 
IDP population. “We use the term solutions, but 
what we’re really looking at are very short sighted 
options,” said one humanitarian. She continued 
that, “It might be an immediate solution to having 
people in camps that are right in front of us, but is 
this a solution for their life? For the future of 
South Sudan?” Secondary displacement can carry 
its own risks, which may surpass the benefits of 
relocating people.
While transitional solutions can be an important 
tool, the aim should be that they help people 
transition to a solution rather than transition 
from a POC site.
One underestimated step to support transitions 
and solutions is for IDPs to be able to travel to and 
from their intended post-displacement destina-
tions. While there are understandable concerns 
about such movements (particularly a risk that 
these individuals could be seen as providing 
support to an armed group), this can nevertheless 
be essential in helping people rebuild their links 
with those areas long term. Visiting to assess the 
security situation, replant some crops, or check on 
homes can be a first step in helping people to leave. 
Taking actions that force people to choose between 
either staying in the POC or leaving, or which 
make it difficult to do so freely, only further 
prevent solutions from eventually being achieved.
COMMIT TO UPHOLDING ETHICAL TACTICS 
WHEN SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS
When developing strategies to support returns or 
relocations of IDPs, it is important to agree on the 
types of tactics that will be used. For humanitari-
an organizations, there is basic agreement that all 
returns and relocations should be voluntary, 
informed, safe, and dignified. As discussed earlier 
140 UNMISS, Note to PMM on Assisted/Forced Relocation of IDPs from Tomping to POC 3, August 14, 2016.
in this chapter, however, these same principles 
may not be supported by the UN mission. Where 
this is not the case and the UN mission does not 
believe returns and relocations from the POC sites 
must be voluntary, it is important that humanitar-
ians are aware of this information so that they can 
plan accordingly.
In South Sudan, the greatest test of adherence to 
ethical standards and approaches came during 
relocations of IDPs between POC sites. 
Humanitarians felt strongly that even internal 
relocations must still uphold these same ethical 
standards and principles, and that the IDPs should 
be treated with dignity and humanity. UNMISS, 
on the other hand, took the position that when 
IDPs were occupying UNMISS land, they lost the 
right to exercise control over their movements. In 
September 2015 when UNMISS decided to close 
POC 2 site in Juba, they withheld water and 
medical services from the IDPs as a means forcing 
the remaining residents to relocate to other POC 
sites or move to Juba town. In July 2016 during 
another relocation, UNMISS proposed a strategy 
of “assisted/forced relocations” to POC 3, which 
used a series of “incentives and deterrents” such as 
“allowing registration for food assistance and 
communal shelters in POC 3 while progressively 
applying targeted operations in Tomping to reduce 
on the operating space of the IDPs.” Through these 
types of tactics, UNMISS said that “by the time 
UNMISS considers forcing relocation, numbers 
may have significantly reduced hence making it 
easy to relocate the remaining IDPs.”140 Both of 
these incidents alarmed humanitarians as they felt 
it went directly against the principles of using safe 
and dignified solutions.
While recognizing that at times, IDPs may need to 
be relocated from one area of a UN base to anoth-
er, the UN mission and humanitarians should 
commit to exhausting all possible alternatives 
prior to considering the use of “deterrents” or 
other tactics aimed at forcing the relocation. 
Equally, forcing IDPs to leave a POC site while a 
threat of persecution still remains could arguably 
constitute refoulement. Having open and transpar-
ent discussions with all actors (including both 
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humanitarians and the affected communities 
themselves) can avoid negative outcomes that 
create dangers for the IDPs and raise tension 
between actors.
PUT ALL OPTIONS ON THE TABLE 
– INCLUDING INTEGRATION
In order to have a meaningful conversation about 
solutions, it is necessary to put all options on the 
table – including integration. Many individuals in 
the UN mission and humanitarian sector in South 
Sudan have already individually come to the 
conclusion that the POC sites will continue to exist 
for years if not decades, and yet, supporting this 
formally as a solution has never been meaningful-
ly discussed. In reflecting on the POC sites in Juba, 
one humanitarian official said, “The POC [sites] 
will become the slums of Juba. What is sad is that 
there is no dialogue about it. If we start this 
discussion and look long term, we could do much 
better. We could be building two story buildings if 
it’s a question of space.” A recent Special Report of 
the Secretary General came to a similar 
conclusion:
The United Nations presence in South Sudan 
must accept that civilians will continue to seek 
refuge in the protection of civilians sites until 
there is a significant improvement in the situation 
and should therefore turn its energies to 
improving its holistic approach to the 
management of the sites. Utilizing their 
comparative advantages, UNMISS and 
humanitarian actors should …plan for 
medium- to long-term programme engagement 
in the sites.141
Humanitarians and the UN mission need to be 
able to have open conversations about the possibil-
ity that IDPs may want to stay in the sites long-
term – whether it is because insecurity persists, or 
because their pre-displacement homes have 
changed so fundamentally that returning is no 
longer an option. One humanitarian suggested 
that “If I were the SRSG I would try to set out a 
one year, five year, ten year, and 20 year plan. I 
141 UN Security Council, S/2016/951, Special report of the Secretary-General on the review of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, November 10, 
2016, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/951.
would involve all the relevant stakeholders and 
say, if this is our timeline, what we do.” Another 
humanitarian said, “we need to make staying a 
feasible option,” and explained that if there could 
be an open dialogue about this, we could undoubt-
edly find practical ways of managing integration 
that could reduce the strain on the mission.
Exit strategies and solutions require creative 
thinking. Should POC sites emerge in future 
crises, it is important that conversations about 
solutions be inclusive, forward-looking, and not 
rule out any options without first having a thor-
ough conversation about its potential effectiveness.
ENSURE AN INCLUSIVE APPROACH 
TO PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING 
SOLUTIONS INITIATIVES
As mentioned above, one of the best means to 
promote strong solutions mechanisms is to prior-
itize inclusivity during the planning and imple-
mentation stages. Humanitarian and UN mission 
actors have different networks and strengths, and 
by having open discussions between the relevant 
actors, it is possible to share ideas and information 
that will enable more effective support for the 
displaced population.
One of the common weaknesses observed in South 
Sudan was that while solutions initiatives may start 
inclusively, they would at times fail to maintain 
communications as the initiative continued. In 
some instances, this resulted in communications 
breakdowns at the moments when collaboration 
was most essential. One such case occurred during 
the POC 2 relocation mentioned above. UNMISS 
had consulted NGOs during the initial discussions 
about the relocation, but failed to continue to do so 
as the process went forward. Despite NGOs having 
warned that some of the camp residents would 
likely be unwilling to move, the UN Mission 
refused to discuss contingency measures, and 
ultimately forcibly relocated the remaining resi-
dents without informing camp management or 
other NGOs operating in the POC site. This 
incident resulted in a high level of frustration in 
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the NGO community, who felt that many of the 
challenges and negative outcomes could have been 
avoided if NGOs had been consulted in advance.
During future solutions initiatives, it is imperative 
that actors pursuing any type of solutions pro-
gramming ensure that there is robust discussion 
and transparency with all actors that may be 
affected or have insights into local dynamics. 
Importantly, this includes working closely with 
organizations in all locations affected by the 
intervention – those in the areas of displacement, 
the areas of intended relocation, and the areas in 
transit along the way. One of the most common 
causes of discontent during solutions conversa-
tions in 2015 and 2016 was a perception that 
organizations would sometimes work unilaterally 
and exclude or fail to consult other actors whose 
support would be needed at some stage in the 
process. If IDPs are likely to need food, shelter 
assistance, or other support to integrate locally in 
their intended destination, organizations working 
in those areas need to be closely involved in the 
planning. “There needs to be a more ‘start to 
finish’ approach,” said one humanitarian, “the end 
point is not when they have left the POC [sites].”
PRIORITIZE ROBUST COMMUNICATION 
WITH IDPS AND AFFECTED COMMUNITIES
Finally, as with any intervention relating to POC 
sites, robust communication with the IDP com-
munity is essential. Not only do the UN mission 
and humanitarians have a duty of care to ensure 
that IDPs are informed of the situation and op-
tions available to them, but equally, consulting 
with IDPs and affected communities can help in 
the design and implementation of effective solu-
tions support mechanisms. Ideally, all durable 
solutions initiatives should be led by the displaced 
persons themselves, and while internal relocations 
may offer less choice, consulting the IDPs can 
nevertheless enable the planners to develop ap-
proaches that limit harm as a far as possible.
Humanitarians in South Sudan are slowly coming 
to the realization that they need to rethink ap-
proaches to communicating with communities. 
“People in South Sudan trust word of mouth…We 
need to accept that the most innovative channels 
or most effective channels for humanitarians are 
not the ones that South Sudanese trust,” said one 
humanitarian. Communication approaches need 
to be in line with what is most trusted and accessi-
ble to the community, not what is most convenient 
for humanitarians or the UN mission.
An important group to consult during this process 
are the local communities in intended destination 
areas. While the IDPs may indicate that they would 
like to go to a certain location, humanitarians may 
need to reconsider supporting this movement if it 
is likely to lead to tensions and further exacerbate 
existing problems. Issues of land ownership, local 
absorption capacity, and inter-ethnic dynamics all 
need to be carefully assessed.
An uncomfortable component of deciding when to 
support solutions interventions is recognizing 
when it is not possible to assist, even when it is the 
preference of the IDP community. In each case, 
humanitarian actors will need to assess the priori-
ty of supporting the returns and relocations 
against the other needs across the country. 
Although supporting durable solutions is a priori-
ty, it should not come at the expense of other 
lifesaving interventions. In such situations, this 
will need to be discussed openly with the IDP 
community so that they can make informed 
choices about whether to independently seek 
solutions without the support of humanitarian 
actors.
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BOX 13: TIMELINE OF RETURNS, RELOCATIONS, AND SITE 
CLOSURES IN SOUTH SUDAN
April 2013: UNMISS releases Guidelines on 
Civilians Seeking Protection at UNMISS Bases 
which imposes a 72 hour maximum duration for 
any civilian refuge
December 2013: Conflict breaks out. Within one 
week, 30,000 people seek refuge within UNMISS 
bases
February 2014: UNMISS releases Options paper 
for durable and/or transitional solutions for IDPs in 
UNMISS PoC sites during the rainy season which 
presents five options: 1) voluntary return to place 
of last residence, 2) voluntary settlement elsewhere 
in South Sudan, 3) ensuring access to asylum for 
IDPs who want to leave the country, 4) relocation 
to “alternative POC Sites,” and 5) upgrade of 
existing POC sites
April 2014: Paper drafted on Civilians Seeking 
Refuge at UNMISS Bases: Creating Conditions for 
Voluntary Returns
June 2014: UNMISS and humanitarians begin 
voluntary relocation of IDPs at Tomping POC site
August 2014: UNMISS proposes to re-designate 
POC sites as IDP camps on non-UN premises
September 2014: UNMISS forcibly dismantles 
shelters and relocates remaining IDPs at Tomping 
POC site
September 2014: DSRSG/HC/RC recommends the 
establishment of a UN Steering Committee and a 
Technical Working Group on Durable Solutions
October 2014: UN releases Draft UN Governance 
Structure Towards the Achievement of Durable 
Solutions
February 2015: Humanitarians launch plan to 
relocate IDPs from Bor POC site to Akobo and 
Leer. Plan halted at last minute by government
July 2015: UNMISS decides to close POC 2 
(protected site for foreign nationals) in Juba. 
Foreign nationals given option of moving to Juba 
town and applying for refugee status or moving to 
Makpando refugee camp
September 2015: UNMISS begins withholding 
water and medical care from remaining residents 
of POC 2 in effort to incentivize them to leave the 
site. POC 2 residents eventually transferred to 
temporary site in Juba town
October 2015: Meeting held between UNMISS, 
UN Agencies, the Protection Cluster, and REACH 
to discuss intentions and solutions for IDPs. 
Decided to establish standing Solutions Working 
Group (first draft TOR shared December 15, 2015)
November 2015: Relief Organization for South 
Sudan (ROSS, SPLA-In Opposition) releases South 
Sudan Resettlement Strategy
November 2015: Conversations begin about 
relocation of UN House POC 1 Ext. 2
December 2015: UNMISS forcibly relocates IDPs 
from Malakal POC sites 3 and 4
April 2016: Meeting is held in Nairobi on solu-
tions, and draft is prepared of a Framework for 
Supporting Durable Solutions for Displaced Persons 
in South Sudan. Framework is never endorsed by 
HCT
April 2016: ICWG endorses and shares Note on 
IDP Return Movements
June 2016: ICWG endorses and shares Interim 
Operational Guidance on Returns and Relocations
July 2017: New violence drives 4,000 people into 
UNMISS base in Tomping. UNMISS demands 
they be immediately relocated to UN House. 
Relocation commences July 28
August 2016: Note to PMM on Assisted/Forced 
Relocation of IDPs from Tomping to POC 3 which 
discusses an “incentive and deterrent” model
December 2016: UNHCR Protection Cluster 
Coordinator unilaterally drafts 2017 Protection 
Strategy focused on returns. Cluster members 
express concern and strategy is subsequently 
broadened to include other protection issues
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